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PREFACE 
The study focuses  on the transition of Hungary to a  market economy, with  a  review of the 
launching of the 1991-1994  "Programme of conversion and development for  the Hungarian 
economy".  The bulk of the work was finalized  at the end of 1991, but some parts have since 
been updated. 
The Hungarian transition entails specific features:  unlike the other countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Hungary benefits from a tradition of  gradual reform of  the economy, which dates 
back to the end of the 1960s, but it is also committed to honour a large external debt through the 
whole programme period.  Overall, Hungary expected a rather smooth transition to a market 
economy, with moderate growth. It  was envisaged that by the end of the period of the programme 
the main aggregates would approach sustainable levels, with both the budget and current account 
in balance and single-digit inflation. 
A  year  and  a  half into  the  programme,  the  picture  looks  somewhat  different  from  these 
projections, and recent results confirm the trends indicated in the study.  The Hungarian economy 
is suffering from a severe recession and no sign of recovery is foreseen before early 1993.  The 
collapse of CMEA trade is  the main factor  in  this  recession.  The loss  of Soviet  and East 
European export markets was  responsible for at least half of the 10.2% decline in real GDP 
recorded in 1991. 
These unfavourable developments did not hamper progress in structural reform, where the major 
commitments have been met.  Thanks to the dynamism of the emergent private sector and the 
ability of the country to shift trade from the East to the West, the external performance even 
improved over the period, with a current account surplus at the end of 1991 of US$267 million 
instead of a  planned deficit of US$1.2 billion.  Hungary has  also benefited from substantial 
spontaneous capital inflows of foreign  investment, so that no foreign exchange problems are 
expected.  The worrying developments concern unemployment, which reached 9.3% of the active 
population in April1992, and the budget deficit, which was 1% of GDP higher than expected in 
1991  and which in April 1992 had nearly reached its target for the whole year. 
The challenge which Hungary is now facing is how to consolidate the achievements and continue 
with market reform in such an unfavourable economic climate.  There is a risk that the current 
recession will  undermine the stabilization and liberalization efforts of the last eighteen months. 
To avoid this,  the economic policy programme will have to be revised.  The shape that such a 
revision should take is  beyond the scope of this study, but our main conclusions following the 
completion of the study can be summarized as follows: 
- One of the effects of the collapse of CMEA trade, which has particularly hit the big companies 
that were more dependent on CMEA imports,  is  to accelerate the restructuring of the state 
sector.  The Hungarian economy is better equipped to undertake this in 1992 than in 1991: the 
privatization methods have been diversified and decentralised in light of the experience of 1991; 
the bankruptcy legislation has entered into force;  the new banking act has provided a mechanism 
to clear the bad debts from the past.  However, full use of these new instruments will probably 
result in the closing down of a significant number of companies.  Unemployment will rise.  Other 
effects might be to generate a chain of bankruptcies or to weaken the emerging banking sector. -VI-
The private sector, though expanding and particularly dynamic in Hungary, has not yet reached 
the critical size to offset such contractionary trends.  Consequently some measure of support to 
large  companies  is  being  restored.  The Hungarian  Government  has  to find  a  manageable 
compromise between enhancing competition and providing expansionary stimulus. 
- How sustainable is the good external performance? This performance derives chiefly from the 
dynamism of the private sector in Western markets and from expanding tourism in Hungary.  It 
is likely that there are still margins for improvement on both counts.  But it would be unrealistic 
to assume that the current export growth rates could be maintained in the medium term.  In 1992, 
the external surplus is growing, but this is more the result of a contraction of imports because of 
the recession than an expansion of  exports.  The dynamics of imports and its relationship with. the 
restructuring is  less known,  and the effect of a recovery on the external balance is more than 
uncertain. 
- The other key challenge for the coming years is the streamlining of public finance.  The fiScal 
results have been continuously drifting away from the targets over the last eighteen months.  This 
is  only partly due to  fiScal  revenues contracting with the recession.  So far,  the situation has 
remained manageable,  because the increased public  deficit could be fmanced  from  domestic 
saving.  However, there are two reasons to be worried about future stabilization of  public fmance. 
With  the  rise  in  unemployment  and/or  the  increased  support  to  state  enterprises,  public 
expenditures, which have so far remained within the programme ceilings might also run out of 
control.  The tax  return  is  also  not known  yet,  and  because of technical  and  institutional 
deficiencies, fiscal revenues might not increase as much as expected, even if the economy begins 
to recover. (2) 
-1-
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hungary has a long-standing tradition of gradual but steady progress in reform. As early as  1968 
it began efforts to adapt central planning in a more market-oriented direction. Thanks largely to 
this early start, the Hungarian economy is in many ways better placed than other Central and East 
European countries embarking on the process of  transition to a market economy. It has been able 
to contain both inflation and the decline in output better; it has done more to introduce new 
legislation appropriate to a market economy; it has made an early start in privatization and in the 
development of capital markets; it has attracted foreign capital more successfully than any other 
country in the area; it has maintained current debt service payments. 
Economic performance in  the past decade has been mixed.  Negative  features  have  been a 
substantial decline in the rate of growth, increasing albeit moderate inflation, poor productivity 
of resources and declining investment. The deterioration in the standard of living has not been 
particularly severe, but only because of the rapid increase of external borrowing in the first half 
of the decade. 
In tackling the transition to a market economy the Hungarian authorities clearly take the view 
that a gradual approach has proved effective until now, and they intend to maintain this stance. 
It  is important to recognize, however, that the context and objective of this gradual approach have 
altered fundamentally since 1989. During the two preceding decades the possibility of a change 
of  economic regime was not contemplated, and ideology prevented multi-party democracy. Hence 
there was  no alternative to a gradualist approach, and in so far as  it was  possible to achieve 
improvements within the existing economic and political system,  progress was made. In 1989, 
however,  the last  forms  of central  allocation were abolished  and  Hungary set its  sights  on 
thoroughgoing reform that will lead to a market economy fully integrated into the world economy 
and,  in particular, equal to Hungary's goal of joining the European Community. This radical 
change places gradualism in a different light. No longer can it be judged by its ability to modify 
some aspects of the central planning system of the past. Now the criterion is  forward-looking: 
whether gradualism can bring about the enduring reform necessary to transform Hungary into a 
market economy and to prepare it for membership of the European Community. 
i)  The goal of the government's reform programme is clearly to create a market economy. 
The time horizon is four years (1991-94), but the view is widely held, both within Hungary 
and outside,  that the kind of gradualism that in the past permitted modification and 
reduced the cost of transition will  not yield  the same  advantages  in  the context of 
fundamental change. The government programme maps out an appropriate course, but 
a successful transformation also requires that change proceed at an adequate pace. The 
Hungarian government should consider  accelerating  the implementation of the pro-
gramme, especially during the early stages, in order to maintain sufficient momentum. 
ii)  Inflation in 1991, at 28%, was below expectations and, with Czechoslovakia, represented 
the best performance in Eastern and Central Europe. Nonetheless, the inflation rate 
projected by  the government for  1992  remains  well  above  those of Hungary's  main 
western partners. Inflation differentials will  continue to exert strong pressure on the 
exchange rate, whose continuous appreciation in real terms risks activating an inflationary 
spiral  through  the very  expectation of exchange  rate  adjustments.  Other sources  of 
inflationary pressure appear to be on the side of costs and particularly wages; especially 
in a country without a fully fledged monetary and financial system, the importance of  wage 
policy cannot be emphasized enough. -2-
iii)  There is  a worrying financial fragility in a system which has inherited a significant amount 
of bad  loans  from  a  (pre-1987) situation where neither banks nor enterprises could be 
considered fully  responsible for  their operations. Clearly the state must be the ultimate 
guarantor, but the sooner these residual features of  the old system are eliminated the better, 
and the stronger will be the financial underpinnings of the new system. 
iv)  Aggregate unemployment has so far remained quite low, mainly because of labour hoarding 
in the state sector, but sizeable increases are to be expected. How far unemployment can be 
contained will depend in large measure on whether the trilateral wage negotiation mechan-
ism can be strengthened to bring wage growth into line with productivity growth at a low 
level of inflation. Equally important will be the degree of flexibility that can be introduced 
into the labour market. Regional divergences in unemployment which have recently begun 
to emerge indicate that labour is not sufficiently mobile, and it is clear that wage differenti-
ation according  to qualification  is  inadequate. Furthermore, the unemployment benefits 
offered by the new Solidarity Fund may be disincentives for job search. Direct transfers to 
the poorest and an expansion of active labour market policies may be more efficient. 
v)  The burden of the external  debt  inherited  from  the 1970s  and  1980s  is  heavy  by  any 
standard.  Hungary has  long maintained a firm  commitment to servicing  its  foreign  debt 
obligations and to preserving good relations with western commercial banks, which account 
for  the great majority of its creditors. The government aims  to halt the accumulation of 
external debt by 1993 and has set as a medium-term objective the reduction of the ratio of 
debt service to export earnings  to 28%,  mainly  by  further improving the trade balance, 
restructuring the foreign debt (term and currency) and stabilizing its level. These objectives 
presuppose, however, a good macroeconomic performance, sustained over several years. 
vi)  Hungary and the Community both have an interest in ensuring that trade between them is 
as free as possible as reflected in the Association Agreement signed in December 1991. For 
Hungary, improved access to a large market close by offers opportunities to expand trade 
and  to  attract foreign  investment,  as  well  as  strengthening competition in  the domestic 
market and reinforcing the case for liberalizing the economy as a whole. The Community will 
also gain from increased trade and investment and will benefit from having a prosperous and 
stable neighbour. 
The reunification of the European economy is a common end towards which Hungary and the 
Community can take mutually reinforcing action. By advancing economic reform Hungary can 
prepare for full participation in the European economy. The Community, in turn, can provide an 
anchor  for  Hungary's  economic  reform  by  offering  a  clear  prospect of integration  into  the 
Community as that reform is accomplished. -3-
II.  HISTORY OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
The first challenge to the Soviet-type economic and political system adopted by Hungary in the 
late 1940s took place in 1956; it was crushed by the military intervention of Soviet troops. Three 
stages of institutional changes  followed.  Until  1968  the object of reform was  the piecemeal 
improvement of traditional central planning. In 1968 the so-called New Economic Mechanism 
(NEM) began to be introduced; it was  a more ambitious attempt at a comprehensive reform 
ultimately leading to an alternative model of  socialism, decentralized and market-oriented, which 
progressed at an uneven pace until the late 1980s.  The latest round of institutional changes, 
beginning with the partial divestiture of state property to enterprises (1984-85), paved the way 
for the uncompromising return to a mixed,  capitalist market economy, internationally open to 
trade and investment and backed by a parliamentary democracy. The early start and protracted 
reform efforts (though, until recently, abortive) instead of causing 'reform fatigue' have allowed 
Hungary to avoid drastic stabilization programmes and to follow a fairly gradualist approach rather 
than shock therapy, diluting structurat" changes over time.  The economic transition is  not yet 
complete but continuous progress is being made with a view to completing it by the end of 1994. 
1.  The creation of a decentralized planned economy 
In 1945-47 Hungary implemented the basic changes leading to the adoption of a Soviet-type 
system; the entire post-war reconstruction effort was based on central planning and management. 
Financial  institutions  and  industrial  enterprises  were  nationalized;  agriculture,  previously 
characterized by large and low-productivity estates, was  partly nationalized, mostly through the 
creation of  state farms or small farms to which land was distributed, often with positive effects on 
agricultural performance. 
After the 1956 events a first attempt to improve the traditional model was introduced in the late 
1950s, when mandatory delivery of agricultural products to the state was ended and the number 
of normative indices in planning reduced. 
A  more  comprehensive  reform  effort  was  attempted  in  1968.  The  reform  maintained  the 
principles of communist party monopoly of power and state ownership. However, the breaking 
down of  plans to enterprise level was eliminated and centrally determined targets abolished. Value 
indicators (including profits) of  enterprise performance were used, and managerial incentives and 
penalties were geared to these measurements of enterprise performance. A parallel price reform 
introduced contractual prices for  a range of products,  although some prices  continued to be 
administered and heavily subsidized. 
The reform fell  short of a market economy.  Its incompleteness created problems of its  own: 
inflationary pressures arising from persistent monopolies; localized shortages resulting from the 
combination of  enterprise freedom in choosing the product mix and of  inflexible prices aggravated 
by entry restrictions; social tensions generated by growing income differentials between peasants 
and workers, and between state-owned enterprises and the rest of the economy; the inadequacy 
of institutions for the recycling of profits across sectors. In the early 1970s some recentralization 
occurred  in  response to these problems  and  the reform  process was  effectively  halted for  a 
decade. 
One of the beneficial consequences of the 1968 reform effort was  a substantial reduction of 
shortages on the domestic market. Partial shortages continued until the end of the 1980s, but to 
a decreasing extent. -4-
In 1981  branch ministries, which had remained the main vehicle of state control and planning, 
were  merged  into  a  single  Ministry  of Industry,  whose  powers  were  also  reduced;  external 
imbalance and inter-enterprise conflicts, however, led to the continuation of central regulation 
of economic activity. 
In 1984 state enterprises were emancipated from ministerial and (partly) from party control; most 
enterprises were given  a 'self-governing• statute, centered on enterprise councils with powers 
to appoint and dismiss  directors and to approve enterprise plans. However, although this step 
reduced  formal  state  control  and  virtually  transferred  some  elements  of state  property  to 
enterprises, it neither abolished central control nor subjected enterprises to full market discipline; 
ex-post ad-hoc budgetary transfers continued to equalize profitability across enterprises regardless 
of actual performance. Finally, during the period 1968-90 the strong linkage of the Hungarian 
economy to the economies of the other CMEA1 countries remained, as well as  the inter-state 
coordination of these relations, with all its negative consequences. 
These failures and the parallel reform drive in other Central and East European countries led to 
a  decisive  change  in  the  target  model  of Hungarian  reform,  with  private  property  and  the 
privatization of state assets being given a dominant role. The two decades of reform efforts had 
succeeded in reducing at least some of the drawbacks of the traditional model: the Hungarian 
economy  was  plagued  to  a  smaller  extent  than  other  planned  economies  by  disequilibria, 
distortions in the structure of relative prices, lack of  innovation, bad management. Some essential 
components of market mechanisms had been introduced, along with greater exposure to market 
mentality and behaviour. Finally, comprehensive legislative changes were put in place, modifying 
norms concerning key sectors of the economy, very often many years earlier than in other planned 
economies. 
2.  Creation of an advanced legislative framework 
The new banking legislation (1987) dismantled the classic monobank system and took away from 
the National Bank of Hungary commercial banking functions, granting them to new commercial 
banks, including private and foreign-owned institutions. The new act on the Central Bank, which 
was passed by Parliament in 1991, will supplement and complete those rules; the National Bank 
of Hungary, will be left to concentrate on central banking functions and will gain greater auton-
omy.  A State Banking Supervision authority was  also established in  1987  though it started to 
function only in 1989 (see section on banking reform). 
The Companies Act (1988)  gave business entities and persons, regardless of nationalities, the 
same rights as the state to establish or participate in business activities. This allowed the creation 
of small  and  medium-sized enterprises in  almost all  sectors of the economy and favoured  the 
creation of private ventures. 
Simplified  procedures for  external trade were introduced already in  1986, whereby companies 
were authorized to export and import, subject to limited administrative controls (the so-called 
'negative  list').  In  1988,  an  ambitious  import  liberalization  programme,  combined  with  a 
programme of liberalization of prices, was launched to open the domestic market to competition. 
Import  licensing  obligations  have  been  progressively  removed:  at  the  end  of 1991,  80%  of 
industrial production was exempted from  licensing obligations, compared to 14% in  1989. Over 
90% of Hungarian imports require no licence. The tariff rates will be further lowered. Simulta-
Council for  Mutual Economic Assistance, frequently referred to in the West as Comecon; see Box on page 26. -5-
neously the proportion of  consumer goods whose prices are free was increased from 50% in 1988 
to over 90% in 1991. 
Hungary was also the first planned economy to introduce legislation favouring foreign investment. 
Legislation on joint ventures  had  been first  enacted in  1972,  and  then constantly  modified. 
Foreign partners were allowed to hold a majority stake already in 1977, although certain sectors 
were excluded. The Foreign Investment Act (1988, with subsequent amendments) provides for 
the  protection  of foreign  investments,  repatriation  of profits  and  compensation  in  case  of 
expropriation. Together with substantial tax allowances, the law is regarded as one of the most 
liberal, not only in former centrally planned economies but worldwide. Some important modifica-
tions introduced in January 1991  limit the conditions and extent of tax allowances and abolish 
licensing requirements for joint ventures with majority foreign participation. 
Reforms of  the taxation system in 1988 and 1989 (see section on taxation) brought the system into 
line with that of  many West European countries. As part of a comprehensive tax reform, Hungary 
has introduced VAT and personal income tax,  and adjusted the profit tax system  to make it 
consistent. 
The Transformation Act (1989),  which was  designed  tQ  facilitate  the introduction of private 
capital into state-owned enterprises, enables state-owned enterprises to be transformed into joint-
stock or limited liability companies. Finally, with the creation of the State Property Agency (1990) 
and the adoption of the Management and Utilization of State Assets Act (1990) conditions have 
been created for the privatization of a large part of state property (see section on privatization). 
A stock exchange was re-established in mid-1990. 
3.  The 'Programme of conversion and development for the Hungarian econ-
omy' 
The new economic programme, approved by  Parliament in March 1991, set out in detail  the 
objectives and measures for the transformation towards a 'social' market economy by the end 
of 1994 (here 'social' refers to a combination of competition and a social safety net). Acknowl-
edging that by 1991 only a first set of legislative measures had been put in place, the programme 
emphasized accelerated  privatization and reorganization of ownership,  legal  and institutional 
changes to promote market conditions and competition, and a general reduction in the economic 
role of the state. 
The programme also included a short-term stabilization strategy, with containment of  inflation and 
unemployment as prime targets. Debt relief or rescheduling were ruled out by the programme, 
which called for a continuing effort to maintain international solvency and access to international 
financial markets. Long-term growth was to be secured by a strategy of export-led growth. 
Increased importance was given to market instruments, especially monetary policy and moderniz-
ation of the financial system. Reform of pensions, health care and housing was also envisaged. 
The programme reflected the important changes  that had  taken place in  external economic 
relations (collapse of CMEA trade), the need for a new impetus after the lack of progress of a 
first programme drafted in September 1990 and the delays in a number of  key areas (privatization, 
ownership structure, agriculture). -6-
On the whole the programme was clear-cut, action-oriented, workable and feasible in the time 
allowed. It indicated a precise time schedule for specific legislation and actions. The quantitative 
alternative scenarios covering the main economic indicators over the coming years were very 
useful to understanding the underlying hypotheses. 
The realism of  some of the macroeconomic targets and assumptions was debatable, however. This 
concerned in particular the feasibility of the strong export expansion projected from 1992, which 
was to underpin overall macroeconomic expansion, and on the sustainability of a protracted fall 
in private consumption, which was expected to return to the late 1980s level only by 1993. 
The programme realistically recognized that the new legal and institutional framework of a social 
market economy was  not going to be fully  operational in  1992-93,  but many of the measures 
envisaged appeared to stretch out excessively the process of adjustment. 
4.  The pace of change 
Until now Hungary's more gradualist approach seems to have enabled it to contain the costs of 
transition, in  terms of output, living standards, employment, with respect to those incurred by 
other  transitional  countries  which  have  chosen  'shock  therapy'.  This  option  was  open  to 
Chronology of reform 
Most relevant economic reform legislation 
Banlauptcy Law 
Banking Reform  1987 
Companies Act 
Reform of  the taxation system and VAT 
Personal income tax,  Profit tax 
Foreign Investment Act 
Transformation Act 
Securities Act 
Competition Law 
Law on Protection of  State Assets 
Act on State Audit Office 
Law on Privatization of  Domestic Trade 
Stock Exchange Law 
Central Bank Law 
Banking Law 
Law on Accounting 
Compensation Act 
Membership of  international organizations 
GATT 
International Monetary Fund 
World Bank 
International Finance Corporation 
MIGA 
EBRD 
1986 & 1991 
1988 
1988 
1989 & 1990 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1991 
1973 
1982 
1982 
1985 
1988 
1991 -7-
Hungary because it had the advantage of  earlier significant progress towards stabilization, reform, 
restructuring and opening to trade and investment. But the question arises whether Hungary has 
sufficiently adapted gradualism to its new circumstances. In the past, step-by-step changes were 
directed to modifying the existing system; now the aim is transformation into a market economy, 
an objective which requires that a greater impetus be given to change. In particular the collapse 
of CMEA trade is affecting Hungary just as much as the countries that have taken more radical 
and faster steps, and is shortening the time horizon over which action must be taken. 
To consolidate the gains of past stabilization measures it may be necessary to speed up adjust-
ment. Although inflation is still lower in Hungary than elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, 
it is  now eroding previous adjustments, such as  in the exchange and interest rates, so that the 
move to market-determined rates is being delayed and the risk exists that past distortions will be 
reintroduced. Although, in the short term, further devaluation might fuel inflation and higher 
interest rates might cause a deeper recession, they could, if coupled with slightly lower domestic 
absorption and appropriate structural reform measures, enhance exports, domestic savings  or 
foreign  investment  - areas  where  the Hungarian  economy  has  already  proved  to  be highly 
responsive. 
In structural reform, Hungary is reaching a stage where the main steps towards liberalization and 
the removal of distortions have been taken, and the principal challenge is to activate the supply 
side through privatization and the development of the financial sector. In these respects Hungary 
has made only partial progress. The country benefits from the dynamism of  its small private sector. 
Little progress, however, has been recorded in streamlining the operations of the large surviving 
state sector: like other Central and East European countries, Hungary is  behind schedule in 
dismantling monopolies, implementing bankruptcy proceedings, tackling bad debts of enterprises 
and privatizing large state enterprises. The emergence of a competitive supply side will  in any 
event be a slow adjustment process, which should not be lengthened by delays at the decision-
making stage. -8-
III.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
1.  Short-term adjustment and long-term performance 
The Hungarian economy has embarked on a major effort of stabilization and restructuring. The 
ultimate goal is to transform Hungary into a competitive market economy. Since 1989, however, 
economic stabilization and the reform effort have contributed to a dramatic decline in economic 
activity. 
The coalition government formed after the election of Spring 1990 elaborated two programmes 
of economic  reform.  The  first,  called  the  'Economic  programme  of national  renewal'  was 
presented by the government in September 1990. A second, the 'Programme of conversion and 
development for the Hungarian economy• was approved by the Parliament at the end of March 
1991. In addition, a memorandum on 'Economic transformation and medium-term policies' was 
negotiated with the IMF in January 1991, which gave Hungary access to the Compensatory and 
Contingency Financing Facility and to a new extended financing facility. 
The main lines of the country's medium-term (1991-93) development strategy can be summarized 
as follows: 
•  to achieve external and internal balance consistent with the establishment of convertibility 
for current transactions of the forint; 
•  to reduce inflation to a single digit, through a reduction of the budget deficit and the main-
tenance of a tight monetary policy. 
•  to reduce the role of the state in economic activity,  through the development of private 
entrepreneurship and privatization. 
•  to develop the financial system, the first step being the approval of a new Central Bank Law. 
A radical transformation of public finance will also aim at reducing direct intervention of the state 
in the economy. A further reduction of subsidies (to no more than 4% of GDP in 1993), direct 
investment and the overall size of the public administration is envisaged. State intervention will 
be directed at improving infrastructure and restructuring and strengthening social welfare. 
The aim of the present chapter is to evaluate these principal targets in the light of the past and 
the expected performance of the Hungarian economy. 
a.  Long-term trend 
Over the past three decades the Hungarian economy has achieved a relatively high rate of growth. 
Graph 1 shows positive growth rates in  real terms for the period 1969-88, with a sharp decline 
thereafter. However, the data indicate quite clearly that the deceleration of  growth dates back to 
the late 1970s. Growth rates declined from an average of 5.6% per annum in 1969-80, to 2% in 
1980-88, to become negative from 1989. 
Various factors explain this declining trend. In the 1970s both exogenous shocks and economic 
policy mistakes contributed to slowing down the rate of growth and, even more importantly, laid 
down the conditions for the subsequent decline. Two factors were particularly significant. First, 
the reform attempted in the late 1960s failed in terms both of conception and of implementation 
of policies. It maintained central control over the economy (although reducing to a minimum the 
central compulsory planning indices) and left the ownership structure of  the economy substantially (3) 
unaltered. The world recession and changes 
in  market conditions  (above  all  the sharp 
increase  in  the  prices  of energy  and  raw 
materials) had a negative impact on a small, 
open economy like Hungary. The short-term 
negative impact of these exogenous shocks 
was  partially cushioned  by  the transfer of 
resources  from  the  Soviet  Union  (in  the 
form  of heavily  subsidized  exports  of oil) 
and by cooperation within the CMEA No 
attempt was  made,  however,  to introduce 
forms of  industrial restructuring or to ration-
alize the use of energy and raw materials, so 
future growth prospects were undermined. 
The 1980s were characterized by contradic-
-9-
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Graph 1  Long-term trend of GDP 
tory policies. The first half saw the introduction of a set of  adjustment measures aimed at reducing 
domestic absorption by controlling private consumption and reducing hard-currency imports (see 
Table 1  ). As a consequence, the import-led growth strategy initiated during the previous decade 
came to an end. 
Table 1 Macroeconomic performance, 1971-90 (%change at constant prices) 
1971- 1976- 1981- 1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
75  80  8S 
Gross Domestic Product  6.5  3.2  1.8  -0.3  1.5  4.0  -0.2  -0.2  -4.3 
Industrial production  6.4  3.3  1.9  0.7  1.9  3.8  0.0  -1.0  -8.5 
Agricultural production  4.6  2.4  0.7  -5.6  2.4  -2.0  4.4  -1.3  -6.7 
Gross Fixed Investment  6.9  2.5  -3.2  -3.1  2.9  9.1  -9.0  3.6  -8.7 
Personal consumption  4.7  2.6  1.4  1.4  2.0  3.7  -4.3  0.4  -4.5 
Consumer prices  2.8  6.3  6.8  7  5.3  8.6  15.7  17.0  28.2 
Real Wages  3.3  0.7  -0.8  1.3  2.0  ..0.4  -5.1  -0.4  -
Source:  Hungarian CSO Statistical Yearbook, various issues; OECD Economic Surveys -
Hungary 1991; IMF Staff estimates. 
Austerity measures came to a halt in the second half of the decade in order to buy public support 
for the old regime, whose legitimacy was being increasingly, and more openly, questioned. Despite 
signs of declining national income in 1985-86, private consumption increased, the budget balance 
turned into deficit, and the current account of the balance of payments deteriorated rapidly. The 
net debt in convertible currency doubled between the end of 1984 and the end of 1987. 
A paradox in Hungarian trade became clear for the first time. Increased exports to the CMEA 
had  a negative impact on the convertible current account because of the high  hard-currency 
import content of Hungarian exports to the CMEA Moreover, rouble exports 'crowded out' 
non-rouble exports because profits came easily on the rouble export market. Hungary began to 
run substantial surpluses in transferable-rouble trade, which de facto were an interest-free credit - 10-
extended to the other members of the CMEA This surplus was also a major source of domestic 
liquidity creation. 
b.  Recent economic developments 
Since 1989 the Hungarian economy has embarked on a major effort of stabilization and medium-
term adjustment designed to transform Hungary into a competitive market economy. This has 
required the Hungarian authorities to attempt to work out and implement: 
•  a stabilization-oriented economic policy for the short term; 
•  structural modification of the economic system for the medium and long term. 
For the time being, however, economic stabilization and the reform effort have contributed to a 
decline in economic activity, which has been particularly pronounced since 1989. The recession 
was intensified in 1990 oy the breakdown of the CMEA trading system and continued in 1991. 
In 1989 economic performance fell far short of the initial targets set by the government, and the 
economy slowed down to virtual stagnation.  GDP is  estimated to have declined by  over 2%, 
inflation accelerated to about 17%, from 15.7% in 1988, while the convertible current account 
deficit widened to US$1.4 bn from US$0.8 bn in 1988. The state budget deficit reached Ft54 bn 
(3.1% of GDP or US$836 million) for the year. 
Three main factors contributed to this deterioration: 
•  policy slippage resulting in a higher than planned fiscal deficit; 
•  a large external payments surplus with the rouble area, which contributed to a significant 
increase in liquidity; 
•  a sharp deterioration in the balance on tourism. 
Corrective measures were introduced in 1990. The rapid deterioration in Hungary's convertible 
balance of payments, which resulted mainly from excessive domestic demand, called for adjust-
ments  in  demand-management  policies.  The government  sought  to  reduce  substantially  the 
consolidated budget deficit,  to tighten credit, and to enhance the credibility of the adjustment 
efforts in order to reverse inflationary expectations. Exchange-rate and interest-rate policies were 
also geared to helping to improve the convertible current account without resorting to administra-
tive current account and trade restrictions. Measures to reduce the foreign exchange allowances 
for residents travelling abroad were temporarily introduced. The restrictive policy was somewhat 
weakened, however, by the electoral campaign that led to the election of a new Parliament in 
March-April1990 and to the formation of a coalition government. 
Macroeconomic results for 1990 point to a severe contraction of economic activity, although it 
is not completely clear to what extent official statistics are able to take into account the increasing 
rate of expansion of private activity (see section on statistics). Real GDP declined by 4.3% with 
respect to the previous year. The decline was due to the collapse of demand within the CMEA, 
the depressed condition of the domestic market, the effects of the oil price increase in the last 
quarter of the year and a severe drought, which caused losses in agriculture. Industrial production 
declined by 9%, with severe contraction in mining (  -18% ), iron and steel (  -12.2% ), engineering 
(-15.4%), and light industry (-9.6%). Agricultural production fell by about 6.7%. Particularly pro-
nounced were the declines in production of grain (  -18% ),  soya beans (-54%), and sugar beet 
(-12%). -11-
In 1991,  GOP fell  by 7 to 9%, at least 3% more than initially forecast.  Industrial production 
declined by 20.5% in the first eleven months of 1991 compared with the same period of last year. 
The number of registered  unemployed  increased  to  about 400,000  by  the end of the year, 
corresponding  to  8.3%  of the work  force  and  nearly  40%  over the  initial  forecast.  Actual 
unemployment has been increasing especially in those sectors more dependent on exports to the 
Soviet Union. However, the informal sector of the economy and the dynamic development of 
small enterprises made it possible for part of the shock to be absorbed. In 1991, they are thought 
to have contributed 2 or 3 percentage points to the growth of industrial production. 
In 1990  consumption  fell  by  an  estimated 
4.5% with respect to 1989. The fall,  larger 
than originally planned ( +0.5% to 1%) was 
due to a decline in labour incomes and to an 
increase  in saving.  Savings  recovered their 
pre-1989level after small-scale capital flights 
(mainly  in  the  form  of travel  expenditure 
abroad) had substantially reduced this aggre-
gate in 1989. Private consumption increased 
steadily from  1980 to 1987, thus helping to 
worsen the external disequilibrium. It then 
started to contract, and a further decrease of 
4  to 6%  is  estimated  to have occurred in 
1991. 
Gross ftxed  capital formation also  declined 
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Graph 2  Composition of domestic demand 
in  1990.  The distinct deceleration in  investment in  1989 and 1990 was  the result partly of the 
slower growth of output and  available resources and partly of difficulties  in adjusting to new 
business  conditions,  i.e.  replacing  previously state-funded investment with  enterprise-financed 
investment. 
Hungary, like all the other East European economies, had a rather high investment ratio (gross 
ftxed  capital  formation  I  GDP),  in  line  with  the  prescription  of centralized  planning  which 
envisaged a very high rate of accumulation (see Graph 3). However, the process of adjustment 
seems to have begun well in advance of the 
other formerly centrally planned economies. 
Calculated at current prices, the investment 
ratio declined from  28.8 in  1980 to  19.5  in 
1989,  and  with  the exception  of 1985  the 
ratio declined  in  each year of the decade. 
The present level of the ratio is  similar to 
the EC average (20.6), and even lower than 
that  of some  member  countries  like  the 
Netherlands (21.8), Spain (23.8), or Portugal 
(26.4). 
The rate of inventory accumulation is much 
higher  in  Hungary  than  in  industrialized 
countries. Changes in inventory represented 
7.4%  of GDP in  1989, against a value nor-
mally  well  below  1%  in  developed  market 
economies.  The value  is  comparable  with 
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that of other formerly centrally planned economies.2 The relative 'inflexibility' of supply, which 
prompted individual enterprises to diversify their range of products (universalism of the enter-
prise), is often identified as the main cause. Inventory accumulation accelerated further in 1989 
and 1990 (see Graph 2), in an effort to prevent losses resulting from supply problems and price 
increases, which led to a higher than necessary amount of purchases. 
Inflation started to accelerate in 1987, with the annual inflation rate increasing steadily from an 
average of 8% over the period 1980-88 to 17% in 1989, and 28.2% in 1990. For 1991 inflation 
is estimated at 35-37%. In recent years the inflation target has been repeatedly overshot. 
Inflationary pressures are part of the transition costs that Hungary has to bear. The move towards 
a market economy encompassing price liberalization, the removal of subsidies, the dismantling of 
the CMEA and its effects on the terms of trade, and the depreciation of the forint have pushed 
the inflation rate upwards. In 1991, although the price liberalization effect was becoming marginal 
and was unlikely to account for more than 5 percentage points of the overall inflation figure, the 
deterioration in the terms of trade and the devaluation of the forint in January 1991 may alone 
have generated a two-digit inflation figure. In addition, Hungary had to face external shocks, such 
as the Gulf conflict. 
But  the  acceleration  in  inflation  also  reflects  the lack  of control  on the wage-price  nexus. 
Government projections of inflation have not been taken as credible, and wage negotiations have 
resulted in higher than expected wage increases. In 1991, the contribution of wage increases to 
the inflation rate may have been close to ten percentage points. 
Inflation Rate 
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The Hungarian Government has relied on a 
policy  mix  of restrictive monetary, budgetary 
and  income  policies  in  its  attempts  to keep 
inflation under control. However, the survival 
of past  distortions  has  made  the  trade-off 
between  growth  and  inflation  even  more 
severe. The budget could not be more restrict-
ive without affecting standards of living, which 
have  already  been  eroded  by  fiscal  reform, 
which has reduced social security expenditures 
and  removed subsidies and interest subsidies 
on housing. Similarly monetary policy needs to 
accommodate the still  high  public deficits  in 
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Inflation rate 
such as export credits following the dismantling of the CMEA In the past the policy mix adopted 
by the government has been only mildly anti-inflationary. However, the risk that the stabilization 
process  could  be  undermined  is  now  recognized  by  the  Hungarian  authorities.  As  a  result, 
monetary controls are being strengthened and inflation might slow down in 1992. 
2  In Poland change in stocks, as reported by the UN Economic Commission for Europe, represented 6.3% of GDP 
in  1987, 10.1% in  1988, and 22% in  1989. By contrast, in the CSFR the ratio was 1.2% in 1989 and 3.3% in 1990. -13-
c.  Public finance 
As Table 2 indicates, the government budget has been in deficit throughout the second half of 
the 1980s, irrespective of whether the extra-budgetary funds are included. 
Table 2 Revenue and expenditure or the government budget (in billion Forint) 
Central government and social security1  Central government, social security and 
extra-budgetary runds2 . 
Revenue  Expendi- Balance  Revenue  Expendi- Balance 
tore  tore 
1986  572.5  619.4  -46.9  606.8  637.7  -30.9 
1987  631.2  666.0  -34.8  660.4  700.7  -40.3 
1988  713.8  733.5  -19.7  789.9  793.1  -3.2 
1989  829.3  858.6  -29.3  926.6  959.2  -32.6 
1990  1001.0  1003.0  -2.0  1105.9  1089.2  16.7 
1991  1224.6  1302.9  -78.3  1279.0  1332.2  -53.2 
planned3 
1. Hungarian presentation 
2• Consolidated budget according to IMF-GFS presentation 
3. Initial projection, which has since been revised 
Source: Ministry of Finance, IMF 
The deficit declined from 1986 to 1988, and 
then rose again in 1989 reflecting the sharp 
increase  in  housing  loan  subsidies.  As  a 
percentage  of GDP the deficit  fluctuated 
widely  during  the  1980s,  although  it 
remained below 4% (see Graph 5). In 1990 
tight fiscal policy led to a sharp reduction of 
the budget  deficit  to  Ft 2.6  bn,  against  a 
forecast of Ft10 bn at the beginning of the 
year (see Table 2). The increase in expendi-
ture (14.2%)  turned out to be lower than 
the increase in revenue (18% ).  The deficit 
reflects  strong  cuts  in  subsidies  which,  in 
accordance with the World Bank program-
me, should be reduced from 13% of GDP in 
1989 to 4% in 1993. 
Consolidated budget balance 
as% of GOP 
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Graph 5  Consolidated budget balance 
Table 2 includes also estimates for 1991 as initially approved by the Hungarian Parliament. This 
preliminary estimate was the result of a sharply higher state budget deficit and a sizeable surplus 
on the extra-budgetary funds. Structural changes affect the comparability of 1991 data with the 
figures for the previous years: the State Development Institute was incorporated into the central 
government, and local government finances have been reformed; the overall impact on the budget 
balance is estimated at between Ft 10 and 20 billion. State revenue was intended to increase less - 14-
The state budget (1) 
The structure of  the state budget differs somewhat 
from the standard IMF  presentation. In the Hun-
garian practice some debt service items (domestic 
and foreign credit operations of  the government), 
which in the GFS  presentation are below the line, 
are included in the expenditure side. 
There  are two levels of budgets: the state  (  cen-
tral) budget; and the general government budget, 
which  is made up of the  central budget,  some 
extra-budgetary funds and a social security fund, 
and the local government budgets. Recent  practice 
is to attempt to reduce the number of  extra-bud-
getary funds and to transfer the relevant items to 
the government budget. 
The  revenue  side  of the  central  government 
budget includes: 
•  Payments of  enterprises 
Enterprise profit tax, customs duties, dividends 
of  state property,  income taxes, payments on 
various  producer  turnover  taxes,  previously 
mostly related to CMEA trade. 
•  Payments from consumption 
Two kinds of  taxes,  VATand excise. At  pres-
ent there are three VAT rates: a general rate 
(25%),  a  rate for foodstuffs  '(Q%),  and an 
intermediate rate (15%) on som~  services. A 
revision  of VAT is  under  review,  with  the 
intention of reducing the rates to two:  10% 
and 20%. 
•  Payments of  households 
This  item  includes  personal  income  taxes, 
other taxes (i.e.  car taxes, fees,  etc.). 
•  Payments from  central budgetary institutions 
and from extra-budgetary funds 
Activities of  the central budgetary institutions 
outside their institutional activity are taxed. 
•  Income from international transactions 
Includes  repayment  of credit  extended  to 
LDCs, credit extended to the Hungarian gov-
ernment  by  other  governments,  as  well  as 
credit from the World Bank (only for the part 
directly extended to the government). 
•  Other income 
The main expenditure items are: 
•  Subsidies to enterprises 
Subsidies to enterprises are extended for sev-
eral purposes: producer price subsidies,  agri-
cultural products subsidies, import price sub-
sidies (abolished from 1991 ), subsidies related 
to CMEA trade. 
•  Transfers to central budgetary institutions 
Central  budgetary  institutions  include  insti-
tutions  dealing  with  health  care,  education, 
infrastructure (e.g.  road maintenance), for the 
most part working under direct supervision of 
a ministry. In the framework of  the reforms of 
the general government their scope of  activity 
will be revised. 
•  Transfers to local government 
Previously  100%  of the  local  government 
budgets  came from  central transfers.  Local 
taxes have recently been introduced, and about 
20% of expenditure  is now funded  by  local 
revenues. 
•  Transfers to social security fund 
The  budget covers  transfers  only for certain 
components, the main one being family allo-
wances. 
•  Transfers  to extra-budgetary funds  (includes 
Housing Fund (see below)) 
•  Investment expenditure 
Since  1989 a sharp decline  in  direct invest-
ment activity by the state has occu"ed. Three 
main items remain: 
i  Financing of  infrastructure and defence; 
ii  Financing of  the Yamburg pipeline project, 
which is going to be taken over by the State 
Development Institute; 
iii Housing subsidies 
Under the previous regime, the state granted 
loans to individuals at a very low interest 
rate  (3%  p.a.).  The  Housing  Fund, 
fmanced by direct transfers from  the state 
budget,  paid  the  difference  between  the 
subsidized and mortgage interest rates.  The 
item is substantia~ about Ft1 00 bn in 1991. 
The Parliament passed a bill which offered 
two options: 
a) The government would take over 50% of 
the debt, and the interest rate on the remai-
ning 50% would be increased to the market 
level;  this option  was chosen by 80% of 
those concerned. 
b)  The  interest  rate  on  the  entire  debt 
would be increased to 15% in 1991. 
The  financial  losses  incu"ed have  been 
included in the budget. - 15-
The state budget (2) 
•  Expenditure on international transactions 
Includes credits granted to other governments, 
recently reduced,  and insurance,  export guar-
antees and other trade-related credits. 
•  Debt service 
•  Other expenditure 
This represents a small amount. 
•  Reserve (Ft 7 bn in 1991) 
The deficit is financed for the most part by long-
term credit from the National Bank of  Hungary. 
The issuing of Treasury bills is a relatively new 
instrument in Hungarian practice. 
than expenditure; in particular, the expected decline in revenue from enterprises could not be 
completely offset by the increase in household payments. 
The deficit was to be financed for the most part by long-term credit from the National Bank of 
Hungary and by issuing state bonds, and for the rest by increasing the stock of Treasury bills. The 
interest on NBH long-term credit, which  was  previously extended at a below-market rate,  is 
gradually being raised to the market level, although, according to the Hungarian authorities, this 
measure will apply only to new loans (about Ft 60 bn). Debt service, rose from Ft70.7 bn in 1990 
to an estimated Ft110 bn, adding a further burden to the budget, and though the high level of 
inflation will reduce the real interest payments on the old domestic debt, this will not apply to the 
external component of the debt. 
Table 3 shows the structure of public debt as  at end-December 1990. The total amount of the 
public debt represented about 65% of GDP in 1990. The debt is the result of loans granted by 
the central bank to cover the deficit (portfolio and refinancing loans), as well as Ft519.2 bn which 
is  debited as  the cumulative amount arising from successive devaluations of the forint.  As  the 
table shows, bonds and treasury bills represent only 2% of the debt. In particular, the issuing of 
Treasury bills is a relatively new instrument in Hungarian practice. It  was used for the first time 
in 1989. Interest on bills of 3, 6 and 9 months' maturity currently is 31%, 32% and 34%, at an 
annualized rate, respectively. 
The deficit in  1991  turned out to be Ft114 bn instead of Ft78 bn, that is one percentage point 
of GDP higher than planned. Both revenues and expenditures were lower than planned, with a 
more  marked  decline  for  revenues  as  a  result of a larger  than expected  fall  in  output and 
consumption,  which  affected both direct  and  indirect  tax  revenues.  On the expenditure side, 
unemployment benefits exceeded the targets and the delay in raising energy prices increased the 
expenditure on subsidies. 
In the future the size of the state budget deficit could be substantially higher if  payment arrears 
among  enterprises  and  bad  loans  in  the banking  sector  and  provisions  for  the consequent 
necessary  recapitalization  are  included.  The  rationale  for  including  these  items  in  budget 
expenditure is  that the state should be considered the ultimate guarantor for the state sector. 
State-owned enterprises cannot be held responsible for  their performance under the previous 
regime. -16-
Table 3 Public debt at 31 December 1990 
Ft Qillion 
Portfolio loans by the NBH to the budget directly and government bonds  503.2 
Portfolio and refinancing loans granted by NBH to the State Development Institute  259.5 
Bonds sold to commercial banks, other financial institutions and insurance companies  17.5 
Treasury bills  10.2 
Domestic national debt without provisions for forint devaluations debited to budget  790.4 
Forint devaluations debited to the budget  519.2 
Total  1309.6 
Source: National Bank of Hungary Annual Report 1990, p.32. 
Both arrears among enterprises and bad loans in the banking sector are present in Hungary on 
a large scale and are worrying, though not to the same extent as in other transitional countries. 
Enterprise payment  arrears,  although  difficult  to calculate,  are estimated by  the Hungarian 
authorities at about Ft 150-200 bn as at the end of 1990. They are a form of quasi-money. Since 
November 1990, to discourage enterprises from delaying payments the penalty interest rate on 
arrears has been increased to equal to twice the basic rate. However, since the actual cost of 
borrowing by enterprises at the margin is much higher than the basic rate, the penalty differential 
is not very large and the measure has not been effective. 
Bad loans, calculated by the National Bank of Hungary in accordance with international auditing 
rules, amounted to Ft36 bn at the end of 1990, which is less than 4 per cent of bank assets. They 
are concentrated in three banks: the Hungarian Credit Bank, the Hungarian Commercial Bank 
and the Budapest Bank, which together inherited about half of the bad loans of the NBH when 
they were established in 1987. The other banks do not account for much of that debt and have 
made ordinary provisions in line with Basel Agreement regulations. Recently the government 
proposed that a budget guarantee be provided for about half of the doubtful debts inherited by 
the commercial banks and that the share capital of the three banks most affected be raised. The 
banks will be given three years gradually to increase their reserve funds to the level prescribed 
in the new Banking Law, in accordance with the Basel guidelines. The state guarantee will be 
allocated in proportion to the size of the bad debts that the three banks inherited. The govern-
ment proposal, however, is still subject to the approval of Parliament. 
d.  Money and credit 
A restrictive monetary and credit policy, focused in particular on stabilizing the domestic currency 
and on controlling emerging strong inflationary pressures, was initiated in 1989 and continued 
throughout 1990 and into 1991, in line with the agreements reached between Hungary and the 
IMF in March 1990 for a 12-month stand-by arrangement and in February 1991 for a three-year 
extended financing facility. 
Since 1989 the National Bank of Hungary has made more effective use of traditional instruments 
of monetary  and  liquidity  control.  In particular,  in  1990  broad  money  expanded  by  29.3%, 
(Table 3) higher than the growth rate recorded in 1989 ( + 15.3% ). The broad money velocity (4) 
-17-
during the year was fairly stable, after an acceleration in previous years. The broad money growth 
essentially reflected the remarkable expansion during the year of deposits in domestic currency 
owned by  enterprises ( +  39%  ).  Also,  foreign currency deposits  at enterprise level expanded 
significantly during the year ( + 261.3% ), though the amounts involved were modest. This trend 
reflects the view prevailing among enterprises during the year that they should increase their 
monetary holdings to meet transaction requirements and to protect themselves against financial 
uncertainties stemming from the ongoing process of transformation, privatization and liquidation. 
Households also in 1990 expanded their holdings both of forints and of foreign currencies. The 
high liquidity propensity of households in 1990 was a result partly of the urge to use financial 
resources  for  consumption  and  investment  promptly  in  a  generally  more  volatile  financial 
environment (rising inflation) and,  partly of the fact  that real interest rates offered by banks, 
particularly on short-term deposits, were unattractive. Preliminary results for 1991 confirm these 
developments. 
The issuance of bonds, savings  notes, certificates of deposit  and other instruments increased 
remarkably in 1990 ( +  39.7%) and expanded further in 1991  ( +58.4% in June 1991  compared 
to June 1990), reflecting the government's determination to develop new market-based financial 
instruments. To make this  type of financing attractive enough, at the end of 1990 annualized 
interest rates on Treasury bills were raised from 28 to 33% for three-month bills, from about 29% 
to a maximum of 31% for 6-month bills and from 31  to 34% for 9-month bills. However, only a 
small proportion of these bills were placed with non-bank investors. 
Demand for money remained high in 1991, as  a result of the high public deficit and reflecting 
growing financial needs at enterprise level for start-up, restructuring and investment purposes. 
The changes  in  the intra-CMEA settlement system  and the reduction in  turnover could also 
increase enterprises', demand for credit. On the other hand, the household sector is moderating 
its preference for liquidity, though this depends largely on the state and commercial banks' ability 
to implement a positive real interest rate policy to attract savings. 
The primary concern of the NBH in 1990 and 1991 has been to keep credit expansion under tight 
control and to use it more selectively. Total domestic credit after recording growth of 16.8% in 
1989, expanded by an average of 10.6% in 1990, substantially in line with initial forecasts. This 
growth rate was maintained over the first half of 1991. 
In particular in  1990 credit to the central government declined by  2.4%  while credit to local 
authorities expanded significantly ( + 20.3% ), though the amount of funds involved was relatively 
small.  In 1990 credit to enterprises also expanded at quite a high rate ( + 23.8% ),  reflecting an 
urgent need for recapitalization rather than for investment. The need to recapitalize indicates that 
many companies have not yet achieved a satisfactory degree of financial discipline and still look 
to  assistance  from  easy credit policies.  Many banks  (because of their specialized nature) still 
maintain unhealthy financial relations with enterprises. New credit to small (newly established) 
entrepreneurs more than doubled in 1990, albeit the amounts were still very low. Preferential loan 
schemes for strengthening export capabilities and for  promoting privatization were granted in 
1990, in accordance with government priorities in these fields. Credits to the State Development 
Institute expanded moderately ( + 7%) and by less than originally planned. 
In general, credit to enterprises in 1990 reflected banks' growing reluctance to make loans to loss-
making enterprises, which  are now  exposed  to  more  rigid  financial  discipline imposed by  the 
government, including liquidation and bankruptcy. Table 4  Monetary Survey 
(in bn forints) 
1. Domestic credit 
Central govemment,net 
Other government, net 
IJlcal government 
Financial institutions 
(essentially State 
Development Institute) 
Enterprises 
Households 
Small enterprises 
2. Other assets 
3. Net domestic assets 
4. Net foreign liabilities 
5. Broad money 
of which (in forints): 
- Household deposits 
- Enterprise deposits 
6. Bonds and savings notes 
Memo 
1) Household forex: 
deposits 
(expressed in forints) 
2) Enterprise forex: deposits 
(expressed in forints) 
Source: NBH 
End 
1989 
1540.7 
482.0 
5.9 
18.2 
237.8 
464.4 
313.3 
18.5 
306.3 
1847.0 
1019.4 
706.1 
297.2 
161.1 
66.8 
20.5 
13.7 
- 18-
I  II  m 
1990  1990  1990 
1546.8  1584.6  1627.8 
477.2  481.5  469.4 
3.6  3.4  5.4 
19.4  20.2  20.7 
242.0  244.5  246.2 
471.5  493.6  528.1 
308.8  309.7  320.5 
23.2  31.0  36.4 
327.5  312.5  304.3 
1874.1  1897.1  19321 
1043.0  1040.7  1052.8 
732.6  7621  796.2 
299.3  307.7  320.7 
166.4  183.5  189.6 
726  77.8  83.1 
25.5  35.4  48.9 
23.5  27.5  35.2 
IV  End  I  II  Mid 
1990  1990/  1991  1991  1991/ 
End  Mid 
1989  1990 
(%  (% 
var.)  var.) 
1703.4  10.6  1693.2  1749.5  10.4 
470.2  -2.4  478.6  503.9  4.7 
4.3  -27.1  4.8  4.9  44.1 
21.9  20.3  21.5  22.0  8.9 
254.5  7.0  257.0  254.4  4.0 
574.9  23.8  590.7  622.1  26.0 
329.8  5.2  279.9  271.1  -9.6 
43.6  135.7  46.1  49.2  48.7 
329.9  7.7  492.8  524.1  57.7 
2033.3  10.1  2186.0  2273.6  19.8 
1029.1  1.0  1166.1  1190.1  14.4 
9129  29.3  915.2  960.3  26.0 
360.4  21.3  3622  379.0  17.7 
224.1  39.1  269.8  207.1  129 
93.3  39.7  104.7  123.2  58.4 
625  204.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
49.5  261.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
The practice of inter-enterprise credits became more evident in 1990. Reliable figures on this 
phenomenon are difficult to gather. Surveys undertaken by the NBH indicate that these credits 
rose from Ft127 bn as of end-1989 to over Ft250 bn during the second half of 1990.3 They may 
have offset, at least in part, the stabilizing effects of the NBH's restrictive policy. 
During 1990, short- and long-term refmancing rates were used with more flexibility.  The NBH 
basic refinancing rate (rediscount) was raised to about 22% ( +10% vis-a-vis the previous year), 
3  Annual Report of the National Bank of Hungary for 1989 (Budapest, 1990) -19-
and the short-term refinancing rate was raised by almost the same percentage, to about 28%. The 
automatic refinancing of the commercial banks by the National Bank of  Hungary was reduced to 
about 20% of the total capital of the main commercial banks. From the beginning of 1991 this 
automatic refinancing was further reduced to 10%, the NBH's target being to abolish it complete-
ly  from  the  beginning  of 1992.  The  lower  obligatory  reserve  requirements  introduced  for 
commercial banks in 1990 were extended to cover foreign currency deposits as well in June 1991. 
Following  this  trend, bank interest rates on 
credits and deposits were raised. Interest rates 
charged  by  commercial  banks  for  loans  to 
their  customers  averaged  about  28-32%  at 
year-end. They were set by each commercial 
bank on a competitive basis, as a function of 
the term of a loan, the financial risk involved 
and  the  cost  of lending.  Interest  rates  on 
deposits increased during the year by 5-7%, to 
an average of between 26 and 28% at year-
end.  During  the first  half of 1990  interest 
rates on credits and deposits were roughly on 
a par with the official average inflation rate, 
Market interest rates for credits and 
deposits 
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but they then became slightly positive.  This  Graph 6 
real interest rate trend did not amount to a 
Market interest rates for credits 
and deposits 
particular incentive for households and small 
enterprises to increase their saving rate. The evolution of banks' average interest rate in 1990 is 
shown in graph 6. 
During the first half of 1991 the interest rate rose to some extent, to level off around mid-year. 
The NBH is  committed to maintaining positive real interest rates through adjustments in the 
refinancing rate and changes are expected if the slowdown in inflation is confirmed. However a 
minor increase might come from the increase by  the NBH in the forint refinancing rate for 
foreign currency deposits. 
e.  Balance of  payments, international reserves and external financing 
The process of reorienting foreign trade away from the CMEA (and the USSR in particular) and 
towards Western markets began in 1989 and was successfully pursued in 1990 and 1991. The 
developments in foreign  trade reflected the government's policy of encouraging enterprises to 
limit their trade relations with former CMEA partners, the progressive opening of EC markets 
to Hungarian products, the forint devaluation policy adopted in 1989 and 1990, the continuing 
application of subsidies to some export products and a sharp decline in domestic demand. 
As a result of these trends, Hungarian exports to CMEA countries fell by 27% in volume terms 
between 1989 and 1990 and imports from them decreased by 20%. At the same time convertible-
currency exports rose by 10% in volume and imports by 3%. As a result, the share of trade with 
Western economies rose from 50% of the total in 1989 to 70% in 1990. This significant result was 
achieved despite Hungary having  to pay higher prices for oil imports, particularly in the last 
quarter of 1990. -20-
The convertible-currency trade balance in  1990 showed a surplus of US$  348 million.  Owing 
chiefly to a better than expected tourism balance, and despite increased interest payments, the 
current account in convertible currencies showed a small  surplus of US$  127 million,  which 
implied a striking turnaround from a deficit of US$ 1.4 bn in 1989, an improvement of US$ 1.5 
bn (  4.4% of GOP) (Table 5). 
As  regards Hungarian rouble-denominated foreign  trade (essentially with the USSR), despite 
several efforts in 1990 designed to reduce Hungary's cumulative outstanding claims on the Soviet 
Union (probably as much as the equivalent of US$ 2 billion) no major progress was achieved. In 
1990  Hungary's  trade balance in  non-convertible currency still exhibited  a  surplus  (Table 6) 
reflecting partly the inability of the Soviet Union to offset its debt through exports of oil and raw 
materials. 
In 1991  Hungary's foreign trade performance was  expected to be badly hit by further external 
shocks associated with growing domestic constraints. Trade volumes, particularly with the USSR 
and with some former Comecon partners, are estimated to have declined by 50-55% as compared 
with the previous year, reflecting the shift, from 1 January 1991, to hard currency trade at world 
market prices,  the virtual collapse of the Soviet economy, the closure of several East German 
enterprises which used to be leading participants in intra-Comecon trade and the overall hard 
currency shortage in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The collapse in 1991 of Hungarian trade with former Comecon countries was partly offset by a 
25-30% expansion of exports (in volume terms) to traditional Western markets such as Austria, 
Germany, Switzerland and Italy. According to preliminary figures, during the first seven months 
of 1991  the trade balance in  convertible currency showed a slight surplus of US$  93  million. 
Because of a better than expected travel balance and reduced costs of transport, the surplus of 
the current account in convertible currency for this period was even higher, at US$ 370 million, 
compared to the initial forecast of a current account deficit as high as US$ 1.2bn. This outcome 
in 1991 was quite an encouraging performance. 
In 1990 Hungary's convertible currency capital account showed some weakness, particularly during 
the first  part of the year,  because of substantial withdrawal of short-term inter-bank deposits 
valued at around US$ 900 million. The capital outflow continued during the second half of 1990 
though at a slower pace. These withdrawals and the reluctance of Western banks to advance new 
credit were a consequence of domestic political and economic uncertainties (elections in Spring 
1990) and of external factors that caused increased disquiet in international financial circles, such 
as  Bulgaria's request for a debt moratorium and the growing payment difficulties of the Soviet 
Union (with the consequent deterioration in its credit standing). In 1991  the original target of 
raising about US$ 1 bn was exceeded, though the cost to Hungary of  some fund-raising operations 
was  higher than expected, reflecting the country's current financial risk. 
Hungary  also  experienced  difficulties  in  1990  in  concluding  some  medium-term  borrowing 
operations with Western banks which were needed mainly to refinance external debt obligations, 
to support the balance of payments and to strengthen the country's overall reserve position. In 
fact, according to the National Bank of Hungary, only one syndicated loan, worth US$ 40 million, 
was negotiated in 1990, compared with US$ 570 million in 1989. Trade-related financing facilities 
obtained in  1990 were modest too (US$ 250 million). 
To cope with this situation Hungary turned increasingly to issuing bonds and notes on interna-
tional capital markets, though the financial costs of these operations increased significantly during 
the second half of 1990,  reflecting the country's financial  risk.  In 1990 slightly less  than US$  1 -21-
billion were raised in this way.  A  substantial part of these bonds, though issued through the 
banking system, were sold to non-bank private creditors. 
Hungary's limited access to the private capital market in 1990 was  compensated by a greater 
reliance on official  multilateral and bilateral creditors.  In an effort to strengthen its  reserve 
position and in view of the expected release of a  tranche of credits granted by  multilateral 
institutions, Hungary obtained from the BIS a bridging loan worth US$ 280 million. 
The IMF 13-month stand-by arrangement agreed in March 1990 provided a  total of US$ 170 
million (30% of Hungary's quota). However, because of ordinary repurchases and extraordinary 
repayments, Hungary's net borrowing with the IMF was negative by about US$ 160 million. 
In February 1991 Hungary agreed with the IMF on a three-year Extended Financing Arrangement 
equivalent to SDR 1,114 million (210% of  Hungary's quota) in support of  the country's three-year 
programme of economic stabilization and structural transformation. In addition, a compensatory 
and contingency financing facility equivalent to SDR 226.2 million has been provided, with the 
possibility of a second purchase in 1991 of SDR 121.8 million, if the necessary conditions are met. 
Disbursements from  other multilateral institutions included  a  structural adjustment loan and 
project aid from  the World Bank, a co-financing loan from the Ex-Im Bank of Japan, and a 
medium-term loan up to a maximum of ecu 870 million (equivalent to about US$ 1 bn) from the 
Community,  as  well  as  some  lending  from  the International  Finance  Corporation  and  the 
European Investment  Bank.  In  1990  official  bilateral creditors  pledged some  US$  2  bn to 
Hungary. This included a US$ 1 bn short-term credit line from Germany, with a 90% federal 
government guarantee. Also a net amount of US$ 460 million was secured from private creditors. 
In 1991,  Hungary also secured the second tranche of the Community's medium-term loan,  a 
World Bank structural adjustment loan, Japan's co-financing of the World Bank loan, and project 
finance from the European Investment Bank. In addition, the Group of  Twenty-Four in July 1991 
approved a  loan of US$ 500 million, of which the Community will  contribute 50%. The first 
tranche of the EC contribution was disbursed in August. The funds are to be used to support the 
balance of payments and to strengthen the country's reserve position. 
In 1991 Hungary was also able to increase significantly its medium- and long-term borrowing on 
international capital markets, which totalled US$ 1.6 bn. 
Foreign direct investment in Hungary is beginning to play an important role in external financing. 
In 1990 contributions in cash made available by foreign investors (mainly American, Japanese and 
German) amounted to about US$ 300 million. In 1991 it is reckoned that foreign contributions 
in cash exceeded US$ 1.4bn, well above the US$ 550 million originally forecast. Debt amortization 
projections in 1991 have been scaled down from US$ 2.4 to 2.2 bn, reflecting fluctuations in the 
US dollar exchange rate. Short-term capital movements at present appear to be balanced with 
outflows, which seem to be under control. 
As a direct consequence of growing external financing constraints in 1990, hard currency official 
reserves decreased by 40% in 1990 to about US$ 1.1 bn (against US$ 1.7 bn at the end of 1989), 
equivalent to about 2 months' convertible currency imports. At the end of 1990 and throughout 
1991,  the reserves increased again,  to reach nearly US$ 3.2 bn in October 1991  (3.2 months' 
imports), well above the target for the end of 1991  (US$ 1.9 bn). -22-
Table S Balance of payments in convertible eurrendes 
(million US$) 
1988 
Exports  5505 
Imports  5016 
Trade balance  489 
Services (net)  -1410 
Unrequited transfers (net)  114 
Current account  -807 
Medium- long-term capital  556 
. assets (net)  -27 
. liabilities (net)  583 
. direct capital investment  -
Short-term capital  288 
Capital Account  844 
Overall balance  37 
Reserves (increase = -)  -39 
Stock of reserves  1976 
1989 
6446 
5910 
536 
-2100 
126 
-1438 
1563 
32 
1351 
180 
-44 
1519 
81 
-71 
1725 
1990  1991 
Jan-Oct 
6346  7358 
5998  7265 
348  93 
-94.8  -436 
7271  713 
127  370 
204  2479 
-76  -52 
280  1461 
- 1071 
-893  -659 
-689  1820 
-562  2190 
562  -2190 
1166  3214 
Source: National Bank of Hungary 
1  The item includes transactions related to trade following the foreign exchange liberaliz-
ation, the decentralization of foreign trade and the increase in the number of small 
private entrepreneurs. -23-
Table 6 Balance of payments in non-convertible currencies 
(million US$) 
1988  1989 
Exports  4484  4047 
Imports  4390  3540 
Trade balance  94  507 
Services (net)  140  363 
Unrequited transfers (net)  2  4 
Current account  232  866 
Medium- long-term capital  -268  -278 
. assets (net)  -69  -127 
. liabilities (net)  -199  -151 
Short-term capital  -41  -109 
Capital Account  -309  -387 
Overall balance  -77  479 
Reserves (increase = -)  77  -479 
Source: National Bank of Hungary 
f.  Foreign debt 
1990  1991 
Jan-Oct 
2719  413 
2529  259 
190  154 
112  -55 
52  5 
250  104 
-97  14 
23  23 
-120  -9 
69  -29 
-28  -15 
222  88 
-222  -88 
Hungary's total external debt in foreign currency has increased significantly in recent times. In the 
early 1970s it stood at less than US$2 bn, then reached US$9.7 bn in 1980 and since then doubled 
to reach more than US$22 bn in 1991. The continuing expansion of the debt reflected in part 
Hungary's pressing need over the past few years to obtain growing external financing resources 
for investment and consumption purposes in the framework of the implementation of the New 
Economic Mechanism programme. However, investment financed by external borrowing simply 
led to an expansion of  the production capacity of  state enterprises (which did not devote sufficient 
attention to growing restructuring problems) and to the construction of heavy and expensive 
infrastructure with limited social impact. External borrowing for consumption, on the other hand, 
allowed  the government  to import badly  needed goods  to meet the growing  demands  of a 
population more and more dissatisfied with the inefficiencies of the domestic supply side. 
At present Hungary has the highest debt per capita in Central and Eastern Europe. During the 
last few years total debt service obligations (capital amortization and interest) averaged between 
US$ 3.5 and 4 billion a year. -24-
Table 7 Gross foreign debt of Hungary (end of period) Millions of USD 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
In convertible currencies 
Gross foreign debt  19.884  19.602  20.390  21.270  22.658 
By original maturity: 
Short-term  3.103  3.363  3.306  2.941  2.177 
Long and medium term  18.401  18.239  17.084  18.329  20.481 
By type: 
Financial loans  17.600  17.469  18.060  17.687  18.135 
Trade-related credits  1.852  1.626  1.763  1.080  1.777 
Intergovernmental credit  0  0  0  0.472  1.612 
Other credits  423  607  667  1.231  1.234 
In non-convertible currencies 
Gross foreign debt  947  583  361  235  154 
By original maturity: 
Short-term  184  120  87  80  38 
Long and medium term  763  463  274  155  110 
By type: 
Financial loans  211  138  68  71  35 
Trade-related credits  0  0  0  0  0 
Intergovernmental credit  728  439  280  140  104 
Other credits  0  0  13  24  15 
Foreign debt total  22.631  20.105  20.751  21.005  22.812 
Source: National Bank of Hungary, 1992 
The debt service ratio declined from  45.5%  in  1990 to around 30% in  1991.  As of end-1991 
around 90% of the total debt consisted of  medium- and long-term obligations. Publicly guaranteed 
debt to Western private creditors (commercial banks and Western bond-holders) predominates 
(about 90% of the total medium- and long-term debt), the balance being debt to official creditors, 
in particular multilateral, and other credits. 
The country has never been in arrears. This reflects Hungary's traditional firm commitment to 
servicing its foreign debt obligations and to preserving good relations with Western commercial 
banks. 
In the light of current prevailing trends it is likely that in the near future the share of commercial 
bank debt will  decrease while  that of international financial  institutions and official  bilateral (5) 
-25-
creditors  will  expand.  However,  the  increasing  external  assistance  granted  by  international 
financial institutions, such as the IMF, as well as the European Community and the Group of 24, 
and aimed in particular at supporting the balance of payments is intended to be an extraordinary 
and temporary form of support, which will cease to be needed once the most delicate phase of 
stabilization and economic reform is over. 
Table 8 External borrowing, US$ million 
1989  1990  1990 
(forecast)  (outcome)* 
1.  Issuance of bonds on international capital market  1006  800  994 
2. Syndicated loans  570  500  40 
3. Bank-to-bank loans  497  200 
4. Trade-related credit  311  500  250 
5. Loans from international organizations  315  700  934 
6. Structural adjustment loan co-financing  116 
7. Direct capital  116  200  350(est) 
Total  2815  2700  2884 
NBH and IMF preliminary estimates 
Source:NBH and IMP 
During the next few years Hungary's total external debt obligations may slightly decrease. It is 
clear, however, that debt servicing will  continue to constitute a serious financial constraint on 
Hungary's external position and economic policy mix. The government continues to be committed 
to servicing promptly its  foreign debt obligations, since it believes that this  is  essential to the 
success of its policy of maintaining Hungary's creditworthiness on international capital markets 
and seeking to attract larger amounts of foreign direct investment. The government's medium-
term objective is to reduce the debt service ratio to 28% essentially by avoiding further increases 
in the external debt by 1993 and reducing it thereafter, by further improving trade performance 
and by  restructuring where possible the terms  and profile of the foreign  debt as  well  as  the 
currency mix (with the aim of minimizing valuation effects). 
A necessary precondition for the policy of staying current on debt obligations is  a sustainable 
balance of payments position, together with an active financial policy on the international capital 
markets. The results of 1990 and of the first months of 1991 were very encouraging. The large 
current account deficit of  US$ 1.4 bn in 1989 practically disappeared. After some fears during the 
first half of 1990, Hungary's creditworthiness on international capital markets was restored and 
private direct investment started expanding (US$ 337 million in cash in 1990 and US$ 1.4 bn in 
1991). In the medium term, as the economy recovers, a sustainable balance of payments can be 
achieved only if the supply side of the economy substantially improves its margins of productivity 
and international competitiveness through privatization programmes and the establishment of  joint 
ventures.  Moreover,  sound monetary and fiscal  policies  are  required  to encourage domestic 
savings and induce spontaneous fqreign capital inflows. 
The medium-term challenge for Hungary is to move from recession to expansion and at the same 
time improve its trade performance and keep its external debt at a manageable level. -26-
2.  Trade with the CMEA 
During  the  past  forty  years  the other CMEA countries were important  trade  partners  for 
Hungary. As indicated in Table 27, in Chapter N.5, the CMEA in 1990 accounted for over 29% 
of total Hungarian exports, and more than 32% of Hungarian imports. Recent developments 
within the bloc, and in particular the collapse of trade that has occurred since 1989, therefore 
have important consequences for the Hungarian economy. This section analyses recent develop-
ments in intra-CMEA trade and develops a few observations on the macroeconomic impact on 
the Hungarian economy of the collapse of CMEA trade. 
Hungary is a net exporter of machinery and equipment (which account for slightly less than half 
of its total exports to the CMEA), industrial consumer goods and agricultural products, and a net 
importer of energy, raw materials and semi-finished products, which together account for more 
than 60%  of Hungarian imports  from  the CMEA On the export side the 'specialization' in 
machinery and transport equipment increased during the last decade, while the share of agricul-
tural products has declined, reflecting an effort to redirect part of this trade towards other areas. 
Trade relations with the CMEA have entailed a massive trade diversion with respect to the pre-
war  situation, when Hungary used  to  trade  mostly with  Germany and Austria.  Furthermore, 
despite the resource transfer during the period 1960-80, in the long run the CMEA has damaged 
the economic interests of Hungary (and more generally of all  the Central and East European 
countries),  because  it  entailed  forced  patterns of specialization  and  normative  allocation  of 
industrial output; and trade dependence on the Soviet Union, particularly for  imports of raw 
materials. 
a.  The collapse of  CMEA trade 
At the beginning of 1990 Hungary seemed locked into trade dependence on the Soviet Union and 
to  stand  to lose  greatly from  an  immediate  move  to  trade  at international prices  settled in 
convertible currencies. Nonetheless, Hungary has responded better than other formerly centrally 
planned economies  to  external supply shocks  and  to the change in  CMEA arrangements.  It 
proved able to respond quickly to a dramatic decline in intra-CMEA trade, reorienting a large 
part of its exports to the hard-currency area. 
Trade with former CMEA partners accounted in roubles contracted markedly in 1990. Exports 
declined by nearly 23% with respect to the previous year, adding to the decline already recorded 
in  1989 (-4%). Similarly imports declined by about 17% in 1990, after a decline of 9% in 1989. 
Export contraction was  particularly evident in machinery (  -27%) and raw materials and semi-
finished products (  -27% ). Imports of machinery decreased by 27%, fuels and energy declined by 
21%, although this decline in the value of energy imported is  less dramatic than the decline in 
volume. However, Hungary experienced an improvement in its rouble terms of trade in 1990. At 
the same time,  its hard-currency trade increased substantially. Exports rose from US$217 m in 
1989 to US$322 m in  1990, and imports from US$157 m to US$287 m. 
CMEA trade probably reached its lowest point in 1991. The switch to dollar accounting was nearly 
complete by the end of the year, rouble transactions representing about 4% of total Hungarian 
trade instead of 25-30% in  1990. In addition, the collapse of trade had a multiplier effect in the -27-
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
The  Council for  Mutual  Economic Assistance 
(known as CMEA or Comecon)  was founded in 
1949 to assist the  economic development of its 
member  countries.  Members  were:  Bulgaria, 
Cuba,  Czechoslovakia,  the  German  Democratic 
Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, 
the  USSR  and  Vzetnam.  Albania,  a founding 
member,  ceased to participate in  1962. Angola, 
Laos,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua  and  Yugoslavia 
were observers. 
The  organization  included  several  operational 
committees and two financial institutions: 
•  the International Bank for Economic Coop-
eration  (IBEC ),  to  overcome  the  disadvan-
tages of  the bilateral payments system ofintra-
CMEA trade; 
•  the  International Investment Bank (JIB),  to 
provide  medium- and  long-term  loans  for 
investment projects common to several coun-
tries. 
The  effort  to  integrate  the  CMEA  economies 
produced extremely poor results,  and centrifugal 
forces  developed  well  before  the  economic  and 
political crises of  1989.  Trade remained the most 
important form of  economic co-operation. How-
ever,  owing to  the  inconvertibility of currencies 
and the cumbersome procedures of  state-trading 
organizations, trade took place under strict bilat-
eral agreements with annual protocols specifying 
in  detail  the  quantities  and prices for  transac-
tions.  The  mechanism  of  price determination  -
based on a moving average of  world prices over 
the preceding five years - created enormous prob-
lems,  especially  from  the  second  half of the 
1970s. 
A  'star-shaped' pattern of trade developed,  with 
the  USSR at the centre  and the East European 
countries  at the points of the  star,  and mainly 
comprising complementary trade  (raw  materials 
against manufactures). 
This was the result not of  comparative advantage 
but of  the trade diversion which occurred after the 
Second World War, away from the former natural 
trade partners in Western Europe.  Trade between 
CMEA  members,  which  accounted  for  9%  of 
their total trade in 1948, grew to 51% in 1981. 
A massive transfer of  resources took place during 
the 1970s from  the USSR to the East European 
countries.  This transfer consisted of: 
•  a substantial USSR  trade surplus with  other 
CMEA countries; 
•  implicit  trade  subsidies,  i.e.  the  opportunity 
cost  to  the  Soviet  Union  of trading  raw 
material and energy products at below world 
prices. 
The trade pattern changed in the late 1980s, when 
the USSR began to run trade deficits with almost 
all its East European partners. 
At a meeting in  Sofia  in  January  1990 it was 
decided to conduct trade in convertible currencies 
from  1 January 1991, and to apply world market 
prices to intra-CMEA trade,  without a time lag. 
The  collapse of the  Soviet market and in 1991 
the lack of  hard currency turned a slow-down in 
trade to near-collapse,  aggravating the recession 
in the East European countries. 
Finally,  after a number of  meetings and negoti-
ations,  at the 46th Session of  the CMEA on 28 
June  1991  in  Budapest,  a protocol  was  signed 
providing for  the  complete  dismantling  of the 
organization with all activities ending at the end 
of  September. 
CMEA zone, generating a regional recession and a shrinking of the ex-CMEA markets. The 
overall impact on trade volume is hard to assess at this stage. The decline in export volume to the 
CMEA is  estimated at between 30 and 50%. But convertible currency export earnings on the 
CMEA market were as high as US$  1.2 bn in the first ten months. Imports, mainly affected by 
the increase in the energy bill, amounted to US$ 1.5 bn over the same period. -28-
Table 9 Hungarian trade with CMEA partners in 1990 
(Roubles m) 
Country  Imports 
Bulgaria  94 
CSFR  835 
Cuba  6 
Poland  308 
Mongolia  7 
Romania  154 
USSR  3200 
Vietnam  21 
Exports  Balance 
48  -46 
849  14 
20  14 
207  -101 
16  9 
127  -27 
3880  680 
4  -17 
b.  Macroeconomic impact of  CMEA collapse 
( 1)  The overall impact 
The CMEA collapse has had a negative impact on output, inflation, and the state budget. 
In particular, Hungary, like the other East European countries, faces three external shocks: 
•  oil price increases; 
•  further decline in CMEA trade; 
•  and worsening of the terms of trade  . 
The increase in the oil price has come primarily from the change in the rules for determining 
price within the CMEA The price of  crude oil has increased from an estimated TR13.7 per barrel 
(US$5.89)4 in 1990 to US$20 per barrel in 1991. 
The income effect of the change of regime was estimated by the NBH at US$1-1.5 bn for 1991. 
The current account of the balance of payments has not necessarily suffered a commensurate 
deterioration, since the terms-of-trade losses expected from the regime change in the CMEA will 
be in part offset by the sharp decline in volume. 
A large part of the deterioration expected by  the NBH will  be reflected in the state budget. 
Roughly half of the impact of the shocks is accounted for by losses on the revenue side resulting 
from the disappearance of the price equalization mechanism that was a feature of intra-CMEA 
trade.  5 Future outcomes will depend on how rapidly and to what extent Hungarian enterprises 
4 
5 
Calculated using the cross rate of the NBH of TR2.325 = $1. However, determining the prices applied in intra-
CMEA transactions is controversial. The same price would be $23.4 per barrel if the official Soviet exchange rate 
of TR0.58 = $1  were applied instead. Moreover, quite apart from which exchange rate is used, the barter nature 
of trade means that the world  market price of the goods exchanged  in  return for oil  under bilateral clearing 
agreements should also be taken into account. 
The mechanism entailed payments to or from  enterprises to offset the difference between domestic prices and 
CMEA trade prices. On balance it generated net revenue for the budget -29-
are able to reorient their production towards western markets. In this respect, performance in 
1990  and  1991  was  extremely  positive.  Even sectors  heavily  engaged in CMEA trade,  like 
machinery and light industry, were able to expand the volume of their exports towards western 
partners. The process of industrial restructuring is partially linked to that of trade reorientation. 
The  reduction of trade  relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  reinforces  the  need  for  a  radical 
transformation of industrial capacity. 
According to a study by the Central Statistical Office, the decline in trade with the CMEA in the 
period 1986-90 caused a reduction in gross production of Ft120 m, with a loss of 120,000 jobs. 
Particularly affected were the machine-building and metal-working sector, especially transport 
equipment  (29%  decline  in  production over the period),  telecommunications  (  -17%  ),  shoe 
industry (  -17%  ), and iron and steel industry (  -15%  ). The reduction also had beneficial effects. In 
particular, the NBH estimated that Ft10.6 bn of hard-currency imports, i.e.  17% of total hard-
currency imports, were saved, because declining exports to the CMEA reduced requirements of 
inputs imported from the hard-currency area. 
(2)  Hungarian-Soviet trade 
The great bulk of the deterioration is accounted for by trade with the Soviet Union. The impact 
of the decline  in trade with  the other CMEA countries  including  the former  GDR is  not 
significant for the Hungarian economy. In 1990 Hungary accumulated another TR800 m surplus 
in trade with the Soviet Union. In 1991 the Soviet Union exported goods worth US$ 1.7 bn to 
Hungary. It imported from Hungary US$ 1.1 bn. Attempts by the Soviet Union to obtain goods 
on credit terms, especially letters of credit, have failed not so much because of direct controls by 
the Hungarian government, but because Hungarian enterprises have judged such deals too risky.6 
There is, however, an interest in continuing trade with the Soviet Union, especially importing oil, 
natural gas and electricity, mainly because of  lower prices and transport costs. By the end of 1991, 
Hungary had concluded trade agreements with most of the republics of the former Soviet Union, 
securing, in particular, minimum requirements for energy. 
An agreement between Hungary and the USSR (in Spring 1990) stipulated that trade between 
the two countries had to be conducted in dollars starting on 1 January 1991. The trade surplus 
accumulated in 1989 (TR658 mn) had to be converted into dollars at a rate of US$0.92 to one 
transferable rouble. 
The parties failed, however, to set a deadline for the conversion, or to establish an interest rate 
on credit up to full reimbursement. The Hungarian authorities suggested the end of 1992 as the 
final date for using up the accumulated surplus, while the USSR proposed five years. Moreover, 
the Soviet side asserted that the sum should be traded off against financial claims on Soviet 
military installations, estimated by the USSR at TR2.5 billion. Although the troops left Hungary 
on schedule, the issue still remains to be settled.  7 
At the end of June an agreement was reached whereby bilateral barter trade will be maintained 
for the short run. Soviet enterprises are allowed to use 65% of the revenues they obtain from 
6 
7 
Although  regulations on  foreign  trade and  foreign  exchange  have become very confused in  the former  Soviet 
Union, exporters are obliged to relinquish a substantial part of their export earnings to the bank dealing officially 
with foreign exchange or directly to the government. This substantially reduces the enterprises' autonomy, and their 
ability to import. 
Soviet troops were scheduled to leave Hungary by 30 June 1991 and had left by 26 June. -30-
sales to Hungarian partners to buy goods from them. The agreement has been extended for 1992 
on the basis of accords with several of the successor states of the Soviet Union. 
Table 10 
Exports 
Imports 
Balance 
Hungarian trade with the Soviet Union, 1988·90 
(Rouble m) 
1988  %change on  1989 
previous year 
4943  -2.6%  4813 
4484  -6.6%  4188 
459  625 
Source: USSR Foreign Trade Yearbook 1989-90 Goskomstat 
3.  Medium term macroeconomic framework 
%change on  1990 
previous year 
-7.8%  4436 
-13.8%  3610 
826 
The dominant features of Hungarian economic policy are, internally,  the gradual approach to 
economic reform and, externally, the strategy for dealing with the country's large foreign debt. 
Initially,  in  the  "Programme  of conversion  and  development  for  the  Hungarian  economy", 
presented in early 1991, the main policy objective was to improve the convertible-currency balance 
of payments  and  to  honour the debt.  Since  Hungary  had  advanced  further  than other East 
European economies in the transition to a market economy, it was envisaged that the domestic 
economy would  not be too  much  affected  by  the balance-of-payments  constraint.  Overall  a 
moderate growth path was projected. This scenario assumed a stable external environment. But 
the collapse of the CMEA obliged Hungary to speed up adjustment. It  succeeded in maintaining 
the external balance, but the domestic economy is  now caught up in a recessionary cycle. The 
projected trend for  the main  macroeconomic aggregates for  the period 1991-93  are shown in 
Table 11. 
Real GDP declined in 1991, but the Hungarian economy is assumed to return to a positive growth 
path already in 1992. However, the performance of the real economy in 1991 was far worse than 
expected, as  a result of the disruptions in trade with the Soviet Union. The revised target of a 
decline by 5% of  GDP in 1991 proved to be optimistic, since GDP is now estimated to have fallen 
by 7 to 9%. Given that inflation or the public deficit might require further restrictive policy, a 
recovery in  1992 may also be on the optimistic side. 
A difficulty arises from the projections for the external sector. The Hungarian authorities foresee 
a substantial reduction of the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments in 1992, 
and a balanced account by 1993. Since foreign direct investment is  not supposed to be the main 
contributor over the period, a consistent improvement in the trade balance is  implied. Even if 
export volumes increase at the rates which are envisaged (5-7% in 1992 and 6-8% in 1993) and 
the terms  of trade do  not deteriorate,  import growth  seems  to  be low  in  view  of Hungary's 
intention to restructure radically its industrial structure, and in view of the expected growth rate 
of between 3% and 5% in  1993. Import elasticity with respect to income is supposed to remain 
constant (at 1) in 1992 and 1993, despite the different growth assumptions for the two years, and 
almost at the same level recorded in  1990 (1.1), a year of steep decline in the growth rate. -31-
Indeed, the trade surplus recorded in 1990 was achieved in the context of  domestic recession, with 
a fall in domestic demand. The great emphasis placed on macroeconomic stabilization produced 
a steeper than expected output decline, but had the positive effect of alleviating pressures on the 
balance of payments. This is  unlikely to happen in periods of sustained growth, which are an 
essential prerequisite for a successful policy of reducing the burden of the debt. 
The decision to gear all policy instruments to honouring the foreign debt entails significant short-
and medium-term costs. The debt already imposes a serious burden on domestic resources, which 
is likely to increase further in the years to come. The government's strategy is to reduce absorp-
tion sufficiently (i.e. to channel enough domestic resources to servicing the debt), for the debt 
burden to decline. The short-term reduction of absorption is expected to pay off in the long run, 
when structural reforms raise the efficiency of resource allocation. 
However, in the case of formerly centrally planned economies (and Hungary is no exception) the 
reduction of domestic absorption does not just take the form  of reduced private and public 
consumption, but materializes mostly in a massive reduction of investment. Gross ftxed  capital 
formation declined by 8.7% in 1990, in line with a trend that has been present in the Hungarian 
economy since the beginning of the 1980s. In Hungary, as in all other planned economies, the 
investment ratio was very high (see section 1.3), but it has been dramatically reduced and is now 
similar to the EC average. The decline in investment was sharp in 1990, exceeding 40% in mining 
and metallurgy, 16% in engineering, 35% in light industry and 28% in agriculture. Obviously these 
data reflect a declining role of direct state investment in the economy. However, there are other 
factors that discourage savings and constrain private investment. 
In particular, a large spread exists between banks' deposit and lending rates. This reflects partially 
structural deficiencies of the banking system (bad loans, limited inter-bank competition, etc.). It 
is, however, mostly the result of  the increasing costs of  servicing the debt, external and public, the 
latter benefiting from preferential interest rates. To meet these the National Bank has set a high 
refinancing rate, which amounts to an implicit tax levied on the banking sector. In other words, 
the spread on interest rates is necessary to enable the banks to service their indebtedness to the 
NBH. 
Such market distortions act as a disincentive to investment. In spite of a good external perform-
ance and a slow down in inflation, there is no sign in Hungary of a reversal in investment trends. 
This will be a major constraint on growth in the medium term. -32-
Table 11  Programme for conversion and development of the Hungarian economy 
Targets/Projection 
1990  1991  1992  1993 
init.  rev. 
Annual percentage change 
Real GOP  -4.3  -3.0  -5.0  1-3  3-5 
Domestic demand  -5.3  -4.7  -6.5  0-1  1-3 
Private consumption  -4.5  -4.0  -6.2  0-1  2-4 
Gross ftxed investment  -8.7  -4.0  -8.4  1  1-2 
Consumer prices (end-year)  33.4  31  30  17  9 
GOP deflator  25.6  27  28.4  19  12 
Export volumes  -6.9  -6.2  -6.0  5-7  6-8 
Import volumes  -6.4  -6.9  -5.0  1-3  3-5 
As percentage of GOP 
Domestic 
Consolidated budget balance  -0.7  -1.2  -1.9  -0.5  0 
Revenue  51.8  49.2  48.0  48  46 
Expenditure  52.5  50.7  49.9  48.5  46 
Gross domestic investment  24.8  24.6  22.3  23  23 
Gross national savings  24.8  20.8  24.5  22  23 
External sector 
Current account1  -0.4  -3.6  -2.4  -2  0 
Gross debt1  64.3  65.7  63.1  64  59 
In millions of US$ (unless otherwise sp_ecified) 
External current account1  -80  -1200  -800  -650  0 
Overall balance of payments1  -607  -168  57  -488  -537 
Foreign direct investment  356  550  716  550  550 
Gross official reserves1  1029  1955  2046  2400  2600 
(months of merchandise imports)  2.0  1.9  2.3  2.2  2.2 
Debt service ratio1 (in % of  57.0  36.2  39.0  33  28 
merchandise export earnings) 
Subsidies (%of GOP)  9  7  7  5  4 
Privatization  -- 8-10  8-10  20-24  35-40 
(% of business assets) 
Import liberalization 
(% of industrial production)  32  72  72  at least 80  at least 80 
1 in convertible currencies 
Source: Hungarian Ministry of Finance (6) 
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N.  ECONONUCSTRUCTURE 
1.  Labour market and social safety net 
a.  The administered labour market of  the 1980s 
Since the end of the 1970s labour supply in the Hungarian labour market has been in steady 
decline. Its demographic base eroded as  the total Hungarian population shrank by 0.13% p.a. 
throughout the 1980s to 10.6 m in 1989. The main reason was that fertility fell below reproduction 
level,  after increasing briefly in the first  half of the 1970s;  this increase is  evident today in  a 
temporary 'bulge' in young labour market entrants. In addition, life expectancy is  among the 
lowest of all East European countries: 66.1 years for men and 74.2 years for women. There was 
some migratory inflow from the Hungarian minority in Romania, but no visible emigration. 
The potential labour supply has been constrained further by  a low retirement age (men >60, 
women >55), which may reflect the low life expectancy, but early retirement has also been used 
to adjust the labour supply to employment losses.  'Total manpower resources', i.e.  the popu-
lation of working age and all those above or below the working age who are active, declined by 
0.6% p.a. to 6.2 min 1988. Economic participation, however, which had always been high, edged 
higher still to 69.3% in 1988, compared to an EC average of  65.3% (total labour force/population 
15-64), limiting the decrease in the total labour force to -0.4% p.a., or 4.8 m in 1988. As total 
employment shrank by virtually the same amount,  the Hungarian labour market was  kept in 
overall equilibrium. Vacancies always substantially exceeded the minimal open unemployment, for 
which official registration was introduced only in 1986. 
The management of  labour supply showed little differentiation among individuals: e.g. general cuts 
in working  time  introduced in  industry in  two  steps  in the late  1960s  and  the early  1980s, 
amounting to some 20% between 1960 and 1987, were preferred over individual part-time work, 
which provided only 1.5% of total employment in 1985. More differentiation was probably found 
in the extensive second economy: in 1988, 70% of women and 81% of men were recorded as 
having a second gainful activity, most of them in agriculture-related activities on smallholdings 
(  48% of women, 42% of men). 
Table 12  Employment by major sector (as % of total) 
1975  1982  1988 
Agriculture  22.6  23.1  20.4 
Industry  35.6  32.3  30.9 
Construction  8.2  7.6  7.1 
Services  33.6  37.0  41.6 
of which 
Transport and telecomm.  7.7  7.9  8.3 
Trade  9.0  9.8  10.7 
Total employment (million)  5.1  5.0  4.9 
Source: IMF - Hungary - Recent Economic Developments - April 1989. -34-
The sectoral development of employment  (see Table 12)  reveals  a decline in  industrial em-
ployment by one-fifth between 1975 and 1988. The construction sector shrank to a similar extent, 
in spite of a chronic shortage of  housing. Throughout this period employment in the service sector 
expanded,  a  development  which  accelerated  after  1982  as  private  activities  were  gradually 
legalized. 
Even in 1988, the socialized sector (including socialized agriculture) was the main employer, pro-
viding  nearly  95%  of total  employment.  In  the  1980s  the  socialized  sector,  however,  lost 
employment much faster than the economy overall. The private sector, on the other hand, has 
become a source of dynamic output and employment creation. Major areas of private activity are 
agriculture, housing construction (95% of  which is private) and services (in consumer services, e.g. 
repair work, maintenance, trade, the private sector share is some 60% ). 'Workers' associations' 
using  facilities  of socialized enterprises outside official working hours were popular until  the 
introduction of personal income tax, and today they have virtually ceased to exist. Estimates of 
the share of private sector employment in 1991 range from 7% to 15%. 
b.  The emergence of  open unemployment 
Towards the end of the 1980s open unemployment became noticeable: labour shedding increased 
as a result of some rationalization in certain crisis industries (mining, metallurgy) and of a system 
of tax-based wage control (see 2.4), which induced the dismissal of marginal employees, mainly 
unskilled workers and pensioners. Nevertheless, registered unemployment had only crept up to 
some 23,000 (0.5% of the labour force) at the end of 1989. 
Since  the beginning of 1990,  however,  the restrictive  macroeconomic  policy,  the collapse of 
CMEA trade,  the  temporary  demographic  'bulge'  (100,000  additional  young  labour  market 
entrants  in  1990-92)  and,  to a  lesser  extent,  rationalization  and  modernization  of the large 
socialized  enterprises have drastically changed the picture: industrial employment, which had 
declined by 4% in 1989, fell by 11% between January 1990 and January 1991. Registered unem-
ployment  increased  to about 400,000  (8.3%  of the labour force)  by  the end of 1991,  while 
vacancies fell to a negligible level. Although the unemployment level is still low, the sheer speed 
of the increase has created much insecurity and prompted repeated adjustment of policies. 
Reflecting this insecurity, forecasts for unemployment range widely: different sources expect 10-
15% by the end of 1992, a peak in 1993 and some decline in 1994. Estimates of the total amount 
of non-profitable employment under market conditions amount to 15-20% of  current employment 
(20-30% in the state enterprise sector). The impact on unemployment may be attenuated by some 
voluntary withdrawal from the labour market, but it will mainly depend on job creation, which is 
currently very small, at least to the extent that it is captured by official statistics. 
The composition of registered unemployment in summer 1990 indicates that unemployment is 
becoming a widespread phenomenon, even if professional and skilled workers are still far less 
affected. Furthermore, strong regional differences have emerged: in greater Budapest, where some 
30%  of the labour  force  is  located,  unemployment  is  still  minuscule;  in  fact,  workers  with 
knowledge of western languages or business practices are very scarce and well remunerated. But 
unemployment in some other regions already exceeded 7-11% of their labour force in July 1991. 
The development of regional mobility, which is at the moment virtually non-existent, should thus 
be a key  priority of labour market policy, but has to be addressed by other policies as well, in 
particular with regard to transport and housing (see 2.3). -35-
c.  The search for an effective social security net 
Along with the economic reforms of the 1980s, institutions were created or adjusted to address 
the growing involuntary job losses:  labour offices,  active employment promotion policies  and 
unemployment insurance emerged. The gradual tightening of  labour market conditions prompted 
a search for the most appropriate solutions, but the sharp acceleration of unemployment from 
1990 is stretching labour market policies to their limits. 
In the traditional paternalistic approach to labour, income was provided only through employment, 
and it was the obligation of the state to provide employment to every citizen considered fit for 
work. Thus the employment offices, which became institutions in their own right in 1981, initially 
focused on matching employment requests with registered vacancies - though even in 1989 only 
6-7% of total labour market turnover involved the employment offices - and on active labour 
market policies. The major policies available at one time or another included retraining support 
(which provided some 30,000 places in 1990), temporary payments to larger enterprises to delay 
redundancies (  4,000 in 1988), work-fare (20,000 in 1990), marginal employment subsidies (10,000 
additional employed until 1990), early retirement (10,000 in 1990) and loans for independent 
activities (20,000 in the first half of 1990), which had to be suspended in mid-1990 because the 
funds were being abused. In 1988 the expenditures for these measures were consolidated in an 
Employment Fund, which was nevertheless still fully financed from the budget. Today the employ-
ment offices have grown to a network of  20 regional employment centres with some 150 branches 
and  1,200 staff.  The share of the resources allocated to labour market administration in the 
Hungarian budget is still 5 percentage points lower than in most OECD countries. Their work is 
complemented by  private placement agencies,  which  focus  in  particular on professional and 
managerial employees. 
More and more, however, the growing number of unemployed exceeded the state's capacity to 
act as the 'employer of last resort• which, in the absence of any welfare system outside the work 
sphere left a growing number of people without means of subsistence. Therefore from the start 
of 1989  unemployment  benefits  were  introduced:  eligibility  was  based  on previous  gainful 
employment of at least eighteen months within  the last three years  (which  excluded school 
leavers),  the replacement ratio was  50%-70% of the last salary for one year,  after which  a 
'temporary' unemployment allowance of 75% of the benefit would be granted. The introduction 
of such an individual transfer based on previous income stimulates mobility towards higher paid 
private-sector activities, as it partially covers the much higher unemployment risk. Because of the 
limited eligibility and the unfamiliarity of the scheme, only some 40% of registered unemployed 
were receiving  benefits  at the end of 1989,  but that share increased to 80%  at the end of 
February 1991. 
By then it had become obvious that the financial requirements of  the unemployment benefits were 
overwhelming the means allocated to the Employment Fund, which forced active employment 
measures to be aborted. The Employment Promotion Act of 1 March 1991 therefore separated 
the two tasks: the Employment Fund continues to be financed by an annual budgetary allocation 
and focuses on active labour market policies; unemployment compensation and early retirement 
payments are now provided from a newly created 'Solidarity Fund', which is mainly financed by 
contributions of employers (1.5% of gross wages, from 1 July 1991) and employees (0.5%). The 
Hungarian Solidarity Fund is in fact the first unemployment insurance fund in Eastern Europe. 
Eligibility for unemployment benefits now depends on a minimum of 360 days of contributions 
over the past four years. State employees are automatically considered to have contributed over 
the past four years; the transitional rules for employees in the private sector are not clear. In the -36-
future a system  based on contributions will  provide an incentive to employees to seek legal 
employment. The length of the period during which benefit is paid varies between 180 and 720 
days, depending on the accumulated contribution periods; the replacement ratio is 70% of  the last 
income in the first half and 50% in the second half of the period, but never below the minimum 
wage.  The last  condition  may  tum out to be a  disincentive  to  take  up  legal  employment. 
Graduates of colleges and universities can now also  receive benefits of 75% of the minimum 
wage. A tripartite Labour Market Committee supervises the working of the system and decides 
on the use of the funds for active labour market policies. Given the recent rates of increase in 
unemployment, the budget contribution to the Solidarity Fund had to be increased by 50% in 
1991 and will have to be raised again in 1992; higher contributions and reductions in the benefits 
are under discussion. 
The pension system, which is  to be transformed into an insurance system,  is  also under heavy 
strain because of the deteriorating demographic structure and the low  retirement age.  If an 
improving economic situation has beneficial effects on health, the retirement age will have to be 
raised along with rising life expectancy. Higher contributions would run the risk of a growing tax-
wedge increasing the incentive for prime-age workers to work in the hidden economy. Although 
the real value of small pensions appears to have been maintained better than that of pensions in 
general,  the  average  pension  level  is  clearly below what  the Statistical  Office considers  the 
minimum subsistence income  (Ft8200 per month for  a single person). This explains  the high 
participation of pensioners both in the open and in the hidden economy. 
Eventually a system of income supplements based on need (measured by family structure, income 
and possibly assets) will have to be created to provide the bottom level of the social safety net. 
This becomes more urgent as subsidies on specific consumption (food, transport, rents) are phased 
out. The net effect of such a transformation would still offer budgetary savings, as direct income 
transfers are a more efficient means of targeting support to the lowest income groups. 
Housing policy is of key importance in the context both of social security and of labour market 
mobility. The average number of private houses (supplemented by state provision) built between 
1976 and 1985 was 58,000, compared with 24,000 state dwellings. But high real interest rates for 
new mortgages and reduced budgetary means for housing subsidies have curtailed construction. 
While the availability of private housing, which is often inhabited by several generations, provides 
some social cushion in periods of  structural transformation, it is also one of  the strongest obstacles 
to labour mobility.  A real-estate market and a regulatory environment which  permits flexible 
tenancy contracts and sub-letting should be established. 
d.  From direct wage control to collective wage bargaining 
Wage  determination  is  gradually changing to collective  bargaining with  a significant  national 
component.  In  the  past,  central wage  control was  used  to control private consumption  and 
inflation.  Workers  or enterprises  were subject  to direct  wage  regulation.  In the  process  of 
economic reform, however, wage determination devolved to the level of the enterprise, which 
tended to exploit its soft budget constraint to obtain high wage increases for its employees. To 
control the potential development of inflation a tax-based incomes policy was introduced: in 1988 
an  incremental tax rate of 100% was  applied on wage growth exceeding nationally determined 
limits of 2.5% for the wage bill or 3.5%' for the average wage. Strong state enterprises obtained 
exceptions ('wage clubs'), but overall the policy succeeded in keeping wage inflation to 4% (7% 
in industry). -37-
At the beginning of 1989 wage determination was transformed further to a system of collective 
bargaining: since then a tripartite 'National Council for Reconciliation of Interests' has negoti-
ated the minimum wage and a reference rate of  wage growth. Further collective bargaining takes 
place on the enterprise level, no sectoral bargaining structures exist yet. In the absence of an 
effective bankruptcy threat for state enterprises, this system was unable to prevent wage inflation 
from accelerating quickly: already in 1989 the actual wage growth of 16-17% exceeded by far the 
planned rate of 6-7%. In 1990 gross monthly wages in industry are estimated to have grown by 
23%, and there are estimates of a further acceleration to 30% in 1991. The nominal wage push 
is an important component of the inflationary pressures which have built up since 1987, although 
real wages have declined since the beginning of the 1980s. 
There is now a strong reliance on national tripartite negotiation to steer labour market adjustment 
(also with regard to the Employment Fund and the Solidarity Fund, see 2.3). The organizational 
foundations of such a structure are still weak, however, as  private employers' organizations are 
only  beginning  to  emerge,  and  the main  trade  union  is  still  the descendant of the former 
communist trade union, which was the only legal union until1988. 
Wage differentiation was  in the past limited by the traditional rigidly egalitarian system under 
which the government determined minimum and maximum wages ('brackets' or 'tariffs'): under 
this system skilled workers could earn no more than 1.5 times and top executives no more than 
4  times  the wages  of unskilled workers.  Today enterprise managers  have  larger margins  for 
differentiating wages, but actual wage differentiation appears slow to move away from the old 
bracket system. The main wage differentiation is developing between the state and the private 
sector, with foreign firms as the driving force. 
e.  Education and training 
Employment and income in Hungary will  depend critically on the quality and flexibility of its 
human resources. In some respects Hungary appears to have a reasonable starting position: the 
literacy rate is  98% of adults,  primary school enrolment reaches 97% of the age group (it is 
compulsory up to the age of 16), secondary school enrolment is 70%, but about half of this is in 
'apprentice schools' which offer little additional training. While total expenditure on education 
(5%  of GDP in  1986)  exceeds  the level  of Germany (4.5%;  for  comparison:  France 5.8%, 
Netherlands 6.8%  ), these expenditures are mainly focused on basic education. Only 15% of the 
university-age  population  attend college  or university,  compared with  about 30%  in  OECD 
countries. 
Hungary  has  an important  tradition  in  science  and technological  research  and  has  tried  to 
maintain its capacity by investing about 2.6% of  its GDP in R&D, a much higher proportion than 
other countries with similar levels of development. The restricted access to Western technology 
has,  however, hampered the quality of the efforts. The risk of a brain drain involving the best 
scientific and engineering professionals is already present. -38-
2.  Energy 
Hungary's primary energy consumption has increased steadily since 1970. In 1988, the last year 
for which detailed data are available, 23% of primary energy requirements were satisfied by coal 
and coke, 32% by oil and oil derivatives, 27% by  natural gas,  and the rest by electric energy, 
nuclear power and wood. 
Hungary is relatively poor in natural resources and imports slightly more than half of its energy 
needs. The main domestic sources of energy are coal, which accounts for 22% of fmal consump-
tion, and natural gas (19% ). Domestic production of  crude oil represents 11% of final consump-
tion. According to the Hungarian authorities, however, this contnbution will decrease substantially 
in the next few years, and additional annual imports of 1 million tons will be required by 1995. 
The main energy supplier is the Soviet Union, which in 1989 exported over 6 million tons of oil, 
1.5 million tons of  oil derivatives, 11 million Kw/H of  electric energy, and 1.4 million tons of  coal, 
as well as natural gas worth 0.5 billion roubles. 
Table 13 
Production 
Imports 
Exports 
Primary supply 
Energy supply, 1988 
(m tons oil equivalent) 
Oil 
2.9 
-9.6 
2.5 
10.0 
Final consumption  8.3 
Source: Energy Data Associates 
Gas 
4.9 
-5.1 
--
10.0 
7.8 
Coal  Elec.  Other  Total 
5.5  2.7  0.7  16.7 
-2.9  -3.0  -- -20.6 
0.2  0.5  -- 3.2 
8.2  5.2  0.7  34.1 
6.0  2.5  0.7  25.3 
Oil supply difficulties emerged in  1990. At the beginning of the year, Hungary and the Soviet 
Union had reached an agreement for delivery of  6.5 m tons, which was subsequently revised down 
to 5.1 m tons. Both in September and in October, however, further cutbacks were announced, as 
a result of the Soviet Union's inability to meet requirements, and total deliveries for the whole 
year amounted to about 4.9 m tons. In 1991, the Soviet export capacity was further reduced and 
Hungary imported only 3.2 million tons of crude oil from the region. 
Hungary's  reliance on Soviet energy supplies is  not likely to change in  the future. A  further 
decline in  oil  imports from  the Soviet Union can be envisaged, because of the switch to hard 
currency settlement at world market prices, but lower transport costs will mean that Soviet oil will 
remain competitive. -39-
3.  Agriculture 
The agricultural sector accounted for 20.8% of Hungary's gross domestic product, and employed 
about 20% of the total labour force in 1989. It is organized in state farms, cooperatives, private 
and small-scale farms.  In 1989,  cooperatives and small-scale farms  accounted for  the bulk of 
production.  The cooperative sector dominates  in  terms  of the number of productive  units, 
employees and percentage of cultivated land. It  also predominates in the output of arable crops, 
especially wheat, maize and sugar beet, and is a large producer of cattle and sheep, whereas the 
private sector is somewhat strong in animal production, notably pigs and poultry. Private output 
is also very important in fruit and vegetables (see Table 15). 
The main crops are maize and wheat, but Hungary also has a sizeable production of sugar beet, 
fruit and vegetables. The livestock sector is strong in pigs and cattle, and poultry production is 
also important. Wheat, cattle and poultry are important export items (Table 15). 
Up to 1989 Hungarian agriculture was viewed as a success. Reforms began earlier than in any 
other sector, and already in the early 1970s central control was less stringent in agriculture than 
in industry. Reforms succeeded in increasing crop yields at least up to 1989. It is difficult, how-
ever, to evaluate the real extent of  the success, because of the lack of transparency resulting from 
the price-subsidy-tax regime and massive subsidies. 
Although Hungarian agriculture made gradual improvements from 1964, market mechanisms never 
replaced state control. Agriculture, like other sectors of the economy, continued to be character-
ized by price distortions, output restrictions and soft-budget constraints. The lack of  incentive was 
partly solved by  permitting farmers  to work on private plots and allowing decentralization of 
agricultural activity within a farm. To ensure output of an assortment of products corresponding 
to the needs of the population and to CMEA commitments, an array of financial incentives was 
constructed, which resulted in bargaining between state and farms. 
In 1990 and 1991, Hungarian agriculture faced several shocks. Both domestic demand and demand 
from the CMEA declined, though this was partly counterbalanced by improved access to the EC 
and other western markets. Severe drought affected crop yields in 1990, and costs were increased 
substantially by inflation and reduced subsidies on agricultural credits. Given these shocks, it is 
not surprising that agricultural production has contracted, although the decline has been less than 
that in industry. 
In 1991, domestic price distortions and output restrictions were almost completely eliminated, and 
nearly all  of Hungary's external trade is  now conducted at market prices  and in convertible 
currencies. Nonetheless, Hungarian agriculture needs further liberalization and an infusion of 
western capital, which it is hoped will come from privatization. 
The process of privatization, which began with cooperatives in 1989, has been very slow, mainly 
because of the difficulties in settling the property rights issue. The transition process is unlikely 
to accelerate  until  the government  has  a  coherent set of policies  designed  to promote the 
privatization of agricultural cooperatives. 
Moreover, as for many other economic activities, under present conditions it is quite difficult to 
distinguish those enterprises in temporary difficulties from those which will remain unprofitable 
in the long run. The low level of net investment is a major constraint for the immediate future. -40-
Table 14  Main Data on Agriculture, 1989 
Number of  A.ver.  Employ  Aver. size  Cult. land 
Units  ment  of farms  (per cent) 
(1000)  (ha.) 
State farms  136  118  6887  26.1 
Cooperatives  1388  424  4177  62.1 
Small-scale  1435  11.9  - -
Total  2959  - - 100.0 
Source: CSO Statistical Pocket Book- 1989 
Table 15  Value of Output of Main Products by Social Sector 
1988, Ft. billion 
Forint bn  State farm  Coope- Small scale 
rative 
Total crops  24.1  99.3  54.5 
Wheat  4.1  25.6  0.7 
Maize  5.1  22.7  7.0 
Sugar beet  0.9  5.1  0.6 
Vegetables2  0.6  3.6  23.1 
Fruits  2.6  4.1  10.4 
Grapes  2.2  2.4  7.5 
Total livestock  33.5  73.5  77.4 
Pigs  11.8  20.7  37.8 
Cattle  10.4  30.0  10.0 
Poultry  7.3  17.1  23.3 
Sheep  0.8  4.9  2.3 
Total output  57.6  172.8  131.9 
1  As percentage of production in 1989. 
2  incl. potatoes 
Source: CSO: Statistical Pocket Book - 1989; 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Hungary: Country Profile 1990-91 
Production 
(in per cent) 
Animal  Plant 
17.3  12.7 
40.4  55.3 
42.3  32.0 
100.0  100.0 
Total  Volume of 
exports as 
%of pro-
duction1 
177.9  -
30.4  22 
34.7  3 
6.5  -
27.3  41 
17.1  39 
12.2  -
184.4  -
70.3  5 
50.5  26 
47.6  31 
7.9  74 
362.3  --41-
Table 16  Production of Basic Crops, 1971-89, million tons 
1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1987  1988  1989 
Average  Average  Average 
Grain crops  11.4  12.6  14.4  14.2  15.0  15.4 
of which:  4.3  5.2  6.1  5.8  7.0  6.5 
Wheat 
Maize  5.9  6.4  7.0  7.2  6.3  7.0 
Sugar beet  3.1  4.0  4.5  4.3  4.5  5.3 
Vegetables  1.8  2.0  1.8  2.2  2.3  2.0 
Fruit  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.6  1.7  1.6 
Wine1  495  516  498  326  471  385 
1  Million litres 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Hungary: Country Profile 1990-91 
Table 17  Production of Livestock, 1984-89 ('000 bead) 
('000 Head)  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Cattle  1901  1766  1725  1664  1690  1598 
Pigs  9237  8280  8687  8216  8327  7660 
Sheep  2832  2465  2337  2336  2216  2069 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit - Hungary: Country Profile 1990-91 
4.  Industrial structure and policy 
This section seeks to describe the structural changes under way in the Hungarian economy and 
certain policies which may affect those changes. The first part examines the current structure of 
the Hungarian economy and industry and the structural changes which took place during the 
1980s. The second part is devoted to the aims and constraints of Hungarian industrial policy. 
a.  Cu"ent structure of  the economy and structural changes during the 1980s 
(1)  Overall structure 
The overall structure of the Hungarian economy differs markedly from that of  western countries. 
Table 18, which compares the structure of  employment in the major sectors (agriculture, industry 
and energy, construction and services) in Hungary with that in the EC, the United States and 
Japan, shows that: -42-
•  the share represented by agriculture is appreciably greater in Hungary: 18.4% compared with 
10.3% in Japan, 6.6% in the EC and 2.8% in the United States; 
•  the share represented by industry is  also much higher in Hungary: 30.4% compared with 
24.4% in the EC, 23.9% in Japan and 16.7% in the United States; 
•  the share represented by services, by contrast, is  lower in Hungary: 44.2% compared with 
56.3% in Japan, 61.8% in the EC and 75.2% in the United States. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Hungarian economy underwent a process of industrialization, 
which had the effect of reducing the importance of the agricultural sector (which accounted for 
more than a third of the working population in 1960, as compared with 18% in 1989). The trend 
in the 1980s was  more one of •tertiarization', with the result that industry's share of GDP and 
total employment fell, while that of  services rose. Between 1980 and 1989, the share of industrial 
employment decreased from 33.3%  to 30.4%, while that of services increased from  37.7%  to 
44.2% (see Table 19). Recent data suggest that this trend is likely to continue, the services sector 
being less affected by recession than the industrial sector. 
However, the contribution of the services sector to GDP in Hungary is still well below that in 
western countries. This discrepancy provides an indication of the potential growth of this sector 
in the East European countries, particularly as it is bound to play a key role in their transition to 
market  economies.  Efficient  transport,  communications,  banking  and  insurance  services  are 
necessary if firms are to operate effectively and the private sector is to develop. 
(2)  Structure of Hungarian industry 
An analysis  of the structure of Hungarian industry shows that 'heavy' industif accounted, in 
1989  for  68.8%  of industrial output and for  60.5%  of industrial employment (see Table 20). 
Within heavy  industry,  the extractive and metal-manufacturing industries still play a relatively 
important role (accounting for 16.2% of industrial output and 12.2% of industrial employment), 
a  pattern of industrial specialization which  is  scarcely consistent with  Hungary's comparative 
advantage,  given  its  scarce energy and  mineral  resources.  An effort is  currently being made, 
however, to reduce the role of these industries in the Hungarian economy and to boost that of 
the capital goods industries, whose share of industrial output and employment is relatively low by 
western standards.  In 1989 the engineering sectors accounted for  approximately a quarter of 
industrial output and a third of industrial employment. 
Light industry accounts for 12.6% of industrial output and for 22.2% of industrial employment, 
while in the agri-foodstuffs sector the equivalent percentages are 17.8% and 15.2%. Within light 
industry,  textiles, clothing and footwear occupy an important position, accounting for 7.4% of 
industrial output and for 14.6% of industrial employment. 
Table 21  compares the industrial structures of Hungary and the EC.  The comparison is  only 
approximate because of different nomenclatures which mean that, although sectors may have the 
same names, they do not always cover the same field of activity. In Hungary some sectors account 
for  a  higher proportion of industrial employment than in  the EC. Such  is  the case with  the 
extractive  and  metal-manufacturing  industries  (12.6%  compared with  3.8%  in  the EC),  the 
8  In  Hungarian industrial statistics the definition of heavy industry is wider than that commonly used in western 
countries and includes power generation, the extractive and metal-manufacturing industries and chemicals. -43-
construction materials sector (  4. 7% compared with 4% in the EC), textiles, clothing and footwear 
(16.2% compared with 9.9% in the EC) and agri-foodstuffs (15% compared with 8.8% in the EC). 
This would seem to suggest  that Hungary's  industrial specialization is  closer  to that of the 
countries in the south of the EC than to that of those in the north. In countries such as Greece, 
Portugal and, to a  lesser extent, Spain,  a higher proportion of industrial employment is  also 
accounted for by the more traditional and labour-intensive industries than is the case for the rest 
of the Community. By contrast, sectors such as engineering and chemicals play a lesser role in 
Hungary than in the EC. Within the engineering sector, it should be noted that the discrepancy 
between the share of industrial employment in Hungary and that in the Community is  more 
marked in the transport equipment and metal-manufacturing sectors and less  marked in the 
machinery  and  electrical  and  electronic  equipment  industries,  which  seem  to be relatively 
developed in Hungary. 
In the course of the 1980s changes occurred in the structure of Hungarian industry: the shares 
of  heavy industry and the agri-foodstuffs industry increased, while that of  light industry diminished. 
This trend is more apparent in the case of  employment than in that of production. some industrial 
restructuring seems to have taken place. The role of  some branches diminished. For example the 
share of  the mining and metal-manufacturing industries in industrial employment fell from 13.1% 
to 12.2% between 1980 and 1989, transport equipment from 6.5% to 5.5%  and the textile and 
clothing industry from  12.2%  to 10.9%. By  contrast, such sectors as  mechanical engineering, 
electrical and electronic equipment, precision instruments, man-made fibres and pharmaceuticals 
saw their shares of industrial output and employment rise. This trend was consistent with one of 
the aims of Hungarian industrial policy, which is to strengthen the role of sectors with a higher 
technology content. 
b.  Trend of  industrial production 
The Hungarian economy is currently experiencing its sharpest recession of the entire post-war 
period. The decline in industrial output began in 1988 and has accelerated since then, reaching 
3.4% in 1989 and 8.5% in 1990. In 1991 the fall in industrial output accelerated; the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade has  estimated  a  fall  of between  10%  and  15%.  This  fall  in  Hungarian 
industrial output is  principally due to two factors:  the low level of domestic demand and the 
contraction of Hungarian exports to CMEA countries. 
It should be emphasized, however, that the decline in industrial output may have been overes-
timated for statistical reasons. For the output of frrms  employing fewer than 50 people only 
estimates exist . These are based on the tax returns completed by the managers of  these small and 
medium-sized firms.  The number of such firms has increased very sharply,  and,  according to 
estimates made by the Ministry of  Industry and Trade, their output is likely to have grown by 70% 
in 1990. The underestimation of industrial output has grown in parallel with the development of 
the small, private sector and, according to the Hungarian Statistical Office, probably amounted 
to 15% in 1990. 
As Table 22 shows, the decline in industrial output is not evenly distributed over all industries. 
In 1990 the sectors hardest hit by the recession were the metal-manufacturing and extractive 
industries  (falls  of 19%  and  11.8%  respectively),  the engineering sector (-15.7%)  and light 
industry (  -10%  ).  By contrast, the chemical industry (  -5.4%  ),  the construction materials sector 
(  -5%) and the agri-foodstuffs industry (  -0.9%) suffered a  below-average fall  in output, while 
power generation even recorded a slight rise ( +0.2%  ). -44-
The slump  in  CMEA trade,  in  particular with  the Soviet  Union,  has  affected  a  number of 
industries whose output went mainly to that market. This is  the case with certain capital goods 
industries (for example, transport equipment (buses), telecommunications and instruments), the 
metal-manufacturing industry (in particular aluminium production, where there was a fall of  30% 
in orders from the rouble area) and the footwear industry. 
c.  Industrial policy 
Hungarian industrial policy is subject to a number of constraints which, more than the adoption 
of a clearly defined strategy, guide decisions in  this  field.  The major constraints affecting the 
reorganization of Hungarian industry include the need to accumulate foreign currency because 
of the economy's high level of indebtedness, the scarcity of raw material and energy resources, 
inadequate infrastructure, the lack of domestic capital, technological backwardness and the lack 
of managerial expertise;  these last  three factors  explain the favourable treatment afforded to 
foreign investment. 
The restructuring currently under way in the Hungarian economy is designed first and foremost 
to reduce the activities of  the raw-material- and energy-intensive industries, and in particular those 
of the metal-manufacturing industries. The measures adopted in these industries are intended to 
cut subsidies and protection, to reduce the number of production plants and to modernize existing 
plants. In the extractive and metal-manufacturing industries generally, which are major consumers 
of energy and are also  liable to generate environmental problems, the Ministry of Industry is 
especially anxious to ensure that the privatization process is not accompanied by the creation of 
additional production capacity but instead by the modernization of existing capacity which will 
pave the way for the manufacture of more processed and higher quality products. 
By  contrast,  the  activities  of a  number  of capital  goods  industries  are  being  encouraged, 
particularly through tax rebates. These sectors include those producing agricultural machinery and 
machinery  for  the  agri-foodstuffs  industry,  the  electronics  and  data-processing  industry,  the 
telecommunications equipment sector and the car industry. In the last case, the aim is to create 
assembly activities and plants to produce spare parts in order to satisfy domestic demand better.
9 
In these capital  goods  sectors cooperation with  foreign  investors  is  being sought. In the car 
industry, for example, joint ventures have already been undertaken with GM, Ford and Suzuki. 
A principal objective of the restructuring process is to increase Hungary's export capacity. How 
far and how fast firms that have traditionally exported to CMEA will improve the quality of their 
products sufficiently to meet the standards of western markets has yet to be seen. The greater 
openness of the economy should  promote specialization  in  Hungarian  industry that is  more 
consistent with its comparative advantage than was the case within the CMEA framework. This 
should make it easier for Hungary to disengage from energy-intensive activities. 
Industrial restructuring is being held back, however, by a number of obstacles, of which the most 
important are: 
• 
• 
9 
the lack of capital; 
the underdeveloped banking system, the consequent difficulty of  gaining access to credit and 
the excessively high cost of credit; 
Nestorovich,  C.  (1990), 'L'industrie automobile  ~ l'est:  strat~gies nationales et internationates•, le  Courrier des 
pays de  l'est No. 350, Mai-Juin, pp. 3-33. -45-
•  the difficulty of gauging the value of firms,  though the new accounting law could improve 
the situation; 
•  problems linked to the rigidity of the labour market, the lack of labour mobility and the 
necessity of lengthy negotiations with trade unions over redundancies. 
Instead of pursuing a highly centralized industrial policy, therefore, the Hungarian government 
wishes  to  create  conditions  favourable  to  industrial  reorganization  by  providing  transport, 
communications  and  business  service  infrastructures,  by  facilitating  foreign  investment,  by 
stimulating innovation and by liberalizing trade. 
Privatizations should also help to bolster the industrial restructuring process. Privatization is seen 
not as an end in itself but rather as a means of making Hungarian industry more competitive. To 
that end, the privatization strategy set out by the Ministry of Trade and Industry clearly focuses 
on the interrelationships between privatization and restructuring by identifying the firms for which 
privatization should be combined with reorganization. In the extractive industries, for example, 
privatization should be accompanied by the closure of unprofitable production units, while in the 
engineering  sector  partners  are being sought  as  a  means  of promoting  firms'  technological 
development. 
Table 18  Structure of employment; Hungary compared with the EC, the United States and 
Japan 
Employment (%  )1 
Hungary  EC2  us  Japan 
Agriculture  18.4  6.6  2.8  10.3 
Industry and energy  30.4  24.4  16.7  23.9 
Construction  7.0  7.2  5.3  9.5 
Services  44.2  61.8  75.2  56.3 
Total economy  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1  The figures relate to 1989 in the case of Hungary and the United States and to 1988 in the 
2 
case of Japan and the EC. 
EC =  D + F + I + UK + NL + B + DK + ES 
Source: 1989 Hungarian Statistical Yearbook for Hungary; Commission's sectoral database for 
the EC, the United States and Japan. -46-
Table 19  Structure of GDP and employment in Hungary 
GDP (%)  Employment (%) 
1980  1989  1980  1989 
Agriculture and forestry  19.6  16.6  21.0  18.4 
Industry and energy  37.2  33.3  33.3  30.4 
Construction  8.0  7.8  8.0  7.0 
Services  35.2  42.3  37.7  44.2 
Total economy  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source : Hungarian Statistical Yearbook. -47-
Table 20  Stmcture of industrial production and employment in Hungary 
Branch  Production  Employment 
1980  1989  1980  1989 
Mining  8.1  5.7  7.1  6.9 
Electricity  5.7  6.2  2.2  3.1 
Metal manufacturing  9.1  10.5  6.0  5.3 
Engineering  23.5  24.8  31.9  32.6 
of which 
machinery  5.5  6.5  8.0  9.7 
transport equipment  6.8  5.5  6.5  5.5 
electrical and electronic equip- 6.5  7.7  10.1  10.0 
ment 
instruments  2.0  2.6  3.6  3.6 
mass-produced metalware  2.7  2.5  3.7  3.8 
Construction materials  3.5  3.1  4.9  4.5 
Chemicals  18.6  18.5  6.8  8.1 
of which 
petrochemicals  6.9  4.6  0.4  0.4 
·man-made fibres  1.9  2.6  1.7  1.7 
pharmaceuticals  2.1  3.0  1.4  1.7 
HEAVY INDUSTRY· TOTAL  68.5  68.8  58.9  60.5 
Wood processing  1.8  1.9  3.0  3.0 
Paper  1.3  1.5  1.0  1.0 
Publishing  0.9  1.3  1.2  1.4 
Textiles  4.7  4.2  7.4  6.5 
Leather and furs  2.2  1.8  3.7  3.7 
Clothing  1.9  1.4  4.8  4.4 
Handicrafts, etc.  0.9  0.5  4.3  2.2 
LIGHT INDUSTRY • TOTAL  13.7  12.6  25.4  22.2 
FOOD INDUSTRY  16.7  17.8  12.2  15.2 
OTHER INDUSTRY  1.1  0.8  3.5  2.1 
Industry total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: 1989 Hungarian Statistical Yearbook. -48-
Table 21  Industrial structure of Hungary and the EC compared (1989) 
Production (%)  Employment (%) 
Ec1  Hungary  EC  Hungary 
Mining and metal manufacturing  5.9  17.3  3.8  12.6 
Engineering  44.1  26.4  49.5  33.6 
of which 
machinery  9.8  6.9  11.6  10.0 
transport equipment  14.2  5.9  12.4  5.7 
electrical and electronic equip- 13.2  11.0  16.1  14.0 
ment instruments 
mass-produced metalware  6.9  2.6  9.4  3.9 
Construction materials  3.6  3.3  4.0  4.7 
Chemicals  15.7  19.7  13.0  8.4 
of which 
pharmaceuticals  2.3  3.2  1.7  1.8 
Wood processing  2.7  2.0  3.5  3.1 
Paper and publishing  6.1  3.0  6.1  2.5 
Textiles  3.4  4.5  4.6  6.7 
Leather and furs, footwear  1.0  1.9  1.5  3.8 
Clothing  1.9  1.5  3.8  4.5 
Food industry  14.5  19.0  8.8  15.7 
Other industry  1.1  1.4  1.4  4.4 
Total2  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1  EC=D+F+I+UK. 
2  Unlike in Table 20, industry is here defined according to the Community definition; i.e. 
excluding electricity 
Source: Commission's VISA databank for the EC. 1989 Hungarian Statistical Yearbook. -49-
Table 22  Trend of industrial production in Hungary (volume) 
Branch  1990 index  Average annual rate of 
(1989 =  100)  growth 1980-90 
Mining  88.2  -2.2 
Electricity  100.2  +2.3 
Metal-manufacturing  81.0  -1.6 
Engineering  86.3  +0.6 
Construction materials  95.0  +0.05 
Chemicals  94.6  +1.1 
Light industry  90.0  -0.8 
Food industry  99.1  +1.0 
Other industry  77.2  -3.6 
Industry total  91.5  -0.3 
Source: National Bank of Hungary for 1990 index and 1989 Hungarian Statistical Yearbook. 
Table 23  Breakdown of firms by size, 1988-90 
Percentage of economic units in each category1 
Number of  1-20  21-50  51-300 
employees 
Year 
1988  18.7  14.5  28.2 
1989  33.5  15.7  22.7 
1990  52.7  14.4  16.4 
300 or  Not  Total 
more  specified 
23.3  15.3  100.0 
17.2  10.9  100.0 
9.7  6.8  100.0 
1  The figures for 1988 and 1989 refer to the situation at 31 December, whereas for 1990 they 
refer to the situation at 30 September 
Source: Grosfeld I.  and Hare P. (1991), 'Privatization in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia', in 
European Economy Special Edition No.2. -50-
S.  Foreign trade 
This section highlights the geographical reorientation of Hungarian trade against the background 
of the dissolution of the CMEA and examines the present structure of Hungary's exports and 
imports and the most recent developments, with emphasis on the relations between Hungary and 
the EC. 
a.  Structure of  trade 
(1)  A small open economy 
With a population of 10.5 million and a surface area of  93,000 square kilometres, the Hungarian 
economy has a small domestic market. International trade can therefore provide important outlets 
and should play a vital role in the future development of Hungarian industries. However, the 
Hungarian  economy  can  already  be termed  a  small  open economy;  in  1989,  exports  were 
equivalent to 34.1% of GDP and  imports  to 31.2%.  By  way  of comparison,  the degree of 
openness of the Austrian economy, as measured by exports as a proportion of GDP, is 40%. 
The export ratio varies sharply from one industry to another. In 1989, it ranged from 0.3% in the 
energy sector to 42.7% in the engineering industry (see Table 24). The most export-oriented 
sectors include- in addition to the engineering industry, whose exports used to go mainly to the 
rouble area - the chemical industry (31.2% ),  metal manufacturing (30.2%) and light industry 
(27%  ), where exports go mainly to the non-rouble area. The engineering industry is  therefore 
particularly affected by the slump in trade with the CMEA countries. 
(2)  Geographical redirection of trade: the EC as Hungary's prime trading partner (Table 25) 
In 1980 the CMEA countries constituted the main outlet for Hungarian exports, accounting for 
50.5%. Of those countries, the USSR took the lion's share (29%  ). Hungary's other main trading 
partners were the EC (20.1%), the former GDR (9.8%), Austria (5.6%) and Switzerland (5.4%). 
By 1990 the geographical breakdown of Hungarian exports had altered radically. Trade with the 
CMEA countries  had  collapsed,  with  the  proportion  of exports  going  to  those  countries 
accounting for only 28.9% of  the total, the USSR's share being 18.4%. Conversely, the proportion 
of  exports going to the industrialized countries had increased sharply, and the EC now constituted 
the main outlet for  Hungarian exports, accounting for 35% of the total. The importance of 
Austria as a trading partner had also increased (12.6% of Hungarian exports). 
The same phenomenon can be observed in the case of imports, although it is a little less marked 
because of Hungary's dependence on energy and raw material imports from the USSR. Between 
1980 and 1990, the proportion of  Hungarian imports coming from the CMEA countries fell from 
47% to 32% and from 27.8% to 17.6% in the case of the USSR, whereas the EC's share rose 
from 23.1% to 32.5%. In 1990, the CMEA countries and the EC therefore each supplied a little 
less than a third of Hungarian imports. However, while the amount of imports from these two 
areas is identical, their composition varies sharply, with the CMEA countries providing mainly raw 
materials and energy products and the EC manufactured products. 
Various factors determined this geographical realignment of Hungarian trade. First, the payment 
difficulties of the USSR led the Hungarian government to urge fmns to restrict their exports -51-
there. Second, the increased opening-up of the Community market (reduction in quantitative 
restrictions except for sensitive products, participation in the GSP from 1 January 1990) played 
an  important  role.  According  to  Hungarian  official  statements,  10  a  third  of the growth  in 
Hungarian  exports  to  the EC in  the first  half of 1990  may  have  been due to Community 
concessions. Finally, the reforms designed to liberalize trade in Hungary, the devaluation of the 
forint11  and  the fall  in  domestic  demand,  which  has  increased  the proportion  of domestic 
resources available for export, have also boosted the growth in exports to western markets. 
However, this realignment of  trade requires the conversion of  some production capacity to enable 
Hungarian  products  to satisfy western quality standards.  Consequently,  in order to limit  the 
problems  in  certain sectors where the bulk of production goes  to the CMEA countries, the 
Hungarian authorities are envisaging action to prevent the sharp fall in trade with those countries 
(and particularly with the former USSR) from continuing. 
In the medium term, the EC and the EFI'  A countries are bound to play an increasingly important 
role as trading partners of Hungary, since it is unlikely that Hungary will be able to expand its 
exports to the other East European countries, which are also undergoing reforms. By contrast, 
the geographical proximity, size and purchasing power of  the Community market make it a logical 
outlet for Hungarian exports, all the more so as Hungary has already aligned itself on some of the 
norms and standards agplied in Germany. This is also the conclusion reached in a recent study 
by  Tovias  and  Laird,  which  demonstrates  the  impact  of liberalization  of trade  between 
Hungary and the EC on Community imports from Hungary. That study suggests that, with a status 
comparable to that of an EFT  A country, which is  almost what the new European Agreement 
implies for Hungary, the growth in these imports over the next decade could reach 15%. It  should 
be pointed out, by way of comparison, that Hungarian exports to the EC grew by about 75% 
between 1989 and 1991, according to national sources. 
(3)  The structure of trade with East European countries differs from that with the EC 
Table 26 provides a breakdown of  Hungarian exports and imports by product in 1989. The overall 
figures show Hungary to be an exporter of machinery and transport equipment (30.2% of total 
exports), manufactured products (27.6%, mainly metal products, textiles and clothing) and agri-
foodstuffs (19.9%). However, there are marked differences in the structure of exports according 
to whether the recipients are other East European countries or the EC. 
In the case of East European countries, exports of  machinery and transport equipment dominate, 
since they alone account for almost half of exports to that area. A prime example is exports of 
buses and spare parts, which account for 30% of Hungarian exports to the USSR.13 The other 
main  products exported to East European markets are other manufactured products (20% of 
exports to East European countries) and agri-foodstuffs (17.4%). These three product categories 
account for 85% of total Hungarian exports to East European coun.tries. The structure of  exports 
to the EC area is more varied, although other manufactured products and agri-foodstuffs again 
play an important part, accounting for 32.4% and 27% respectively of all exports to that area. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Comments made by Mr. B. Kadar, Minister of Foreign Trade, at ECE symposium. See ECE (1991), 'Economic 
Survey of Europe in  1990-1991
1
,  p. 89. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the real effective exchange rate appreciated in  1990. 
Tovias A  and LairdS. (1990), •Whither Hungary and the European Community', World Bank Working Paper. 
Figure quoted  by  OECD (1991)  in  •changes in  Regional  Trade Patterns of Central and Eastern European 
Countries•, CCEETffD(91  )92. -52-
The export specialization indices which  can be used  to compare the structure of Hungarian 
exports to a given area with that of Hungarian exports to the world14 confirm that Hungary's 
export specialization is different in respect of East European countries on the one hand and the 
EC on the other. Thus, Hungary specializes in exporting capital goods to East European countries 
(index figure of 1.6) and agri-foodstuffs (index figure of 1.4) and other manufactured products 
(index figure of 1.2) to the EC. 
The structure of Hungarian imports also differs according to whether they come from the other 
East European countries or from the EC. Thus, a little less than half of Hungarian imports from 
the USSR consist of energy products, although capital goods account for 32.5% of Hungary's 
imports from the East European countries. Capital goods account for 38.6% of  Hungarian imports 
from  the EC,  from  where Hungary also  imports chemicals  (25.8%)  and other manufactured 
products (27.2% ), especially textiles and clothing. 
The import specialization indices which  can be used  to compare the structure of Hungary's 
imports  from  a given  area with  that of its world imports  confirm  the high  level  of the East 
European  countries'  specialization  in  energy  products  (index  figure  of 2.4)  and  therefore 
Hungary's heavy dependence on the USSR. In the case of imports from the EC, there is a marked 
specialization in  chemicals  (index figure  of 1.6),  capital goods  (1.2)  and  other manufactured 
products (1.1). 
(  4)  Rapid growth of Hungarian exports to the Community market, even in the case of certain 
sensitive products 
Table 28 shows the recent trend of Hungarian exports to the EC. Between 1989 and 1990, the 
fastest growing sectors were machinery and electrical equipment ( +  36.9%) and metal products 
(  +  36% ). Exports in the agri-foodstuffs sector, by contrast, fell by 5.9%. Over the period 1986-90, 
good performances were recorded by non-metallic products, capital goods,  chemicals and also 
textiles, clothing and footwear. Generally speaking, the trend in such sensitive products as steel 
and  textiles  has  therefore  been  fairly  favourable  in  recent  times,  this  despite  Community 
protection. The importance which the Hungarians authorities attach to access to the Community 
market  can  be gauged,  however,  from  the  fact  that  agricultural,  steel  and  textile  products 
accounted in 1990 for a little less than half of Hungarian exports to the EC. 
By contrast, Hungarian imports from  the EC fell overall by 3.1% between 1989 and 1990 as a 
result of weaker domestic demand (see Table 29). The sectors most affected were intermediate 
products and capital goods, whereas imports of consumer goods continued to rise. According to 
Gacs  15,  following the liberalization of imports, demand for imported products from consumers 
increased more than that from firms.  The reasons put forward by Gacs to explain this phenom-
enon are, first, the higher levels of liquid reserves held by consumers than by firms, and, second, 
the shortages on the consumer goods market, whereas forced substitutions have taken place on 
the capital goods market. 
14 
15 
This is defined as the ratio of the share of Hungarian exports of products i to area j of total Hungarian exports 
to area j to that same share vis-~-vis the world. 
Gacs J. (1990), 'Liberalisation of Trade in Reformed Centrally Planned Economies: the Case of Hungary', paper 
presented to the fifth conference of the European Economic Association in  Usbon. -53-
Table 24  Export ratio in industry in 1989 
Branch  Rouble and non.rouble exports as percentage of total 
sales 
Rouble  Non·  Rouble  Total 
Extractive industries  2.0  2.4  4.4 
Energy  0.2  0.1  0.3 
Metal manufacturing  3.4  26.8  30.2 
Engineering  27.5  15.2  42.7 
Construction materials  1.5  11.1  12.6 
Chemical and petrochemical industry  7.7  23.5  31.2 
Light industry  8.6  18.4  27.0 
Agri·foodstuffs  2.0  5.9  7.9 
Other industries  5.1  17.4  22.5 
Total  10.8  17.0  27.8 
Source : CSO Statistical Yearbook. 
Table 25  Geographical breakdown of Hungarian trade 
COUNTRY  EXPORTS  IMPORTS 
1980  1990  1980  1990 
CMEA  50.5  28.9  47.0  32.0 
USSR  (29.0)  (18.4)  (27.8)  (17.6) 
Other socialist countries  3.6  3.4  3.1  2.2 
Industrialized countries  37.1  60.8  41.5  59.2 
EC  (20.1)  (35.0)  (23.1)  (32.5) 
Austria  (5.6)  (12.6)  (7.2)  (14.8) 
Switzerland  (5.4)  (3.4)  (4.4)  (5.6) 
USA  (1.4)  (3.5)  (1.7)  (1.6) 
Developing countries  8.8  6.9  8.4  6.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Calculations have been made using export and import figures in forints. 
Source : Institute for Economic and Market Research and Information. -54-
Table 26  Breakdown of Hungarian trade by product, 1989 
Branch  World  East Euro- USSR  EC12 
pean Coun-
tries 
a) Exports 
Food, beverages, tobacco  19.9  17.4  20.3  27.0 
Raw materials  5.2  2.2  1.7  7.6 
Mineral fuels  2.9  0.7  0.5  2.7 
Chemicals  12.4  9.8  9.9  12.8 
Machinery and transport equipment  30.2  48.4  48.1  14.8 
Other manufactured products  27.6  20.0  19.1  324 
Miscellaneous  1.9  1.4  0.5  2.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
b) Imports 
Food, beverages, tobacco  6.9  1.9  0.8  3.5 
Raw materials  6.4  6.4  9.4  3.6 
Mineral fuels  11.8  28.5  45.4  1.0 
Chemicals  16.3  10.2  8.4  25.8 
Machinery and transport equipment  33.4  32.5  19.0  38.6 
Other manufactured products  24.5  19.3  16.7  27.2 
Miscellaneous  0.7  1.3  0.3  0.3 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: COMTRADE- UN database -55-
Table 27  Specialization indexes by product 
1989  Export specialization  Import specialization 
vis-i-vis  vis-A-vis 
Branch  East Euro- EC12  East Euro- EC12 
pean coun- pean coun-
tries  tries 
FCK)d, beverages, tobacco  0.87  1.36  0.27  0.51 
Raw materials  0.42  1.46  1.00  0.56 
Mineral fuels  0.24  0.93  2.41  0.08 
Chemicals  0.79  1.03  0.63  1.58 
Machinery and transport equipment  1.60  0.49  0.97  1.16 
Other manufactured products  0.72  1.17  0.79  1.11 
Source : COMTRADE - UN database 
Table 28  Structure of Hungarian exports to the EC 
1990  1989 
Ecum  %of total  %change  1986=  Ecum  %of 
in 90/89  100  total 
Agri-foodstuffs  714  24.5  -5.9  126  758  29.5 
Mineral products  95  3.3  2.1  96  93  3.6 
Chemicals  338  11.6  12.0  156  301  11.7 
Leather goods and  156  5.3  21.4  155  128  5.0 
footwear 
WCK)d, paper  118  4.1  24.7  170  95  3.7 
Textiles, clothing  465  15.9  21.9  156  381  14.8 
Non-metal products  220  7.5  21.2  516  182  7.1 
Metal products  232  7.9  36.0  127  170  6.6 
Machinery and elec- 412  14.1  36.9  204  301  11.7 
trical goods 
Transport equipment  35  1.2  20.7  273  29  1.1 
Precision instruments  15  0.5  2.0  104  15  0.6 
Other manufactured  116  4.0  -2.2  153  119  4.6 
products 
Total  2915  100.0  13.3  155  2573  100.0 
Source: Eurostat, COMEXT. -56-
Table 29  Structure of Hungarian imports from the EC 
1990  1989 
Ecum  %of total  %change  1986  Ecum  %of 
90/89  =100  total 
Agri-foodstuffs  119  4.3  6.5  100  112  3.9 
Mineral products  11  0.4  -28.1  33  16  0.6 
Chemicals  492  17.7  -14.2  93  573  20.0 
Leather goods and  142  5.1  26.2  141  112  3.9 
footwear 
Wood, paper  96  3.5  20.6  153  80  28 
Textiles, clothing  384  13.8  15.5  119  332  11.6 
Non-metal products  132  4.8  -9.7  308  146  5.1 
Metal products  124  4.5  -10.9  64  139  4.9 
Machinery and elec- 909  32.8  3.3  141  880  30.8 
trical goods 
Transport equipment  183  6.6  -33.1  178  273  9.6 
Precision instruments  108  3.9  -8.4  113  117  4.1 
Other manufactured  72  2.6  -8.3  95  78  2.7 
products 
Total  2771  100.0  -3.1  120  2860  100.0 
Source: Eurostat, COMEXT. 
6.  Foreign investment and joint ventures 
The Hungarian government is keen to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to encourage 
the formation of  joint ventures (N) with western partners. Such foreign investments will have an 
impact on the structural changes in the Hungarian economy. This section tries to expand upon 
this issue by describing, first, the role that FDI and Ns are expected to play in the development 
of the Hungarian economy; second, the evolution of FDI and Ns in the economy (giving some 
idea of their relative importance); third,  the sectors in which FDI and Ns are concentrated; 
fourth, the conditions in Hungary which favour or encourage FDI and the setting up of Ns; and, 
fifth, the conditions which discourage FDI and the formation of Ns. Joint venture is defined here 
restrictively, as foreign participation in companies set up under Hungarian law. -57-
a.  The role of  FDI and JVs 
Official Hungarian expectations of the role that FDI and Ns  can play in developing the economy 
are high indeed - they are expected to make a major contribution to the transformation of the 
Hungarian economy from a socialist-type (albeit reformist) system into a market system. FDI and 
Ns  will accomplish this by being conduits from the West of new technology, marketing skills and 
better managerial techniques, as well as providing examples of efficient work organization which 
indigenous companies can profitably emulate. At the same time, Ns and FDI are expected to 
increase domestic competition, thereby, it is hoped, raising the quality of goods for sale. Finally, 
Ns and companies which are the target of FDI are expected to open up Western export markets, 
so contributing positively to the balance of  payments and reducing Hungary's foreign debt burden. 
However,  the Hungarian authorities  also  harbour some fears  about foreign  interest in  their 
economy. These fears are a reaction to popular concern that some national assets have already 
been sold off too cheaply to foreign investors. The other reason for cautiousness is the lack or 
weakness of the regulations necessary to open the market (prudential legislation related to FDI, 
taxation of multinational enterprises, foreign exchange regime). As a result, the authorities have 
temporarily reserved the state's right to intervene in some sectors (natural resources, transport, 
infrastructure -including telecommunications-, some sections of the energy industry and heavy 
industry) where state ownership will be maintained. 
b.  The evolution of  FDI and JVs 
In 1972, Hungary passed legislation which aimed to encourage FDI and the setting up of Ns. As 
a consequence, a number of Ns  were registered over the following years. However, the numbers 
remained low, even after a revision of the laws covering foreign investment in 1978. Only in 1985, 
when the economic climate in Hungary began to be liberalized somewhat, did the rate of Ns 
being  set up  accelerate.  This  meant  that whereas  in  1984  there were  27  joint ventures  in 
operation, the number of operating Ns in 1985 was 45. 
It was not, however, until Act XXN covering foreign investment entered into force on 1 January 
1989 (following its acceptance by the Hungarian parliament at the end of 1988) that the value of 
FDI into Hungary and the number of registered Ns increased significantly. Act XXN, which is 
covered in Section IV.6.d below, radically revised the laws on foreign investment very much in 
favour  of potential  investors.  This  Act,  in  conjunction  with  the simultaneous  political  and 
economic upheavals occurring in Hungary, meant that the 176 Ns operating in 1988 grew to 
approximately 1000 by the end of 1989, over 5000 by the end of 1990, and stood, at the beginning 
of 1991 at over 7000 (see Table 30). Roughly US$800 million flowed into Hungary during 1990, 
taking total capitalization to approximately US$1.2 billion. In the first quarter of 1991, it was over 
US$1.5 billion. This makes Hungary the largest recipient of FDI in Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, despite the enormous increases in the numbers and value of Western participation 
in the economy, care should be taken not to overestimate its importance for the overall balance 
of payments. Trade flows still far outweigh FDI flows- exports to the West in 1989 were worth 
US$6.7 billion, while imports from the West cost US$5.9 billion. 
As for the size of individual foreign investments, the bulk have been, and continue to be, rather 
small. In 1990, about 57% of all new ventures with foreign participation had a startup capital of 
roughly US$20,000, while only 2.4% had start-up capital exceeding US$2 million (although the 
latter constituted 77% of total initial capital provided in 1990). Furthermore, the average share -58-
of start-up capital provided by the foreign participant has typically been about 45% (for JVs and 
non-JVs). 
c.  Sectors in which FDI and JVs are concentrated 
The 1989 figures for the total value of capital invested showed that 38% of JVs were involved in 
manufacturing, 30% in the provision of financial services, and 18% in the running of hotels and 
restaurants. However, the capitalization of individual JVs in manufacturing has hitherto been 
generally rather small, and of the absolute number of JVs operating in 1989, 60% were engaged 
in manufacturing. 
Within manufacturing, data for 1990 on capital invested show that 42% of JVs were operating 
in machine engineering, 23% in the construction materials industry, 19% in light industry, 8% in 
the chemicals industry, and 4% in metal manufacturing (see Table 31). Recent, sizeable invest-
ments in Hungary include the purchase by General Electric of a controlling interest in Tungsram 
(the  light-bulb  producer,  which  is  one of Hungary's  largest  industrial  companies)  and  the 
agreement between General Motors and Raba to co-produce engines and motor cars. 
If,  however,  the sectoral breakdown of JVs within manufacturing is  done on the basis of the 
number of  JVs involved in each sector, then machine engineering maintains its supremacy (55%), 
but light industry accounts for only 16% of manufacturing JVs, the chemicals industry accounts 
for  16% too, construction materials 7%, and 2% of JVs operate in metal manufacturing (see 
Table 31). 
Comparison of 1990  data with  1988  data  (see Table 31),  indicates  that JVs  are increasingly 
concentrating  on machine  engineering.  Furthermore,  JVs  engaged  in  machine  engineering, 
accounted for only 41% of the total number of  JVs operating in 1988, a significantly lower figure 
than in 1990. Light industry, by contrast, seems to be declining in relative importance, as does the 
construction materials industry (to a lesser extent). It is too soon to discern any firm trends in 
these figures. The apparently increasing relative importance of the machine engineering industry 
could reflect the favourable tax treatment it has received following tax reforms introduced in 1989 
(see section (d) below). 
The nationality of foreign  participants  in  JVs  and  the main  sources of FDI tend to mirror 
traditional links and foreign trade patterns. In terms of numbers, JVs are dominated by Austria, 
then Germany and Switzerland. However, of the JVs started in 1990, 30% had German partners, 
25% had Austrian partners, and about 18% had US partners. As for the division of capital from 
abroad invested up to 1990, Germany was the largest source at 23.5% of the total and Austria 
second with 21.1 %. The USA has also been a major source, responsible for 20.2% of the total. 
Other important sources of FDI include firms from the UK, Italy, Liechtenstein and other West 
European countries, as well as South Korea. 
d.  Conditions favouring FDI and the creation of  JVs 
Hungary is considered the most favourable and attractive country in Eastern Europe for Western 
firms  to engage in business activities. This judgement is  based principally on its  liberal foreign 
investment laws and its tax policies. Foreign investment in Hungary is governed by Act XXIV on 
foreign investment, introduced on 1 January 1989. This act, first, gives a foreigner (whether an 
individual or a firm)  the right to own up to 100% of a Hungarian-based company. Second, JVs -59-
with a majority foreign participation can now be set up without first receiving official permission 
in the form of a licence (thus avoiding bureaucracy)- something that was not possible before 1 
January 1991. Third, a foreign company now has a number of possible ways of acquiring real 
estate, and the remaining obstacles to real estate ownership are being reduced. Fourth, foreign 
investors  are guaranteed full  protection for  their investments  - in  other words,  Hungary is 
committed  to  compensate  fully  any  investor  whose  company  or assets  are  nationalized  or 
expropriated; furthermore, the compensation must be paid in the currency used for the original 
investment. Fifth, the foreign participant can freely transfer abroad its share of the profits, in the 
currency of the participant's original investment - even if the profits have come from domestic 
sales and have consequently produced forint profits. 
Radically revised Hungarian tax laws were introduced on 1 January 1989. As a consequence, the 
many different taxes and tax rates facing companies were reduced to a uniform entrepreneurial 
profit tax, which significantly reduced complications and enhanced transparency. This encourage-
ment to foreign investors was reinforced by the provision of a number of  generous tax allowances 
aimed specifically at them. Thus, companies with foreign participation can obtain either (i) tax 
allowances of 100% for five years, followed by tax allowances of 60% for another five years, or 
(ii) tax allowances of 60% for five years followed by a further five years' tax allowances of 40%. 
To qualify for either set of tax allowances, it is necessary first of all that the initial start-up capital 
of  the company exceeds Ft 50 million, of  which more than 30% is provided by the foreign partner. 
Second, it is  essential that more than half of the company's annual income comes from  the 
physical production of goods, or the provision of hotel services (provided that the hotels were 
built by the company which runs them). These represent the minimum conditions which must be 
fulfilled to qualify for either of the two sets of tax concessions. 
However, to qualify for the more advantageous set (i) of tax allowances, the company must also 
be producing so-called priority or economically important goods, as defined by the Hungarian 
government. These priority goods are electronics; vehicles and vehicle components; machine tools; 
engineering components;  agricultural,  food-processing  or forestry  machinery  and equipment; 
products  enhancing Hungary's  convertible-currency  trade in  agriculture;  and  machinery  and 
materials used for packaging. 
Another significant  tax  allowance  available  only  to companies  with  foreign  participation  is 
provided in the case where operating profits are used for reinvestment in the Hungarian economy. 
Should such a company increase the capital base of its operations or invest in another enterprise 
operating in Hungary using income earned in Hungary, then that company is  entitled to a tax 
rebate. This  amounts to repayment in full  of the tax  paid on that part of company income 
subsequently used for investment purposes. 
Further characteristics favouring Hungary as a site for Ns and western FDI include its increa-
singly liberal foreign trade regime (90% of imports have been liberalized and can be purchased 
with forints), its relatively low wage rates, and its stock of human capital skilled in mathematics 
and science. 
e.  Conditions discouraging FDI and the setting up of  JVs 
At a general level, western investors are made nervous by Hungary's macroeconomic environment 
high inflation by western standards, declining industrial production, high interest rates and rising 
unemployment.  They worry  also  that economic depression could  exacerbate social  tensions. 
Furthermore, although institutions essential for the operation of a market economy do now exist, -60-
or are being created, they do not yet work smoothly (a failing recognized by the government) -
too many administrative controls still hinder free enterprise and foreign trade, and the procedures 
and inclinations of the Hungarian administration still lack transparency. 
Among other problems are the lack of people with the type of managerial skills required by a 
functioning market economy, and the legal position of companies concerning the risk insurance 
that they  must  purchase  - especially  insurance  covering  the workforce  against  work-related 
injuries.  A  less  important constraint  may  be recent  legislation which  raised  the capital-base 
threshold (of a company with foreign participation) necessary to qualify for tax allowances from 
Ft25  million  to  Ft50 million.  The Hungarians  did  this  with  the aim  of encouraging foreign 
participation and N  arrangements in the production sector rather than the trading sector. 
Hungary's infrastructure is also a problem. Roads and telecommunications especially need a great 
deal  of expensive  investment  if they  are  to  be modernized  and  extended.  There are  also 
insufficient warehouses and customs clearing facilities available relative to the needs of western 
firms. 
Table 30  Growth of Operating Joint Ventures, 1974-91 
Year  Foreign Capital (US$ m)  Number 
1974  4.9  2 
1980  21.7  6 
1982  29.0  12 
1983  34.3  20 
1984  35.5  27 
1985  44.1  45 
1986  64.5  62 
1987  95.8  102 
1988  259.8  176 
1989  -400  -1ooo 
1990  -1,200  >5000 
1991
8  -1,500  >7000 
a  Data as of end of 1st quarter 1991. 
Source: UN, EC, WEFA -61-
Table 31  Breakdown of JVs engaged in manufacturing by industry 
Percentage of  Share of total 
total joint ventures  value of equity of JVs 
Activity  1988  1990  1988  1990 
Machine engineering  41.1  54.6  33.7  42.3 
Construction materials  11.6  6.6  27.0  23.3 
Light industry  24.2  16.4  25.7  19.3 
Chemicals  18.9  16.1  9.0  8.4 
Metal manufacturing  1.0  2.1  1.8  4.1 
Miscellaneous  3.2  4.2  2.8  2.6 
Data: Hungarian national statistics; 1990 data as at end of 1st quarter. -62-
V.  ECONOMIC REFORMS AND POLICIES 
1.  A framework for assessing reform 
Before discussing the various reform measures undertaken in Hungary during the past few years, 
it may be useful to attempt an overall assessment of the reform process. The current status of 
reform can be judged against the analytical framework developed in a number of  studies published 
recently by the Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.16 
The first  issue is  the irreversibility of the regime change. What remained of the old system of 
planning and management has been dismantled, and there is a clear commitment to political and 
economic democracy. The government was democratically elected, and economic policy measures 
are debated and adopted according to democratic rules. 
Irreversibility is a necessary condition for transition to a fully fledged market economy, but alone 
it is not sufficient. Sound macroeconomic stabilization is also needed, as well as a more long-term 
commitment to restructuring. 
Although stabilization in Hungary is not complete, stabilization measures have helped to improve 
budgetary discipline and control of the money supply by the monetary authorities. Liberalization 
is fairly advanced, in terms both of price and of trade liberalization. These measures have helped 
to remove distortions and to establish an element of competition in goods markets. 
The process of transition to a market economy is fairly advanced, a legislative framework is being 
created and institutions are being adapted to the new market environment. None the less, prob-
lems  remain  in  some  areas,  such  as  ownership  structure and  the under-development of the 
financial sector, etc. Furthermore, privatization is  proceeding slowly,  and its implementation is 
proving more difficult than originally envisaged. The promotion of new private firms is only at a 
preliminary stage, and the tutelage system has  not been completely broken down.  Only a few 
bankruptcies are taking place, and the banking system, heavily burdened with bad loans, is unable 
to exercise financial control over enterprises. 
Experience  since  1989  both  in  Hungary  and  in  other  economies  in  transition  shows  that 
restructuring needs to be far-reaching in order to produce meaningful results: the distortions are 
so deeply rooted in the system that there is  little alternative to trying to move on all fronts at 
once. Too long a delay between adjustment and reforms could lead to an undue lengthening of 
the contraction of the economy that stabilization inevitably causes, and to repeated, continuous 
efforts to stabilize. 
It may be argued, and indeed the Hungarian authorities have repeatedly stressed, that the social 
costs associated with a too sudden transformation of the economic system can be unbearable. 
Moreover, the task of liberalization is more far-reaching than in many LDCs, for example, where 
it has mainly consisted in abolishing various constraints that prevent the proper free interplay of 
economic agents who already operate in  accordance with the basic principles of decentralized, 
profit-oriented economic systems. In the case of the Hungarian economy in the past fifty years, 
as  in  the other former centrally planned economies,  markets simply  have not existed,  except 
16  See  European Commission  (1990),  'Economic Transformation in  Hungary and Poland',  European Economy 
43;  and  European  Commission,  'The Path of Reform  in  Central and  Eastern Europe', European Economy 
Special Edition No. 2. -63-
perhaps for small (marginal) segments of  the economy. Thus, liberalization cannot be a short-term 
phenomenon. 
In some aspects of reform, such as the long-term effort at rebuilding market institutions, there 
is no alternative to gradualism. But necessary gradualism should not be used to justify delay in the 
implementation of much-needed short-term adjustment measures. Such delay would not necess-
arily lead to a reduction of  the social costs associated with the transition, let alone eliminate them. 
Nor should gradualism be used as a rationale for economic policy choices that are driven by other 
objectives, such as the commitment to debt servicing. 
In this chapter various institutional changes that have taken place so far will  be discussed,  in 
particular the reform of the financial sector, privatization, and the reform of the tax system. 
2.  Reform of the financial sector 
a.  Institutions 
In  January 1987 a comprehensive banking reform was launched in Hungary. An essentially mono-
bank system was transformed into a two-tier system. In this new system the government granted 
the National Bank more autonomy. Its role was strengthened, and its instruments of  monetary and 
credit  control  and  management  were  better defmed.  The central bank was  relieved  of its 
commercial banking activities by the transformation of commercial banks that it had previously 
controlled into independent entities with the role of providing credit to enterprises. Besides these 
main commercial banks, the National Savings Bank and 260 savings cooperatives managed the 
credits and deposits of households. The National Bank of Hungary assumed traditional central 
bank functions, particularly regarding the regulation of credit and liquidity (money supply), the 
management of interest rates, the determination of official exchange rates, the management of 
hard currency and gold reserves, fiXing of compulsory reserve ceilings for commercial banks, the 
implementation of open market operations, etc. Deposit and loan transactions with households 
and enterprises were transferred to the newly  established or existing commercial  banks  and 
specialized financial institutions, whose autonomy was strengthened appropriately. 
The Hungarian banking reform of 1987 has done much to meet the urgent need to introduce a 
greater transparency into the financial sector, to establish a dynamic commercial banking system 
aimed at supporting investment, consumption and the rising costs of transformation in industry, 
agriculture  and  services,  as  well  as  to generate greater competition among banks and other 
financial institutions in mobilizing and allocating national savings. 
A  complementary,  but  not secondary,  objective of the reform was  to  achieve  a  significant 
improvement in  the quality,  costs and efficiency of financial  intermediation. The appropriate 
policy and regulatory framework was to be set out by the National Bank and supervised by the 
new State Banking Supervision in the Ministry of Finance. The banking reform foresaw that, at 
least initially, the National Bank would maintain direct responsibility for commercial and official 
transactions  in  foreign  exchange  (only  in mid-1990,  in  the framework  of a  further  stage of 
decentralization, were th~e  functions in part transferred to commercial banks and to enterprise 
level). 
Following the reform, at the end of  the first year (1987), 21 commercial banks and other financial 
institutions were operating in Hungary, including 3 joint venture banks. At the end of 1991 the 
number of  banks in Hungary was 37, of  which 32 were operating with commercial banking licences -64-
and 5 were specialized financial institutions. Of the 37 banks,  15 have foreign shareholders. In 
addition  to  these banks,  there were  17  representative  offices  of foreign  banks  operating in 
Hungary. 
The 1987 reform was followed up by a further set of banking regulations introduced in January 
1989, which entitled all commercial banks to service both households and enterprises and ended 
the distinction between them and savings banks. The new system was further enhanced in the 
course of 1990 with the setting up of a Bank Association, an International Training Centre for 
Bankers and, later in 1991, of a Clearing Centre. 
Despite recent government efforts to encourage the national banking system to extend its business 
to non-traditional clients and in particular to newly established and privately owned medium- and 
small-scale  firms,  the links  between  commercial  banks  and  the traditional  selected  business 
activities and sectors, such as construction, agriculture, foreign trade are still strong, partly as a 
result of the inherited structure of assets.  The client diversification  policy,  which  is  aimed  at 
assisting financially the transformation process and at reducing banks' financial risks  through a 
proper portfolio management, has so far achieved only limited results. 
Also the degree of concentration in the banking sector appears still to be abnormally high with 
the National Saving Bank and the four largest commercial banks owning about 75% of the total 
assets and controlling over 50% of the total business volume. The state is still a major shareholder 
in the three major commercial banks, holding an average of 40% of the shares. In this respect 
Hungary would benefit from a better client diversification and a lower degree of bank concentra-
tion, which would minimize financial risks and give newly established and privately run medium-
sized banks the opportunity to capture 'business niches' by providing new packages of financial 
services on a competitive basis. 
Banks' reluctance to grant loans at competitive costs to newly established small- and medium-scale 
firms  partly reflects their prudence regarding the uncertain business future of new firms,  high 
start-up costs, uncertain returns on investments and more general financial uncertainty related to 
existing and potential inflationary pressures. To minimize their financial risk banks usually request 
their clients to provide adequate collateral, which many new companies or individual entrepre-
neurs simply cannot provide. 
On  the other hand,  financially  unhealthy  bank-enterprise  and  inter-enterprise relations  still 
prevail,  particularly  in  the  state-run  heavy  industry,  where  restructuring,  privatization  and 
liquidation have proceeded relatively slowly so far. This may help to explain the continuing high 
dependency of banking institutions on the industrial sector. 
A securities market has recently begun to develop with the trading of state bonds, certificates of 
deposit,  notes etc.17  Its  further evolution will  be essential for  promoting capital mobility and 
efficient use of earnings.  New financial  services have also been developed and are now being 
provided both to enterprises and to households. This reflects the government's efforts to increase 
competition among banks in both the range and the costs of the financial services they offer. 
A stock exchange was re-established in mid-1990, following the approval of a stock exchange law 
effective from  1 January 1990. Only thirty companies are quoted, however, and the number and 
value of transactions has so far been quite small. 
17  Commercial bills were introduced in Hungary in 1985 and Treasury bills in 1988. -65-
Further improvements derive from the new Central Bank law, effective since 1 December 1991, 
which redefines the role of the NBH and its relations with the commercial banks, and allows a 
greater degree of  autonomy from political authority. At the same time, new legislation on banking 
and finance came into effect (Investment Funds Act, Financial Institutions Act). These provide 
a legal basis for  the introduction of new financial  regulatory and supervision instruments for 
banking control and management. It includes, in particular, a comprehensive regulatory framework 
to reduce lending concentration, to lower the proportion of  non-performing or sub-standard loans 
in the banks' portfolios and to enhance competition in commercial and retail banking. The law 
gives banking supervision key functions, such as credit monitoring, reviews of  the quality of  banks' 
assets and implementation of  prudential regulations on risk exposure, capital adequacy, investment 
limits, liquidity ratios and licensing. It  also ensures the autonomy of  the State Banking Supervision 
authority. These new laws will be complemented by a new law on accounting, which became 
effective at the beginning of 1992. Legislation is  also being prepared to introduce a system of 
deposit insurance. 
Monetary policy will rely entirely on market-based instruments. A policy of maintaining positive 
interest rates will be pursued. Regulations regarding a new role for the NBH in foreign exchange 
transactions will be considered in the framework of  further decentralizing foreign exchange policy. 
The completion of the banking reform started in 1987-89 is also intended to encompass key items 
such  as  the future and role of state ownership in the banking sector,  the setting of reserve 
requirements, management of low-interest loans (particularly for housing), inter-bank ownership 
criteria and principles, interest practices, minimum capital adequacy, appropriate rules governing 
entry and exit of  banks, and other urgent matters that are particularly relevant at present, in view 
of the growing financial risks and economic uncertainties. 
New legislation on the establishment of venture capital institutions is being discussed. The role 
and function of the State Development Institute will also probably be modified in the light of the 
emerging requirements. 
The development of  key financial services such as export guarantees and export credits, mortgage 
banking and banking for  economic development and enterprise promotion also  needs to be 
addressed quite urgently by the Hungarian authorities. An export credit agency is already being 
established. 
During 1992 banks with foreign participation are to be authorized to grant loans, take deposits 
and run cheque accounts for personal customers (so far foreign banks were authorized to provide 
funds only to enterprises). 
b.  Monetary and credit policy 
Traditionally in Hungary the role of monetary and credit policy was to control the overall credit 
volume so as to meet the economic policy targets laid down in an annual plan, and the Central 
Bank had a monopoly in banking and credit (mono-bank system). Under this system the National 
Bank of Hungary had unlimited capacity to create bank deposits and provide financial resources 
to finance the budget and other central government requirements. In this system the amount of 
money in circulation in the economy was determined directly by central government authorities, 
which also retained a complete monopoly over foreign ~change  transactions. In addition, some 
specialized financial institutions and more or less autonomous departments of the NBH provided -66-
banking services and credit to well-defined sectors and enterprises in the framework of central 
government directives issued for the implementation of the national central plan. 
In this system interest rates and exchange rates had no allocative or redistributive role. Foreign 
exchange and external borrowing were intimately linked to import plans at central planning and 
enterprise level. In this respect, the exchange rate was mainly an accounting mechanism used only 
to effect consistent conversion of foreign prices into domestic prices. 
As a result of far-reaching reforms that began in 1987 and were further extended in 1989 in the 
framework of the process of liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and restructuring, the 
National Bank of Hungary assumed most of the typical central bank functions and, in line with 
western practice, began to use more actively the traditional instruments of monetary and credit 
control and management, such as the regulation of  the money supply, interest and exchange rates, 
etc. 
The principle that the National Bank should not finance the Treasury's requirements with addi-
tional monetary instruments and that commercial banks should not provide state-owned enter-
prises with soft credit was also affirmed. At the same time, it was recognized that the introduction 
and eventual expansion of open-market operations represented a most useful way of regulating 
saving and  providing investment in  the framework of anti-inflationary policy.  In 1989/90 the 
financial  and  banking  regulatory  framework  was  further  liberalized  to permit  new  lending 
opportunities, to encourage the establishment of new financial institutions and to provide a new 
range of  services. The government regards these changes as significant steps towards the adoption 
of an effective  financial  policy which  will  focus  on a  more active  use of available  financial 
instruments, more appropriate distribution of  competencies among the public entities responsible 
for monetary and financial policies and a higher degree of independence for the National Bank 
of  Hungary as the principal authority responsible for applying control and regulatory instruments. 
The government's medium-term strategies and policy objectives focus  on the need to create a 
favourable  domestic environment for  mobilizing  domestic  and foreign  capital  for  investment 
purposes. The government intends to attain this objective by pursuing a policy of positive real 
interest  rates  and  by  encouraging  saving  with  various  instruments,  in  the  framework  of a 
continuing demand management policy. 
The National Bank of  Hungary (NBH), for its part is committed progressively to reduce its direct 
financing of state budget deficits, in line with the IMF agreement. At the same time, the use of 
open-market financial instruments (government bonds, Treasury bills, certificates of  deposit, etc.) 
will be encouraged, with the aim of mobilizing private savings for public financing purposes. 
The NBH is committed to providing financial resources to the government and to commercial 
banks at non-preferential rates. As agreed with the IMF, basic refinancing loans at lower rates 
of interest will be granted only on past loans to the government and for medium-term investment 
projects. In principle, strict monetary policy would imply that during the next few years the growth 
of the monetary base and the degree of system liquidity would probably fall  behind the growth 
of nominal GDP. 
The government's strategies and medium-term objectives in credit management include continuing 
to regulate credit expansion in line with the country's external payments position. The government 
intends to address urgently unhealthy financial relations between banks and state enterprises, with 
the ultimate objective of  setting up a more effective credit policy aimed at improving the overall 
efficiency of resource allocation. It also plans to strengthen the homogeneous and harmonized -67-
system of interest rates and keep the reserve requirements of commercial banks at an acceptable 
and satisfactory level. 
As regards credit distribution to final users, general credit management will become more selective 
and credit to the State Development Institute will be progressively  reduced.  Credit to state 
enterprises will  focus  on their particular  financial  needs  in view  of their  restructuring  and 
privatization. Credit to medium- and small-scale privately owned enterprises and business is to be 
expanded significantly. 
c.  Exchange rate policy 
At present, the Hungarian forint is  de facto fully convertible for current account transactions 
carried out by resident enterprises, banks and foreign joint ventures (repatriation of profits). 
The move towards this kind of current account convertibility has been supported by a policy of 
progressive devaluation of the forint. Since the beginning of 1989, the forint has been devalued 
seven times (Table 32), depreciating overall by 77% in nominal terms. Through these adjustments, 
the Hungarian authorities have avoided major misalignment of  their currency and restored a good 
degree of confidence in the forint. The differential between the official and parallel exchange 
rates was reduced from about 40% in 1989 to 10 to 15% in 1990 and disappeared almost entirely 
in  1991.  However, with the growing  domestic inflation in  1990  and 1991,  the real effective 
exchange rate showed a net appreciation which partly offset the gains of previous devaluations 
(Graph 7). This divergence between the nominal and real rates is  the result of a compromise 
between policy objectives: the declared priority was to minimize the foreign exchange constraint 
by, in particular, improving competitiveness through devaluations; however, the inflationary conse-
quences of such  a  policy were not compatible with  the inflation  target, which  was  already 
threatened by the effects of price and trade liberalization. 
In the future, this policy trade-off should be 
mitigated.  The  competitiveness  policy  will 
more  and  more  rely  on  productivity  gains 
expected from restructuring and privatization. 
Inflationary  pressures  will  be  kept  under 
control, provided the Hungarian government 
succeeds  in  tightening  fiSCal  and  monetary 
policies. Under these circumstances, the Hun-
garian  authorities will  be able  to pursue  a 
policy  that  avoids  appreciation  of the real 
exchange rate. A debate about the appropri-
ate exchange rate regime has  already been 
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forint  to fluctuate  within  a  pre-determined 
band, as  adopted recently in Poland, ranged 
against those who recommend keeping a fixed but adjustable exchange rate system. The recent 
simplification of the currency basket to which the forint is pegged18 will anyhow enable external 
competitiveness to be monitored more closely. 
18  Since December 1991, the forint has been pegged to an average of the US$ and the ECU, instead of the previous 
basket of 10 currencies. -68-
Foreign Exchange Regulations 
Foreign  exchange  regulations  are  enforced  by  the  Ministry  of Finance.  Non-residents  and 
resident individuals may hold convertible-cu"ency accounts with commercial banks.  These 
accounts carry tax-free interest payable in the cu"ency of  deposit and have a guarantee of 
repayment.  The interest rate is set as a function of  the cu"ency and maturity of  the deposit 
to  be  competitive  with  those  in  the  international  market.  No particular  authorization  is 
required for the use of  these resident accounts in foreign cu"ency, although they may be used 
only for private purposes like tourism and travel abroad and not for commercial activities. 
Payments in forints to non-residents must be deposited in blocked forint accounts  and can 
be freely disbursed.  Only the transfer of  these funds is subject to authorization. 
Imports of  foreign goods by Hungarian enterprises for settlement in convertible cu"encies are 
now completely free.  Imports of  consumer goods settled in convertible cu"encies are subject 
to  a global  quota  established periodically  in  US  dollars  by  the  Ministry  of International 
Economic Relations.  Payments for invisibles related to merchandise transactions,  including 
transport and advertising,  are unrestricted. 
Foreign  exchange allowances for travel are subject to low ceilings,  for balance of  payments 
control purposes: only $50-worth of  forints may be purchased annually for tourism purposes, 
but transport tickets can be paid for in forints. No minimum spending or conversion require-
ment any longer applies to non-resident travellers to Hungary.  Legal entities must su"ender 
their foreign exchange earnings to the banks and consequently are not allowed to hold foreign 
exchange accounts. 
Non-residents may now freely take out of  the country their foreign exchange assets, in addition 
to their personal effects, without a licence from the foreign exchange authorities, provided that 
local taxes have been paid. Non-resident employees of  joint ventures may freely transfer 50% 
of  their after-tax income abroad. Foreign investment, as well as the transfer abroad of  capital 
(in the case of  liquidation) and profits are now liberalized and protected, provided that fiscal 
obligations in Hungary are met. Reinvestment of  profits is encouraged by appropriate profit tax 
concessions,  which act as an incentive. 
As regards exchange rate regulations and administrative reforms, during the first half of 1990 a 
first  phase  of foreign  exchange  decentralization  was  introduced.  Commercial  banks  were 
authorized to undertake commercial transactions with foreign partners. Banks that wish to provide 
foreign exchange services may obtain a licence, which is approved by the National Bank and by 
the State Banking Supervision Office. 
The Hungarian authorities are currently setting up an interbank market, which would reduce the 
intermediary role of the NBH in foreign-exchange transactions. Full current account convertibility 
of the forint will be introduced by the end of 1994. Table 32 
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Table 33  Exchange rates 1988-91, period averages 
Effective rates  1 
Ft/US$  Nominal  Real 
1988  50.4  79.6  83.0 
1989  59.0  82.1  83.7 
1990 Q1  64.0  80.3  80.5 
1990 Q2  64.9  79.4  83.5 
1990 Q3  62.9  78.3  86.6 
1990 Q4  61.0  77.7  90.3 
1991 Q1  70.3  70.1  n.a. 
1991  Q2  75.9  72.32  96.82 
1 1985=100 
2 April-May figures for the nominal rate; May figures for the real rate. 
Source: IMF-IFS -70-
3.  Privatization 
a.  Historical background and legal framework 
Although privatization was not part of the economic reform launched in 1968, Hungary already 
had a private sector before the collapse of the one-party state in 1989; it was smaller than in 
Poland, but larger than in other Central and East European countries. In 1990 the private sector 
provided a significant share, estimated at around 10%, of Hungarian national income. 
Privatization in Hungary is characterized by several distinctive features: 
•  it was preceded by a gradual but substantial legislative and institutional build-up: company 
law (1988), law on transformation of business organizations and associations (1989), law on 
foreign investment (1988), bankruptcy act (1986, revised in 1991); 
•  it is carried out through competitive sales of state assets, similar to the mode of operation 
of the Treuhandanstalt, in the ex-GDR, and has never indulged in mass distribution to the 
public of free ownership titles, as in Poland, CSFR, Romania, and Bulgaria; 
•  it has relied as much on the promotion of new private enterprises and joint ventures as on 
the transfer of state assets. 
The legal framework for privatization was put in place by three major laws adopted early in 1990: 
the law establishing the State Privatization Agency (SPA), to which the responsibility for state 
property and privatization was  given,  the law on protection of state property, and the law on 
privatization of state-owned companies in retail trade, catering and services. 
A compensation law was  passed in the summer of 1991  to recompense the former owners for 
properties confiscated after 1949. 
b.  Privatization strategy: ongoing programmes and results 
According  to  the  Guidelines  on Property Ownership  issued  in  March  1991,  the Hungarian 
privatization programme is aimed at increasing the share of the private sector in the competitive 
sector to over 50% by 1994. Initially, in response to "spontaneous" or "wild" privatization, which 
resulted in an appropriation of state assets by the managers of self-managed companies and the 
nomenklatura, the SPA pursued a rather centralized approach to privatization. However, this 
strategy proved to be too cumbersome, slowing down substantially the transfer of state assets. 
Action was thus taken in  1991  to accelerate privatization. 
Five different types of privatization are currently in progress: 
(i)  Spontaneous  privatization  or company-initiated  privatization  enables  the  enterprise  to 
prepare its own privatization plan by looking for a partner. The plan is submitted to the 
SPA, which monitors its implementation; this procedure is an extension of the transform-
ation of state enterprises into self-managed companies that began in the second half of the 
1980s. -71-
(ii)  The small-scale privatization, or pre-privatization, programme for the sale of small shops 
(less than 10 employees) and catering establishments (less than 15 employees) and other 
services was approved in September 1990. The sales take place through auctions, which are 
not open to  foreigners.  The privatization  of 6,031  identified  units  is  supposed  to  be 
completed by the end of 1992. The programme is  running behind schedule: by the end of 
1991 only 2,120 units, sold for Ft 5.1bn, had been privatized. 
(iii)  Large-scale or "active" privatization is intended for large companies with good prospects of 
generating profits. The SPA estimates the market value of the companies and prepares a 
detailed privatization plan to be submitted to local or foreign potential investors. The initial 
intention was to proceed with successive privatization programmes, each covering a group 
of about twenty companies, every three to six months. However, the asset valuation proved 
to be a lengthy and cumbersome exercise. In addition, the companies either were found to 
be less profitable than thought, or were hit by the worsening of the economic situation in 
1991. As a result, the programme lost momentum. Since September 1990, two programmes 
have been launched, with two other sectoral programmes for vineyards and the building 
sector. In 1991, it was also decided to accelerate the privatization of some large companies 
affected by the collapse of the CMEA: following a review of 15 companies, 7 of them were 
finally selected for privatization. At the end of 1991, only 18 companies had been sold, for 
Ft 183bn, and privatization had been initiated for 107 companies. 
(iv)  Investor-initiated privatization, introduced in February 1991, gives the opportunity to foreign 
investors  or small-scale  entrepreneurs  to make  an offer  to buy  a  company  they  have 
identified. The privatization plan is prepared by the buyer in consultation with the company. 
The role of the SPA is  limited to checking the transparency and appropriate valuation of 
capital. As of end-1991, offers for 356 companies had been received from potential buyers 
or from enterprises, of  which 180 were approved. In terms of asset value, this has been the 
main channel for privatization so far. 
(v)  In  the  same  vein,  companies  have  recently  been  permitted  to  organize  their  own 
privatization, with the assistance of a consultant authorized by the SPA Unlike spontaneous 
privatization, this method, self-privatization, only requires the final approval of the SPA In 
the first phase, self-privatization was confined to companies with less than 300 employees 
and less than Ft 300m annual turnover. Rather less than 400 companies were involved in 
self-privatization at the end of 1991: 20 companies had been transformed, and 353 were in 
the process of transformation. 
c.  Evaluation and Prospects 
Hungary's  privatization  programme  is  very  ambitious:  from  a  state sector comprising  2,200 
companies valued at Ft 1,900bn, about 900 companies will be privatized, representing a value of 
Ft700bn, from which the government expects revenue of  about Ft380-390bn. In 1991, privatization 
proceeds did not exceed Ft40bn, and no increase is foreseen in 1992. All the components of the 
programme are behind schedule, and the Hungarian authorities are debating how to overcome 
the initial  difficulties  of the learning  process,  the political  confusion,  and  the unfavourable 
economic conditions. 
The design of the privatization programme neglected some basic legal incentives or prerequisites 
necessary for the emergence of a capital market. The absence of international company account-
ing standards, for instance, has weakened the relevance of the valuation of state assets before -72-
auctions. For pre-privatization, the fact that the premises of retail outlets could only be leased and 
not purchased discouraged many bidders. Such obstacles are progressively being removed through 
the development of a legislative framework. The Hungarian authorities are also correcting these 
disincentives  by  moving  away  from  a  centralized  privatization  process  towards  diversified 
privatization  channels,  enabling  the privatization  plans  to be tailored  to different  company 
situations and delegating privatization initiatives to the economic agents. The self-privatization 
package is part of the new strategy. 
The role of government institutions will  also be redefined. Owing to inexperience, or even to 
some political opposition, the government institutions have sometimes delayed the transfer of 
state assets. Complications over ownership arose between the local and central governments, as 
in  the case of the Danubius Hotels, one of the "flagship" companies of the privatization pro-
grammes. All the chain's 18 first-class hotels lie on land owned by different local authorities, which 
are entitled to shares in the new private sector entity, making 18 separate sets of negotiations 
necessary. 
Conflicts of interest have also emerged. The SPA seems to have been a source of delays, being 
more concerned to control than to privatize the public sector, as  reflected in its focus  on the 
transformation of companies. Spontaneous privatization or self-privatization have mainly been 
channels  for  transforming  state  enterprises  into  companies,  rather  than  for  privatization. 
Transformation  was  achieved  on  a  large  scale:  through  company,  investor  or state-initiated 
privatization: 218 companies with a book value of Ft345bn had been transformed by December 
1991, and 636 were in the process of transformation, totalling a book value of Ft305bn. However, 
this had only a weak impact on the development of a competitive sector. Case studies quoted by 
Kiss19 suggest, that there is no evidence of improved performance after transformation. Nor has 
transformation systematically  facilitated  the restructuring of companies,  which  remains  to be 
undertaken as a preliminary step to privatization. The government is envisaging limiting the power 
of the SPA by separating the function of managing the public sector from that of privatization. 
A bill will be submitted to the Parliament in spring 1992 which proposes to set up a new agency 
for managing state property. Another bill is in the pipeline for selecting the companies, which will 
remain  state-owned  over  the  next  few  years.  Given  the  social  cost  of  restructuring  and 
privatization, pressures have been mounting to expand this "list of exceptions", to a point which 
might imply a downward revision of the privatization targets. 
Privatization is expected to gain momentum, with the development of financial instruments and 
institutions. As in  other East European countries, privatization is  limited by the availability of 
savings.  So far the dominant source of financing has been the massive inflow of foreign capital: 
foreign participation in privatized companies amounted in 1991 to about 90% of the privatization 
proceeds and was equally distributed between purchases of state assets in privatized companies 
and increases in equity capital in transformed companies. By comparison domestic savings played 
a minor role:  the stock exchange is  still in its  infancy;  the financial institutions, predominantly 
state-owned,  are unable to develop an active role in  the absence of a clear treatment of bad 
debts;  in  addition,  the restrictive monetary policy entailed giving  priority to short-term credit, 
rather than developing the medium-term credit policy needed for such investment. In 1992, the 
financial sector will  be a priority of the privatization programme and its reform will  accelerate 
following  the  adoption  of the  banking  law.  The  government  also  intends  to  increase  the 
19  Yudit Kiss- 1991  -"Privatization in Hungary- wishful thinking or economic way out?", Conference on "Interna-
tional Privatization: strategies and practices", St Andrews, September 1991. -73-
availability of loans at subsidized interest rates and to relax the eligibility criteria for privatization 
loans, which have been underutilized so far. 
Faster restructuring can also be expected. The government strategy is  twofold: to take a more 
active hand in restructuring companies before selling them, in particular, using the proceeds of 
privatization to refloat companies in difficulty;  and to step up the liquidation of unprofitable 
companies,  on the basis  of the new liquidation legislation.  Privatization could  then focus  on 
attractive investment opportunities. However, if unemployment continues to accelerate in 1992 
as it did in 1991, such a policy might generate unsustainable tensions on the labour market. 1992 
will be a test year for the government's commitment to its privatization objectives. 
4.  Reform of the tax system 
a.  Fiscal revenue 
According to statistical data available in April 1991, Hungarian total tax revenue in  1989 was 
Ft817.8 bn (  47.9 per cent of GDP); estimated revenue for 1990 was Ft 970.1 bn and for 1991 Ft 
681 bn. The share in GDP is continuously declining, as taxes are not fully indexed on inflation. 
The 1989 breakdown was 7.2 per cent of GDP for enterprise income tax (which is a profit tax; 
see below), 1.6 per cent personal income tax (which represents 5.5 per cent of GDP, but for the 
remaining 3.9 per cent of GDP is transferred to the budgets of local authorities), 13.5 per cent 
VAT (see below) and excises, 2.6 per cent custom duties, 17.3 per cent social security contribu-
tions, 5.8 per cent other tax revenue. In the absence of a tax reform and with the gradual pace 
of structural reform, no major change has so far affected the composition of fiscal  revenues. 
Subsidies, which can be regarded as a negative tax, were cut from 17-18 per cent ofGDP to 9 per 
cent in 1990 and 7 per cent in 1991 (they will be cut further to 5 per cent in 1992 and 4 per cent 
in  1993;  some subsidies will  still  remain in  agriculture).  According to the latest revised  data 
available, 1989 tax revenue in the consolidated state budget was Ft 865.8 bn, rising to Ft 1,019.3 
bn in 1990 and Ft 1,094.2 bn in 1991. 
b.  Value added tax. 
In all  centrally planned economies, including Hungary since 1947,  a •turnover tax'  used to be 
levied (except on subsidized goods) at every stage of production at differential rates by product 
and by enterprise, simply to syphon off above-minimum profits into the state budget. In 1988 
Hungary introduced a value added tax,  but Hungarians still call it a •general turnover tax', i.e. 
a term which naturally suggests a cascade tax levied on the value of turnover at each stage of 
production, instead of a tax on value added. This tends to generate confusion. 
Already in 1968 Hungary reformed consumer and producer prices, ending up with a system of 
3,000 different turnover tax rates levied in a single stage on wholesale prices (i.e. avoiding the 
cascade effect); in 1986 the turnover tax rates were reduced to four, still in a single stage at the 
wholesale outlet; work on a value added tax began in 1985, and the new VAT was introduced in 
January 1988, when subsidies on consumption goods were reduced and subsidized goods temporar-
ily taxed at a zero rate. Now government services (public administration, education, health) and 
financial  services  are exempt, some basic  goods  and services  are zero-rated (foodstuffs,  most 
staples, water, district heating, public transport; energy and fuels, on which a large non-deductible 
excise tax is levied instead); other services are rated at 15 and other goods at 25 per cent. -74-
Hungarian officials claim that Hungarian VAT is fully harmonized with EEC regulations; the 1990 
law and 1991  amendments have followed EEC trends and intentions, except that the new rates 
are planned to be levied at 10 and 20 per cent (approaching the case of Austria, where VAT rates 
are 8 and 18 per cent). If, at the same time, all previously zero-rated goods are made subject to 
tax, the VAT burden will rise by between 1.7 and 2.5 per cent of GDP. 
c.  ~cise ttrtes 
Excise taxes are levied on a range of goods which is much wider than in the West. In 1986, when 
the former turnover tax was streamlined to four rates and a single stage, in order not to lose the 
fiscal revenue obtained from the more highly taxed goods the turnover tax on those goods was 
transformed into an excise tax. Today this is still substantial on products such as tobacco, alcohol, 
coffee, chocolate, chewing gum, peanuts, crystal, passenger vehicles, fuels, or gold Gewelry carries 
a 65 per cent excise tax plus VAT at 25 per cent). Over time, excise rates have been reduced and 
every year the excise tax on a few products is  abolished. The aim is eventually to charge excise 
tax only on tobacco, alcohol and fuels. 
d.  Ttrt on excess wage increases 
One of the early instruments of wage control under the New Economic Mechanism was a tax on 
increases in wages above statutory guidelines. In 1991 no tax was levied on wage bill increases up 
to 18 per cent, otherwise a 40 per cent tax rate was applied to wage bill increases between 18 and 
28 per cent; over 28 per cent the tax rate applied to the whole of the increase (in addition, there 
is a tax on personal incomes of up to a maximum rate of 50 per cent). 
Hungarian  tax  officials,  like  their  Polish  counterparts who  levy  a  similar  tax  (the so-called 
Popiwek), have not regarded taxation of excess wages  as  a true tax,  since 'in an ideal world it 
should yield no income' (as stated by a Hungarian official);  this point is controversial, but this 
tax has indeed served as a form of wage control which does not raise significant income and has 
been suspended from the beginning of 1992. 
e.  Income ttrtes 
Unti11988 personal income tax was paid only by private self-employed persons. In 1988, when the 
tax  rate on wage  increases above a statutory guideline was  reduced, personal income tax was 
introduced  also  for  employees  of state enterprises,  i.e.  extended from  200,000  to 5.5  million 
taxpayers. Today the tax starts at 20 per cent and rises to a top marginal rate of 50 per cent. 
The profit h..x  (at 35  per cent on the first 3 mn forints,  then 40 per cent in  1990) is  subject to 
sizeable rebates (50-100 per cent) for the private sector and for enterprises partially privatized 
or with  foreign  participation. This  entrepreneurial profits  tax  originally was  devised  for state 
enterprises and cooperatives but, after transitional tax arrangements for  1988,  in  1989 private 
entrepreneurs were given the option to choose between the profits tax and the personal income 
tax, which caused a substantial reduction in the tax burden of the private sector. 
If  there had been no further ownership changes nor progress towards a market economy Hungary 
might  have  muddled  through with  VAT,  personal and/or enterprise income tax;  with  private 
ownership  at  under 5  per cent of the total,  private  income  taxation  could  only  have  had  a -75-
marginal importance. In 1988 it was expected that the private sector would begin to grow only in 
1992, but events moved faster. Today the private sector represents something between 20 and 30 
per cent of GOP according to various estimates; it is probably closer to 30 than to 20 per cent, 
and it is  growing faster than the rest of the economy. Thus the tax system has to be changed 
accordingly, taking into account the importance of  all incomes and, especially in times of  inflation, 
capital gains. 
With the transition to a  market economy the administrative capacity for  tax  assessment  and 
collection has become inadequate: under the old system the direct monitoring of 10,000 large 
enterprises allowed  a  relatively simple tax  administration to catch at least 90  per cent of all 
incomes. With the growth of the private sector many additional activities and incomes become 
·taxable, but the operation of the existing system becomes increasingly uncertain and inefficient. 
According to official estimates, 50-60 bn forints  of income tax  revenue a year are not being 
collected from  prospective taxpayers.  The President of the Hungarian Association of Private 
Entrepreneurs, Mr Polotas, has argued that since 1988, when the possibility of choosing between 
the enterprise income tax  and  personal income tax was  introduced,  all  income tax  has  been 
collected;  however,  the structure,  logistics  and  audit  methods  of the tax  administration  are 
insufficient, and according to the Ministry of Finance tax evasion remains a large-scale phenom-
enon. The new Company Act lumped together new companies, cooperatives and state enterprises 
for  tax purposes, while  the administration is  not able  to deal with  the resulting  hundreds of 
thousands of taxpayers; hence the importance of technical assistance in tax administration under 
the PHARE programme. Improvements in tax administration may be more important than tax 
reform: even if the best tax system could be devised and introduced it would remain useless if it 
was not operated effectively. 
The Hungarian personal income tax system is characterized by differential rates according to kind 
of  income, nature of  ownership, enterprise form. Thus, for instance, farmers' income is tax exempt 
if obtained from  sales  of up  to  500,000  forints,  a  most  generous  allowance.  There is  a  tax 
exemption on up  to 30  per cent of taxable  income  for  financial  and  some  types  of direct 
investments. Interest and dividends are taxed at 20 per cent. In the case of dividends (after a 40% 
profit tax), that means a 52% cumulative tax burden, which unduly favours bank deposits versus 
equity investment. Most fringe benefits (cars, housing, holiday facilities provided by enterprises; 
capital  vouchers  issued  to  employees)  are  tax-exempt.  Cooperatives  are  all  treated  equally 
regardless of size. Capital gains are globalized with other income and taxed in accordance with 
the normal tax rate schedule. In the case of owner-occupied houses the tax can be postponed. 
State enterprises depreciate investment over 12-13 years, while private enterprises are allowed to 
depreciate it over two years. 
In view of these anomalies it can be argued that the Hungarian income tax system is neither fair 
nor efficient; government policy and recent IMF recommendations favour a simpler system of 
income tax (with fewer rates), at lower rates (no more than 40 per cent), more uniform across 
taxpayers  and  levied  on a  broader  range  of incomes,  with  preferential  treatment for  small 
enterprises. The enterprise income tax will probably be transformed into a corporation tax,  at 
lower rates and therefore with a lesser need for particularly generous treatment of private and 
foreign investment (accelerated depreciation, tax holidays and rebates). 
A balance has to be struck between the need to  provide effective incentives  for  private and 
especially for foreign investment on the one hand and, on the other, the need to implement a 
sound fiScal  policy and therefore to obtain an increase in tax revenue. According to Ministry of 
Finance officials, a sound budgetary policy is a more important precondition for the success of -76-
reform than the artificial boosting of private and foreign investment when this is crowded out by 
public sector borrowing requirements, discouraged by  high interest rates and handicapped by 
excessive taxation of dividends. 
S.  Trade reforms 
Hungary's  most  significant  trade reforms  began with  the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism (NEM) in 1968. Since then they have passed through three stages; initially, decen-
tralization, then demonopolization which began slowly in 1981 and accelerated in 1986, and finally, 
liberalization, which began in 1989. 
a.  Decentralization 
Up to 1968,  a small  number of specialized foreign trade companies acted as  a branch of the 
government, ensuring that its plans regarding exports and imports were carried out. Each company 
had its own list of products which it could import and export, and there was  no overlap among 
the lists. In other words, the foreign trade organizations had exclusive rights to trade in certain 
products. In addition, some large industrial enterprises were authorized to export their products 
and to import essential inputs. 
In 1968, as part of the NEM, 22 more industrial enterprises were authorized to conduct foreign 
trade,  exporting  their output and  importing  essential  inputs  (extended  to 5 more  industrial 
enterprises in the 1970s). More importantly, the specialized foreign trade companies were given 
greater independence. Instead of  just carrying out government policy, they became decentralized 
organizations, although acting within the parameters of government rules, subsidies, quotas and 
knowledge of the government's preferences. It is important to realize, however, that although this 
meant some decentralization of the state's monopoly over foreign trade, it entailed neither the 
end of that monopoly nor trade liberalization - the bulk of Hungarian producers had to go 
through the foreign  trade organizations if they wanted to export or import any goods, or else 
obtain licences from the government. 
Another attempt to relax the state's monopoly over foreign trade began in 1981. This combined, 
first,  a significant increase in the number of economic organizations granted licences to engage 
in  foreign  trade (to 270 enterprises by  the end of 1985,  of which  38 were organizations that 
specialized only in foreign  trade, while the others were industrial enterprises, state farms,  and 
cooperatives) with, second, the granting to eight existing foreign trade organizations (and several 
entirely new ones) the right to comprehensive foreign trade - meaning that they could trade goods 
which other organizations were also trading. This was  known as  parallel licensing.  For the first 
time, some competition between the trading organizations was  being allowed, although strictly 
supervised and regulated by the government. It had the effect of accelerating decentralization of 
Hungary's foreign trade activities. 
Nonetheless, the monopoly over foreign trade was not significantly weakened. Licensed organiz-
ations continued to exercise near-monopoly powers to export and import products, although, as 
the number of licensed trading organizations grew, each one had near-monopoly powers to trade 
in  fewer  products.  Moreover,  the decentralization process did  not always  proceed completely 
smoothly. -77-
b.  Demonopolization 
From 1986 onwards, however, more radical foreign trade reforms were implemented which did 
significantly reduce the degree of monopoly in foreign  trade.  Instead of organizations being 
licensed to hold virtually exclusive rights over the imports or exports of particular products, the 
Hungarian government started granting parallel trade licences to all of the trading companies. In 
other words, individual organizations' almost exclusive rights to trade in certain products began 
to be dismantled. The forty enterprises specialized in foreign trade could engage in convertible-
currency imports or exports of any goods other than those on lists produced by the government 
(the so-called lists of  exceptions - goods which needed authorization in the form of a licence from 
the government before they could be traded) and were thus pitted against each other. Further-
more, licences for foreign trade in convertible currency were handed out automatically to any 
organization that wanted them, provided that the goods traded were not on the list of exceptions 
and  that the organization had  produced  them itself,  or needed the imports  for  production 
purposes. As the effect of these reforms seemed rather favourable, the government authorized 
71  more companies to engage in general foreign trading in 1987. 
Then in 1988 came a decree which further significantly demonopolized convertible currency trade 
by allowing any Hungarian business organization at all to carry out foreign trade in convertible 
currency without having first to obtain a licence (unless the goods traded were on the lists of 
exceptions, in which case licences still had to be obtained from the authorities). Nevertheless, 
although trading licences were no longer needed, business organizations were instead required to 
register with  the Ministry of Trade before they could engage in foreign  trade.  Provided the 
organization met a number of conditions, however, registration could not be denied. 
The decree also allowed individuals to sell items to the convertible-currency area (except items 
on the list of export exceptions). Then, from 1 April 1989, individuals were also given the right 
to carry out convertible-currency imports provided that they were used in the domestic production 
of goods or services. As a consequence of these developments, there were 3,000 firms and 1,000 
private individuals registered with the Ministry of Trade by the end of 1989,  and 10,000 firms 
registered by the end of 1990. 
c.  Liberalization 
The most significant of all Hungary's trade reforms, however, was introduced on 1 January 1989, 
when a three-year programme of import liberalization was begun. This meant that the lists of 
exceptions began to be pruned in stages. According to official Hungarian sources (which provided 
all the statistics presented in this paragraph), 54% of the total value of Hungarian convertible 
currency exports and 40% of Hungary's total value of convertible currency imports were covered 
by the lists in 1988. In 1989, systematic trade liberalization reduced the figures to 36% for exports 
and 20% for imports. Following further legislation introduced on 1 January 1991, it was envisaged 
that only 8% of imports and 30% of exports would still be on the lists of exceptions. In any case, 
for products still on the lists of exceptions, authorization is being granted to approximately 90 % 
of licence requests.  Nonetheless, trading in agricultural and food products, a sector for which 
licences are still required, remains dominated by the large, traditional foreign trade organizations. 
As a result of import liberalization, more and more of Hungarian industrial production has been 
exposed to foreign competition - whereas 15% of industrial production was affected by foreign 
competition in 1988, the figure had risen to 32% in 1990, and to about 90-92% in 1991. -78-
The list of import exceptions covers coal,  raw materials,  telecommunications equipment, food 
products, motor cars, some consumer products, textiles and medicines. Import licences can relate 
to a single import transaction or specify a ceiling up to which imports of a commodity or group 
of commodities can be permitted. For those consumer goods which are subject to a global quota 
(and therefore require licensing), the quota is specified in US dollars and was increased by 67 % 
in 1989 compared with 1988, and by another 35% in 1990. 
In some cases export licences have been retained because of international obligations, such as 
textile agreements or COCOM. Furthermore, the Hungarian government reserves the right to 
introduce restrictions on the trade of any goods if it is deemed that Hungary's security would be 
preserved by such action, or if Hungary commits itself to international trade agreements in the 
future, or if such actions would help conserve supplies of staple goods, or if a trading partner 
engages in unfair practices. 
Other important reform measures have also had an impact on foreign trade. For example, the 
unweighted average tariff level on an MFN basis declined from 34% in 1968 to 16% in 1989 and 
to 13% in 1991. Furthermore, under new laws introduced on 1 January 1991 Hungary adopted 
the harmonized customs classification system. Reductions in tariff levels, however, only became 
significant with the recent period of trade liberalization, as, before the present government came 
to power, non-tariff barriers in the form of institutional controls and the prevailing influence of 
the Hungarian Socialist  Workers' Party were  much  more important and effective  than tariff 
barriers. Trade liberalization and declining non-tariff barriers have together had an impact on 
import volumes. For the future, Hungary has offered to reduce its average tariff level to 8% over 
a five-year period, as  part of its commitments within the Uruguay Round. 
Hungary has by now nearly completed its internal trade reform, additional improvements being 
expected  from  forthcoming  changes  in  the economic  environment  (such  as  the  removal  of 
exchange controls or the decentralization of foreign exchange transactions). The integration of 
Hungary in the world economy will also accelerate beyond 1991 following the disappearance of 
the CMEA trade regime and the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements, mainly the European 
Agreement with the EC.  Both changes will further expose the Hungarian economy to interna-
tional competition. If, however, these trade measures have only a weak impact on exports in the 
short run, while  Hungary continues to face  the high  transition costs of structural reform, the 
liberalization of trade might undergo some revision. -79-
ANNEX: ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
(1)  The role of statistics in the transition: a difficult situation 
The long sequence of reforms carried out in Hungary over more than twenty years has not been 
without consequences for the Hungarian statistical apparatus. These reforms, in particular those 
of 1968, have increased the autonomy of firms  and accordingly reduced the confusion between 
the function of statistical measurement and that of an instrument of planning - a stronger and 
more durable feature of  the statistical information systems of  the other East European economies. 
The statistical apparatus has seen partial emancipation from the plan-fulfilment preoccupations 
of those involved  in  the planning  process  - state bodies  and  firms  alike.  Given  their more 
autonomous status, Hungarian statisticians have been able to move closer to certain international 
statistical  standards,  as  in  the case  of national  accounts.  Since  1970,  the  main  Hungarian 
macroeconomic  aggregates  have  been available  in  a  form  compatible with  SNA (System  of 
National Accounts) standards, while continuing to be available in the traditional MPS (Material 
Product System) form. 
Despite this gradual adjustment of the Hungarian system of statistics to an economy which very 
partially incorporates market mechanisms,  serious difficulties  are being experienced today in 
reforming the system. These difficulties are both institutional and conceptual, both aspects being 
inextricably linked. The former communication channels between firms and the various administra-
tive departments involved in compiling statistics and among those departments themselves have 
been profoundly disrupted. How are the statistical institutions going to deal with the large firms 
and banks which will survive in the Hungarian economy (often under foreign influence) and with 
the rapidly increasing number of small and medium-sized firms? How will it be possible to create 
a common accounting and statistical language in an economy which combines a concentrated, 
multinational sector with a local sector of small firms? This difficult reshaping of the way in which 
the statistical apparatus fits  into the institutional landscape raises problems of a more technical 
nature: a redefinition of the methods used to gather data on firms is  necessary, given the rapid 
increase in the number of businesses, and the statistical nomenclatures will have gradually to be 
converted to international standards. 
National and foreign users of Hungarian statistics must expect a fairly long period of statistical 
uncertainty, during which it will be difficult to provide a direct and clear-cut answer to delicate 
questions of major interest to economists.  For example,  do the available statistical measures 
underestimate performance in the transitional period owing to deficiencies in recording private 
activities? Will there be breaks in foreign trade statistics because of institutional and economic 
changes affecting trade formation and management? It is hardly possible today to give an accurate 
answer to these questions. It is only as the system of statistics is reformed and any methodological 
problems are clarified and solved that more satisfactory answers will emerge. These uncertainties 
clearly reduce  the capacity of the system  of statistics  to make  an effective  contribution  to 
managing the transition. But economists should take this fact for what it is:  a  high degree of 
imperfection in the information available to public and private decision-makers will inevitably be 
part and parcel of the transition. Statistical cooperation schemes undertaken with Hungary under 
the PHARE programme aim to overcome this situation as quickly as possible. By its very nature, 
this task is  not easy: on the one hand, statistical indicators are supposed to help measure the 
intensity and speed of structural and behaviourial change in the Hungarian economy, while, on 
the other, the scale and structural nature of this change complicate the task of statisticians and 
require tailor-made methods to be developed. -80-
(2)  Rebuilding the Hungarian system of statistics 
The Hungarian system of statistics should soon benefit from the introduction of a new legislative 
framework governing its activities. The current Statistics Act dates from 1973 and is in need of 
a fundamental updating if the public's perception of statistical activity is to be corrected. A new 
Act is scheduled for 1991. It should guarantee the independence of official statistical bodies and 
redefine the coordinating functions exercised by the Central Statistical Office and the conditions 
under which it may have access to administrative sources. Awareness that attention must be paid 
to the needs of a more diversified population of users has increased among those responsible for 
compiling statistics in Hungary. Thus, both the new parliamentary committees and the business 
community will become active and demanding users of statistical data. 
Statistical nomenclatures and classifications are an essential focus  of the reform of statistical 
activity.  The existing  nomenclatures  in  East European countries  are  heavily  marked by  the 
administrative logic which constrained that activity. A firm's dependence on a given ministry was 
indeed a much stronger classification criterion than its actual involvement in one type of activity 
or another. 
Hungarian statistics officials have embarked on defining a concrete strategy for transition in the 
area of nomenclatures.  20 They are aware of the demands which accompany such an approach: 
•  It requires clear identification of the conceptual changes to be made and of the logical order 
in which they must be carried out, avoiding any confusion between the various statistical 
concepts at stake. A rigorous and operational definition of basic economic units must be 
established before the classifications can be applied which group these units together accord-
ing  to certain criteria.  These basic  units  must  be identified  and recorded in  exhaustive 
registers or lists so that they can be classified. 
•  Explicit coordination must be established between the various administrations involved in the 
introduction and  use of a given  nomenclature. For example,  the quality of coordination 
between the Central Statistical Office and the Customs Administration, which since the 
beginning of 1991  has been responsible instead of the Ministry of International Economic 
Relations for the statistical monitoring of foreign trade, is  particularly crucial in a context 
of general  change  in  overseeing  trade.  The  keeping  of lists  of firms  should  also  be 
coordinated between the various departments responsible for them. 
•  Pragmatic solutions need to be adopted to ensure the continuity of information during the 
period of transition (such as  the publication of data in two nomenclatures). 
Hungarian statisticians are today leaning towards the following decisions: 
(a) 
20 
Introduction in 1992 of a new national nomenclature of activities (the •Hungarian Uniform 
Classification of Activities') harmonized with (but not completely aligned on) the revised 
version of the Community's NACE nomenclature (NACE-REV1). The breakdown of the 
Hungarian nomenclature will remain less detailed than that of NACE and, in this sense, will 
be closer to the UN's ISIC-REV3 nomenclature. 
A seminar on statistical nomenclatures was organized jointly by Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office on 15-19 April  1991  in  Budapest.  This paper takes account of the proceedings. -81-
(b)  Linking of  the national nomenclatures of  products (industrial products, agricultural products, 
buildings and public works, services) with the new national nomenclature of activities. In the 
case of  the nomenclature of  industrial products, an attempt will be made in the medium term 
at harmonization  with  the  Community  PRODCOM project,  which  aims  to develop  a 
homogeneous system of monitoring industrial production throughout the single European 
market that is compatible with the harmonized foreign trade nomenclatures. The interest 
shown in PRODCOM by Hungarian statisticians, as by Austrian statisticians, bears witness 
to the attention paid by neighbouring and geographically close countries such as Austria and 
Hungary to emerging Community standards. 
(c)  Introduction of a new nomenclature of products in foreign trade based on the UN's Har-
monized System (HS). Compatibility with the Community's Combined Nomenclature (CN) 
will be sought, but the peculiarities of  the Combined Nomenclature resulting from the nature 
of the links among the Community's member states require a degree of  caution. Instead, the 
immediate  priority is  a  'magyarization'  of the HS,  to be achieved  through cooperation 
between the Central Statistical Office and the Customs Administration. The current situation 
of the old and new nomenclatures existing alongside each other can only be transitional. 
Operational implementation of the nomenclatures presupposes in particular the existence and 
regular  updating  of a  list  of economic  units  and  firms.  The existing  register  of economic 
organizations, which dates from  1978,  has now been overtaken by  the rapid expansion in the 
number of private units. Preparation of a new list is planned by the Statistical Office. It will be 
fed and updated through access to the data of the tax administration, with which all economic 
units subject to tax on their profits or to VAT must be registered. At the same time, the Ministry 
of Justice. is  implementing  a  project  entitled  'National  Firm  Registration  and  Information 
System', for which finance is available from  the PHARE programme. It would be desirable for 
statisticians to be given access to this register and for its preparation to be coordinated with their 
own efforts. 
The introduction of suitable nomenclatures and registers is the first stage of a complete redesign 
of business  statistics  intended  to  lay  the foundations  for  the launch  of surveys.  Hungarian 
statisticians are currently very busy with this first phase. Its completion should create a firmer basis 
for all business statistics. While the black economy will by its nature remain difficult to capture 
in any register, the gathering of information on new private firms,  particularly small ones (less 
than 50 employees), will be improved: uncertainty about the extent to which these firms are taken 
into account in cyclical  and structural surveys  is  considerable at present, although Hungarian 
statisticians  play  down  the risk  of underestimating  economic  performance  because  of such 
shortcomings. 
(3)  Macroeconomic data: market observation 
(a)  Incomes, employment, unemployment 
Rebuilding the system of statistics also extends to statistics relating to households. Phenomena of 
hitherto  unknown  acuteness  are  now  affecting  households,  such  as  unemployment.  This  is 
currently tracked using the administrative registration of unemployed people carried out by local 
employment offices.  The need has been recognized for  a  more systematic monitoring of the 
integration of households in the labour market, in accordance with international standards. The 
Statistical Office is,  to this end, testing a tentative quarterly 'labour force survey'. The results 
of this experiment carried out in 1991 should enable the survey to be launched in January 1992. -82-
Hungarian statisticians are also  considering the use of tax-related administrative sources as  a 
means of compiling statistics on household incomes, either in addition to or instead of existing 
surveys in this area.  21 
(b)  Price indices 
As in other areas, Hungary is starting from a situation that is rather different from that in the 
other East European countries: a consumer price index covering products sold on free markets 
was introduced in Hungary twenty years ago. The current consumer price index is based on data 
covering each month 120,000 price observations in 130 towns and villages obtained by 160 survey 
officers. However, this survey must now undergo radical reform given the general expansion of 
market mechanisms.  The statistical quality of the index,  which  is  crucial in a period of high 
inflation,  is  affected by  structural and circumstantial problems: the failure to take account of 
quality effects; shortcomings in the information available on the structure of  household consump-
tion that would enable the index weighting to be updated; and difficulties in observing prices on 
the  unofficial  markets  of the  secondary  economy  and  purchases  against  foreign  exchange. 
Cooperation has been established between Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
with a view to improving measurement of the consumer price trend. It is intended to deal with 
all the technical questions raised by that objective. It will allow the exact purpose of the consumer 
price index to be defined with more accuracy and clarity: in particular, in an economy in transition 
in which the inflationary trend is not reflected solely in visible price movements, what component 
of this trend is captured by the index ? 
Similar questions apply to the production and construction price indices, for which reforms are 
also planned. More generally, the entire range of business statistics (monthly or quarterly output, 
employment and wage indices) should be adapted to a situation in which public (in particular 
government) and private decision-makers have a growing need for information on trends in the 
economy. 
(c)  Foreign trade 
A number of changes converge in this field: new responsibility of the Customs Administration for 
the gathering of basic statistical data; adoption of the Harmonized System as  the international 
reference standard; use from 1 January 1992 of a customs document similar to that used within 
the European Community; and the changeover to generalized payment in convertible currencies. 
Will this combination of changes lead to statistical breaks in observed series? These might result 
in particular from the Customs Administration's lack of experience, with imports perhaps treated 
more exha\.iStively than exports. However, the adjustments and corrections made by statisticians 
should, according to officials of the Statistical Office, ensure continuity of the series. The problem 
remains that the redefinition of payment rules within the CMEA is making the task of dividing 
the value of trade between volume and price a particularly delicate one. 
The Statistical  Office  has  no  intention of recalculating  foreign  trade statistics  by  using  new 
exchange  rates  in  order to  re-evaluate  trade  flows,  particularly within  the CMEA Such  an 
21  See  the paper presented by Laszlo Vita at the conference on 'Economic Statistics for Economies in Transition' 
organized  in  Washington on  14-16  February  1991  by  Eurostat and the Bureau of Labour Statistics:  'On the 
future of household income surveys in Hungary'. -83-
operation, which is considered useful for analytical purposes, does not seem justified to officials 
of the Statistical Office from a purely statistical point of view. 
(d)  National accounts 
The SNA is nothing new to Hungarian national account experts. But introduction of the SNA into 
Hungarian statistical practice, while maintaining the MPS, has remained patchy and superficial. 
Indeed, the aggregates measured according to SNA methods were derived from MPS aggregates. 
The current aim is to introduce the SNA in full  and independently. This means adapting data 
collection and coding methods to SNA concepts and a more widespread use of the latter by 
economic analysts. Hungarian national account experts are aiming from the outset to harmonize 
their accounting system with the next version of the SNA While the adoption of international 
standards does not appear to present any major problems in itself, the same is not true for the 
adaptation of the data supply channels of the national accounts system, particularly as far as data 
from firms  is  concerned. Innovations are needed in this area, especially concerning access by 
national  accounts  experts  to  administrative  sources  and  the  standardization  of accounting 
information from firms. -84-
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